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The Entrepreneurship Effect: 
An Accidental Externality in the Federal Income 
Tax 
LEANDRA LEDERMAN*
Case law and commentators often speak as if all income-producing activities 
are taxed similarly. However, that simply is not true for individuals. Although 
the expenses and losses of business activities generally are deductible from 
income of any source and net losses can be carried to other tax years, 
individuals’ investment expenses and losses generally are deductible only from 
investment income. Although many of the provisions restricting investment-
related deductions were enacted at different times, and each one has its own 
rationale, the combined effect of these provisions on individual investors is a 
systematic preference for business losses over investment losses. 
Economists have shown that a tax system that allows full deduction of the losses 
from an activity effectively shifts part of the risk of that activity to the 
government. This, in turn, allows the investor to increase investment in that 
activity without increasing his risk. In other words, the deductibility of a net loss 
from an activity provides a subsidy for that activity. Federal income tax law 
therefore implicitly subsidizes entrepreneurship by individuals. 
The implicit subsidy for entrepreneurship is strongest for high-income 
individuals, for a number of reasons, including the progressivity of the federal 
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income tax. That is, given progressive marginal income tax rates, taxpayers with 
significant income from other sources benefit most from the deduction of losses. 
In addition, as the Article shows, despite progressive taxation, high-income 
individuals are not disproportionately taxed if the business is successful. In fact, 
high-income individuals obtain the largest benefit from techniques, such as 
incorporating the business, that lower the effective tax rate applied to a 
successful business. These insights highlight the importance of considering tax 
changes in a larger context. For example, as discussed in the Article, lowering 
individual income tax rates may actually decrease entrepreneurship by 
individuals. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine an individual with capital to invest. What prompts that person to 
start a business, rather than investing in the stock of a publicly traded company, 
for example? Start-up businesses generally present a substantially greater risk of 
loss than investments in established ventures do. Of course, entrepreneurial 
ventures may offer higher upside potential, but is that enough to prompt risk-
averse individuals to bear the greater downside risk?  
Although there are a variety of non-tax reasons that prompt people to start 
businesses, the federal tax consequences of the decision should not be ignored. It 
is a truism that income from capital—such as investment income—is generally 
taxed more favorably than income from labor—such as wages and salaries—
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primarily because of the possibility of indefinite deferral of tax on that income.1 
For these reasons, among others, several scholars have suggested that, in practice, 
capital may bear little tax.2 By contrast, income from labor generally is taxed as it 
is earned, with relatively few opportunities for deferral.3  
In general, a lower-taxed investment should be more attractive, assuming the 
returns are equal. However, the taxation of income is only part of the picture. The 
tax treatment of expenses and losses must also be considered. Deductible 
expenses and losses lower tax liability by lowering “taxable income,” the base to 
which the federal income tax is applied.4 Intuitively, if more expenses and losses 
 
1 First, gains must be “realized” before they are taxed. The realization requirement 
provides that income taxation accompanies a “realization,” not “paper” gains and losses. In 
general, a realization event is the conversion of property into other property that is materially 
different in kind or extent. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (as amended in 1996) (“Except as 
otherwise provided in subtitle A of the Code, the gain or loss realized from the conversion of 
property into cash, or from the exchange of property for other property differing materially 
either in kind or in extent, is treated as income or as loss sustained.”). Federal income tax law 
requires realization to tax property (“paper” gains and losses are not taxed). See Eisner v. 
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 211–12 (1920). Second, “imputed income,” in this context, the 
benefit resulting from the ownership of property, is not taxed. Third, under current law, an 
heir’s basis in property is the fair market value of the property on the date of decedent’s death, 
generally resulting in a step-up in basis in property retained until death. See I.R.C. § 1014 
(2004). These factors combine to defer taxation on the earnings from capital, sometimes 
forever. In addition, under current law, most dividends are taxed at a lower rate than other 
income. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(1) (2004) (taxing adjusted net capital gain at rates of five percent and 
fifteen percent), I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) (defining “net capital gain” to include “qualified dividend 
income”). 
2 See, e.g., Nöel B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of Tax 
Base, 52 TAX L. REV. 17, 41 (1996); David F. Bradford, Fixing Realization Accounting: 
Symmetry, Consistency and Correctness in the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 50 TAX L. 
REV. 731, 739 (1995); Daniel Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the Taxation of Capital Income, 
50 TAX L. REV. 643, 645 (1995); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between 
an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax A Debate About Risk? Does it Matter?, 47 TAX L. REV. 
377, 378 (1992); Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation and 
Risk-Taking, 58 Q.J. ECON. 388 (1944). See also infra note 372.  
3 Retirement plans provide a mechanism for a service-provider to reduce current taxation. 
The economic effect of retirement plans is to exempt the return on capital. That is, “[u]nder the 
Cary Brown thesis, the ability to make an investment with untaxed soft money is usually as 
valuable as exempting subsequent investment income from tax. ‘Expensing’—deducting an 
investment immediately—and exempting the subsequent profit from tax are usually equivalent 
tax benefits.” Calvin H. Johnson, Soft Money Investing Under the Income Tax, 1989 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1019, 1022 (1989). Because retirement plan contributions are linked to the provision of 
services, see, e.g., I.R.C. § 401(k) (2004), the net effect is to shelter from taxation the income 
on capital earned from the income from labor. See infra note 103. 
4 See I.R.C. § 1 (2004) (defining tax base as taxable income), I.R.C. § 63 (2004) (defining 
taxable income as gross income minus deductions). 
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of an activity are deductible, a higher nominal tax rate may not be unfavorable 
because the base to which that higher rate is applied is low.5 Thus, in considering 
tax incentives with respect to various activities, the income side and deduction 
side must both be considered. 
In fact, the ability to deduct losses is particularly important because the 
ability to deduct losses with respect to a particular activity essentially shifts part 
 
As an example, imagine two single United States taxpayers, Ivan Investor and Brenda 
Businessowner. Assume that each has $80,000 of income from a mix of sources such that their 
next dollars are taxed at a 33% rate. Ivan sells some stock that he has held for more than a year, 
receiving $20,000 in before-tax profits. Brenda receives a $20,000 bonus from a client. Because 
of the 15% rate applicable to “adjusted net capital gain,” see I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C) (2004), Ivan 
will pay less federal income tax than Brenda although each has the same amount of income. 
The following chart shows the federal tax liability of each with respect to the $20,000: 
 Ivan Investor Brenda Businessowner
Tax Liability $3,000 $6,600
What if Ivan and Brenda each spent $15,000 on training course expenses undertaken in 
connection with their livelihoods, without reimbursement? In that case, Ivan would owe more 
tax than Brenda! That is because the $15,000 in expenses would not be deductible for Ivan. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(f) (as amended in 1975) (“Among expenditures not allowable as 
deductions under section 212 are the following: . . . expenses of taking special courses or 
training . . . .”). By contrast, for Brenda, the expenses are likely deductible above the line. See 
I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(1), 162 (2004); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1967). The comparison of the federal 
income tax treatment of Ivan and Brenda with respect to the two events would be the following:  






Non-deductible <$4,950> tax saved
Net Tax 
Consequences
$3,000 tax liability $1,650 tax liability
 
5 As an extreme example, imagine a nominal tax rate of 90% applied to certain activities 
or investments. If the base to which it is applied is minuscule or zero—because of offsetting 
deductions, for example—then the tax will be less burdensome than a tax of 10% applied to a 
base of $1,000. 
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of the risk of that activity to the government.6 Although this economic insight is 
sometimes applied to the context of portfolio investments,7 this Article will show 
the Internal Revenue Code (Code) provides numerous limitations on the 
deductibility of individuals’ investment-related expenses and losses.8 In fact, 
many Code provisions “basket” individuals’ investment-related expenses and 
losses with investment income, precluding the deduction of a net investment loss 
even if the taxpayer has substantial other income.9 By contrast, business expenses 
and losses typically are fully deductible from income from any source.10 Thus, 
individuals can deduct net business losses from any other income they or their 
spouses may have.11  
Accordingly, as this Article will show, the federal income tax law 
systematically reduces the risk to an individual taxpayer of business activity but 
not of investment activity.12 Thus, although the federal income tax generally does 
 
6 See Domar & Musgrave, supra note 2, see also Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the 
Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961, 992 n.84 (1992) (“A tax on gains and a deduction of 
losses . . . will shift a portion of the upside and downside risk of investment onto the 
government, thereby reducing the variance of this risk.” ). 
7 See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 2, at 30–35 (discussing burden on capital income 
under a “normative” income tax); Bankman & Griffith, supra note 2, at 393–95 (discussing 
context of an income tax with full loss offsets); Domar & Musgrave, supra note 2. 
“Under the Haig-Simons formulation of the normative [income tax] base, income is a 
taxpayer’s consumption plus change in wealth for a particular period.” Nöel B. Cunningham & 
Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319, 322 (1993) 
(citing Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921), reprinted in AM. ECON. ASS’N, 
READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl Shoup eds., 
1959); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938)).  
The federal income tax is not a normative income tax. Cf. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 
22 (“No one believes that a normative income tax based upon the Haig-Simons definition could 
ever be fully implemented; its importance is as an ideal.”). For one thing, “[t]he Haig-Simons 
definition calls for taxing all accretions of wealth in a uniform manner,” see Eric M. Zolt, The 
Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39, 41 (1996), which the federal income 
tax does not do. 
8 See infra text accompanying notes 39–156. 
9 See infra text accompanying notes 103, 114. 
10 See infra text accompanying notes 33–37. 
11 See infra text accompanying notes 185–90. 
12 Starting a business is riskier than making a passive investment, in part because the 
former requires coupling labor with capital, thereby eliminating a form of diversification. As 
Professor Terry Chorvat explains, “ceteris paribus, a diversified portfolio of investments has 
less risk than an undiversified portfolio of stocks. . . . This arises because there are two types of 
risk in any investment: idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk. A diversified portfolio will reduce 
the idiosyncratic risk.” Terrence R. Chorvat, Ambiguity and Income Taxation, 23 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 617, 630–31 (2002) (footnotes omitted). Entrepreneurs tend to hold less diversified 
portfolios than non-entrepreneurs. See WILLIAM M. GENTRY & R. GLENN HUBBARD, 
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not subsidize losses from investments, it does enable an individual with an active 
business to shift to the federal government part of the risk of loss from that 
business. In effect, the government subsidizes business activity by bearing a 
portion of the risk. It is as if the individual faced with the investment decision 
posited at the beginning of the Article would have a silent partner to bear a 
portion of any losses a business might experience.13
Of course, the government, also will reap some of the rewards if the business 
is successful, through taxation of the profits.14 And optimistic investors will 
overestimate the chances that the enterprise will be successful. If, after taxes, a 
successful passive investment is more profitable than a successful business 
venture, taxation might discourage entrepreneurship despite the subsidy of 
business losses. However, an entrepreneurial venture not only has the higher pre-
tax upside posited at the beginning of the Article, but, like passive investment, it 
faces significant opportunities for taxation at rates lower than those applied to 
labor.15 In effect, the bundling of capital with labor into an active business can 
lower the rate of taxation on that labor.16
 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND HOUSEHOLD SAVING, 4 ADVANCES IN ECON. ANALYSIS AND POL’Y 1, 
Art. 8 (2004), available at http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/vol4/iss1/art8/ (finding 
that true of their sample). In addition, many new businesses fail. See PESKA ILMANAKUNNAS & 
VESA KANNIAINEN, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, ECONOMIC RISKS, AND RISK INSURANCE IN THE 
WELFARE STATE: RESULTS WITH OECD DATA 1978–93, 4 & n.2 (CESifo Working Paper No. 
356, 2000) (citing EUROSTAT, ENTERPRISES IN EUROPE (Fourth Report 1996)). 
13 See Michael Livingston, Risky Business: Economics, Culture and the Taxation of High-
Risk Activities, 48 TAX L. REV. 163, 168 (1993) (making this point with respect to investments 
generally but not focusing on the limitations that apply to individuals’ investment but not 
business losses).  
14 Cf. id. Taxation of profit coupled with deductibility of losses reduces the variance of an 
investment. See Fried, supra note 6, at 992 n.84. 
15 For example, an individual entrepreneur whose business is successful can incorporate 
the business and thereby benefit from income-splitting. One study found that cutting each 
individual income tax rate by five percentage points board would decrease entrepreneurship by 
thirty percent overall and would decrease it most at the top. JULIE BERRY CULLEN & ROGER H. 
GORDON, TAXES AND ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FOR THE U.S. 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9015, 2002), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9015. In contrast, another study found that changes in tax rates 
had only small effects on entrepreneurial activity. See Donald Bruce & Mohammed Mohsin, 
Tax Policy and Entrepreneurship: New Time Series Evidence, Working Paper (2003), at 
http://web.utk.edu/~dbruce/bruce.mohsin.803.pdf.  
Another study, in focusing on the influence of federal income taxes on capital outlays by 
sole proprietors, found that “a five-percentage-point rise in marginal tax rates would reduce the 
proportion of entrepreneurs who make new capital investment by 10.4 percent.” Robert Carroll 
et al., Entrepreneurs, Income Taxes, and Investment, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 427 (Joel Slemrod ed., 2000). However, that study 
considered only sole proprietors (selecting only those individual taxpayers who, among other 
things, filed a Schedule C in both 1985 and 1988). Id. at 429. Thus, it ignores the possibility of 
incorporation of a successful business. See id. at 430 (“Analysis of the behavior of 
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Accordingly, this Article argues that the structure of the federal tax system, 
particularly the federal income tax system, provides a subsidy for 
entrepreneurship17 by individuals.18 The subsidy exists to the extent that the 
 
entrepreneurs who are organized in other forms of business [besides sole proprietorships] is 
beyond the scope of this chapter.”). Commentary on the Article points out that “shifts in 
organizational form for tax purposes (for example, between unincorporated and incorporated 
businesses) may spuriously change the entrepreneurship status of households.” R. Glenn 
Hubbard, Commentary on Robert Carroll et al., Entrepreneurs, Income Taxes, and Investment, 
in DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH, supra, at 457. 
Strategic incorporation of a successful business is discussed in Part IV.C of this Article. See 
infra text accompanying notes 325–80. 
16 For example, employment tax is imposed on employment income (up to a cap) without 
any reduction for expenses or other deductions. See infra note 347. Self-employment tax, the 
corresponding tax for the self-employed, is imposed on net earnings from self-employment, 
which allows for deductions attributable to the trade or business. See I.R.C. §§ 1401, 1402 
(2004). This also means that the self-employment tax is subject to more manipulation. See 
Patricia E. Dilley, Breaking the Glass Slipper—Reflections on the Self-Employment Tax, 54 
TAX LAW. 65, 96 (2000).  
In fact, because of the absence of information reporting and withholding taxes, self-
employment generally provides greater opportunities for tax evasion than employment does. 
See Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1503–05 (2003); Cullen & Gordon, supra note 15, at 1 (“small business 
owners can much more easily underreport their taxable income than can wage and salary 
earners”). Tax evasion is not a focus of this Article. 
17 The term “entrepreneurship” is used in this Article in the sense of creation of a new 
business venture. See Steven H. Hobbs, Toward a Theory of Law and Entrepreneurship, 26 
CAP. U. L. REV. 241, 241 (1997) (“[T]he heart of entrepreneurship lies in the creation of small 
ventures by one person or a small group of individuals.”).  
This Article does not discuss tax incentives for businesses using venture capital, focusing 
instead on self-funded new business. Cf. AMAR BHIDÉ, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF NEW 
BUSINESSES (1999), quoted in GENTRY & HUBBARD, supra note 12, at 12 n.18 (“More than 80 
percent of the Inc. founders [studied by Amar Bhidé] bootstrapped their ventures with modest 
funds derived from personal savings, credit cards, second mortgages, and so on; the median 
start-up capital was about $10,000. Only 5 percent raised their initial equity from professional 
venture capitalists.”). For an analysis of the tax issues in venture capital-funded start-up 
business, see Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital 
Startups, 57 TAX L. REV. 137 (2003).  
18 This Article assumes that the individual conducts any business as a sole proprietor 
unless he incorporates it. Incorporation of a business is discussed in Part IV.C. See infra text 
accompanying notes 325–80. 
The subsidy is not surprising, given our culture: 
Americans love small business. Despite the notoriously high rate of early failure, every 
year hundreds of thousands of undaunted Americans launch small businesses. The 
folklore of the independent entrepreneur being the backbone of American self-reliance 
and work ethic is a more persuasive argument for favorable tax incentives than any 
reality-based economic consideration. 
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taxpayer has both capital19 and income from sources other than the business 
against which the losses can be offset. For a variety of reasons, including the fact 
that high-income individuals experience taxation at the highest marginal tax rates, 
they are the ones who have the greatest incentive to invest capital in business20 
rather than in passive investments.21  
This insight has implications for the evaluation of tax legislation from a 
policy perspective. For example, the recently enacted Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 200322 lowered individual income tax rates and 
lowered the rate of tax on most dividends to a maximum rate of fifteen percent.23 
Although, at first blush, lower tax rates might seem to spur entrepreneurial 
activity, in fact, the effect may be the opposite. Lower tax rates reduce the value 
of deductions, the importance of which is discussed below.24 In addition, the cap 
on the tax rate on dividends makes investment in stock, including stock in 
 
Ronald F. Wilson, Federal Tax Policy: The Political Influence of American Small Business, 37 
S. TEX. L. REV. 15, 64 (1996). Professor Marjorie Kornhauser remarks: 
Americans imbue earned income with an aura of morality and virtuousness that unearned 
income, particularly inherited income, does not have. Consequently, we Americans 
admire the person who acquires her wealth by means of her own talent and industry, while 
at the same time, we distrust (though perhaps also envy) the idle rich who live off of their 
clipped coupons. 
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality Of Money: American Attitudes Toward Wealth and the 
Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 119–20 (1994). 
19 This Article uses the term “capital” in contradistinction to labor. That is, human capital 
is encompassed in the term “labor,” as it is used in this Article, not “capital.” 
One study found that starting a business is positively correlated with receiving an 
inheritance. See Douglas Holtz-Eakin et al., Entrepreneurial Decisions and Liquidity 
Constraints, 25 RAND J. ECON. 334, 342 (1994). 
20 It might seem that because high-income individuals experience taxation at the highest 
marginal tax rates, if a business were successful, they would bear the greatest tax burden. 
However, that does not take into account possibilities for minimizing tax on successful 
business. This issue is discussed infra in Part IV.B. 
21 The passive investment this paper focuses on is portfolio investment. However, because 
Code section 469 denies individuals a deduction for a net passive activity loss, an individual’s 
passive investment in the active business of another does not experience full loss offsets. See 
I.R.C. § 469(a) (2004). Of course, disallowed passive activity losses can be carried forward to a 
year in which the taxpayer has passive activity income against which to offset it. See I.R.C. 
§ 469(b). 
22 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, 108 Pub. L. 27, §§ 301–02, 
117 Stat. 752, 758 (2003). Those provisions are scheduled to sunset at the end of 2008. See id. 
§ 303, at 764. 
23 See I.R.C. §§ 1(h)(1)(C), (3)(B) (2004). 
24 See infra text accompanying notes 159–61. Lower individual tax rates also reduce the 
benefits of incorporating a successful business. See infra text accompanying notes 325–80.  
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publicly held corporations, relatively more attractive, which should encourage the 
flow of capital to these investments.  
Following this Introduction, the Article is divided into three principal parts. 
Part II considers the various provisions that limit the deductibility of individuals’ 
investment-related expenses (in Section A) and losses (in Section B). As this Part 
shows, each provision has its own rationale or justification as an exception to 
what purports to be, in the standard conception of the federal income tax, the 
general deductibility of profit-seeking expenses. However, together these separate 
provisions systematically restrict the deduction of expenses and losses in 
individuals’ investment but not business activities. 
Part III of the Article demonstrates that investors can invest more in risky 
assets in the presence of an income tax than in the absence of such a tax, without 
increasing their risk of loss. Thus, the deductibility of losses subsidizes risk-
taking. However, because of the limitations on the deductibility of investment 
losses, discussed in Part II, individuals generally do not experience such a subsidy 
with respect to their passive investments.  
Part IV builds on Parts II and III, arguing that the greater loss offsets allowed 
to individuals’ business investments creates an incentive for taxpayers to allocate 
capital to businesses rather than investments, effectively combining capital and 
labor. Section A analyzes applicable case law to show that the essential ingredient 
for an individual’s activity to constitute a trade or business is labor. Section B 
argues that the incentive to combine labor and capital exists primarily for high-
income taxpayers. Finally, Section C demonstrates that high-income taxpayers 
benefit from favorable tax treatment if the business is successful, as well. In fact, 
high-income taxpayers, who are those who would otherwise be taxed at the 
highest rates, benefit most from the lower rates that a successful business may 
experience. The Article therefore concludes that the federal income tax system 
implicitly provides an incentive for entrepreneurship by high-income individuals. 
II. THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF LOSSES IN 
PROFIT-SEEKING ENDEAVORS: THE TWO FACES OF THE CODE 
A standard conception of the federal income tax treatment of individuals is 
that the Code recognizes two principal categories of activities in which 
individuals engage: profit-seeking and personal (consumption) activities.25 As the 
Supreme Court has stated: 
 
25 See, e.g., BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, 
ESTATES AND GIFTS, Vol. 3 ¶ 20.1.1 (2002) (“Whatever the nature of the taxpayer’s economic 
activities . . . virtually all expenses incurred in business or profit-oriented transactions [may be] 
deducted. This stands in sharp contrast to the legislative treatment of taxpayers’ personal 
activities, which give rise to only a few circumscribed deductions.”); Michelle B. O’Connor, 
The Primary Profit Objective Test: An Unworkable Standard?, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 491, 491–
92 & n.4 (1996) (referring to bifurcation into two categories as courts’ historical approach); 
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For income tax purposes Congress has seen fit to regard an individual as 
having two personalities: “one is [as] a seeker after profit who can deduct the 
expenses incurred in that search; the other is [as] a creature satisfying his needs 
as a human and those of his family but who cannot deduct such consumption 
and related expenditures.”26  
This quotation depicts a world in which an individual with expenses related 
to a portfolio of investments will be able to deduct those expenses to the same 
extent as expenses related to employment or self-employment. However, this 
picture is incomplete and misleading. In fact, although individuals’ investment 
and business activities are sometimes portrayed as experiencing the same 
treatment,27 subject to limited, context-specific exceptions, close examination of 
the Code reveals that it systematically subdivides profit-seeking endeavors into 
business and investment activities.  
More technically, with respect to deductions, the Code distinguishes among 
(1) “[p]ersonal, living, and family expenses,” which generally are non-
deductible;28 (2) activities “for the production or collection of income”29 or “for 
the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the 
 
William D. Popkin, The Taxpayer's Third Personality: Comments on Redlark v. 
Commissioner, 72 IND. L.J. 41, 41 (1996) (“In the traditional analysis, taxpayers have two 
personalities—a business and personal personality—concerned respectively with profit-seeking 
and pleasure-seeking.”); see also infra text accompanying note 26. 
26 United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 44 (1963) (footnote omitted) (quoting S. 
SURREY & W. WARREN, CASES ON FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 272 (1960)); see also supra 
note 25. 
27 See Amy J. Oliver, Improving the Tax Code to Provide Meaningful and Effective Tax 
Incentives for Higher Education, 12 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 94–95 (2000) (“The tax 
system classifies all expenses made by individuals in terms of their prevailing purpose, either 
business or personal. . . . The tax code, therefore, operates on the premise that it can 
differentiate between business and personal expenses. . . . Sections 162 and 212 . . . attempt to 
draw such a line by allowing deductions only for ordinary expenses incurred in business or 
other profit-seeking activities.”). Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Allan J. Samansky, Child 
Care Expenses and the Income Tax, 50 FLA. L. REV. 245, 252 (1998) (“A basic principle of our 
income tax is that expenses incurred in businesses or profit-seeking activities are deductible, 
while personal expenses are not.”) (footnote omitted). 
28 I.R.C. § 262 (2004); but cf. William J. Turnier, Personal Deductions and Tax Reform: 
The High Road and the Low Road, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1703 (1986). Professor Turnier argues: 
[P]ersonal deductions should perform three basic functions in a tax system. First, they 
should be a means whereby receipts are adjusted so that the base which is subject to tax is 
indeed income. Second, they should be a means whereby the base is made consistent with 
the fiscal role which has been assigned to an income tax in our society. Lastly, they can, 
on occasion, provide a means whereby our tax system is made compatible with 
fundamental values embraced by our society. 
Id. at 1704. 
29 I.R.C. § 212(1) (2004). 
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production of income,”30 and “transaction[s] entered into for profit,”31 all of 
which face many deduction-side restrictions; and (3) “trade or business” 
activities, which experience few limits on deductibility.32 For convenience, the 
three categories of activities may be referred to as “personal,” “investment,” and 
“business,” respectively. 
In general, business expenses and losses are deductible from income of any 
source—business, investment, and even personal income.33 In other words, 
provisions for the deductibility of business expenses and losses do not require 
“basketing.”34 Even certain assets that would otherwise constitute capital assets 
were they not used in business activity do not give rise to capital losses when 
resulting in recognized losses.35 Because the losses are ordinary in character, they 
can be deducted from any income. Furthermore, individuals’ non-employee 
business expenses are deductible “above the line”36 so they need not be traded off 
against the standard deduction and are not subject to a number of additional 
limitations, discussed below.37 In contrast, important restrictions apply 
specifically to investment losses and investment expenses.38 These restrictions 
are discussed in the following Sections. 
 
30 I.R.C. § 212(2). 
31 I.R.C. § 165(c)(2) (2004). 
32 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162, 165(c)(1) (2004). 
33 See I.R.C. § 162.  
Income from a hobby or from finding money on the street might not constitute business or 
investment income. On the income side, the Code generally does not make a distinction among 
business, investment and personal sources of income. See I.R.C. § 61 (2004); but cf. I.R.C. 
§ 1221 (2004) (defining capital assets, which affects which gains are taxed at preferential 
capital gains rates). There is an exception in the rules applicable to nonresident aliens with 
United States-source income: 
[I]ncome that is effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business is 
taxable—after allowable deductions—at the graduated rates applicable to U.S. citizens 
and resident aliens; . . . income from U.S. sources that is not effectively connected with a 
trade or business in the United States is taxed—without an allowance for deductions—at a 
flat rate of thirty percent. 
Stephanie C. Evans, Note, U.S. Taxation of International Athletes: A Reexamination of the 
Artiste and Athlete Article in Tax Treaties, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 297, 301 
(footnotes omitted); see also I.R.C. §§ 871(a), (b), 873 (2004). 
34 See I.R.C. §§ 162, 165 (2004); see also infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
35 See I.R.C. § 1231 (2004); see also infra text accompanying note 121. 
36 See I.R.C. § 62(a)(1) (2004). 
37 See infra text accompanying notes 39–102. 
38 Some of the deduction-side limitations on investment expenses apply to other expenses 
as well; investment expenses are not always treated uniquely. However, no other group of 
expenses is subject to all of these restrictions. Of course, the tax treatment of investments is not 
entirely unfavorable, in that, for example, investment assets benefit from such things as 
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A. Restrictions on the Deductibility of Investment Expenses 
There are a number of restrictions on the deductibility of investment 
expenses, each of which may be separately justified, according to the standard 
conception of the treatment of individuals’ profit seeking expenses. One example 
is that individuals’ investment expenses (other than those attributable to rental 
and royalty income)39 are treated as “below the line” deductions, that is, as 
itemized deductions.40 Itemized deductions must be traded off against the 
 
accelerated depreciation. See I.R.C. §§ 167(a)(2), 168 (2004). However, business assets benefit 
from these provisions as well. See I.R.C. § 167(a)(1) (2004). The focus of this Part is the 
numerous provisions of the Code that limit the deductibility of investment-related expenses or 
losses but impose no limitation on business-related expenses or losses. 
39 See I.R.C. § 62(a)(4) (2004). The legislative history of this provision is not clear on why 
rent and royalty-generating activities are treated differently from such things as investing in 
stocks and bonds. However, it appears that activities that produce rents or royalties were 
considered more “business” oriented than investment oriented. See H.R. REP. NO. 78-1365, pt. 
1, at 22–23 (1944) (listing six categories of deductions allowable in arriving at adjusted gross 
income, including deductions “attributable to rents and royalties” and referring to the allowable 
categories as generally limited to “certain business expenses and losses . . . from sales or 
exchanges of property.”); cf. 451 STANDARD FEDERAL TAX REPORTS § 29.22(n)-1 (CCH 1945). 
(“To be deductible for the purposes of determining adjusted gross income, expenses must be 
those directly . . . connected with the conduct of the trade or business. For example, taxes are 
deductible in arriving at adjusted gross income only if they constitute expenditures directly 
attributable to the trade or business or to property from which rents or royalties are derived.”). 
Categorizing the expenses of activities that produce rents or royalties as above-the-line 
deductions also avoids questions about whether those activities constitute trades or businesses. 
There are important differences in required activity level between holding stocks and 
bonds for their dividends and interest, on the one hand, and renting out property, on the other. 
Interestingly, the “passive activity loss” provision, Code section 469, provides special rules for 
rental real estate activities, including a $25,000 offset that is subject to phase-out based on the 
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. See I.R.C. § 469(i) (2004).  
40 See I.R.C. §§ 62, 63 (2004). Unreimbursed employee business expenses are also treated 
as itemized deductions, and in fact constitute miscellaneous itemized deductions. See I.R.C. 
§§ 62, 67(b) (2004). 
The distinct treatment is not justifiable under a normative income tax. See supra note 7. As 
Professors Martin Burke and Michael Friel stated in the most recent edition of their popular 
Federal Income Tax casebook, with respect to the below the line status of an investment 
management fee: 
This is a curious result because it seems that taxpayers should always be allowed to 
deduct expenses incurred in the production of taxable income. There is no good policy 
reason to deny above the line treatment to this expense, and yet Congress has done so. . . . 
By contrast, were the management fee a business expense, it would be deductible above 
the line and would not be subject to the potential wastage or disallowance that below the 
line deductions face. 
J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME 14 (6th ed. 2002). 
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standard deduction;41 an individual taxpayer should elect to itemize deductions if 
the aggregate of itemized deductions exceeds the standard deduction to which he 
is automatically entitled.42  
In other words, an individual can claim a $5,000 above-the-line deduction, 
such as a business expense, even if he also takes the standard deduction. 
However, an individual with a $5,000 deduction that must be itemized, such as 
most investment expenses,43 will not benefit from deducting it if the standard 
deduction ($9,500 for married taxpayers filing a joint return for the 2003 tax 
year44) exceeds the aggregate of his itemized deductions. 
The legislative history of the enactment of itemized deductions reflects 
Congress’s intent to make business expenses deductible in computing adjusted 
gross income, the intermediate measure of income used for a number of 
purposes.45 It is not particularly clear why Congress chose to favor business 
expenses over other profit-seeking expenses.46 In addition, the distinction has 
 
41 See I.R.C. § 63(a), (b) (2004). 
42 The standard deduction requires no proof of any expenditures, varies depending on the 
individual’s filing status, and is increased for the aged and blind. See I.R.C. § 63(c) (2004). 
Most high-income individuals itemize their deductions. In 1994 IRS Statistics of Income 
data analyzed by Professors Shuldiner and Shakow, over ninety percent of individuals with 
income of $100,000 or more itemized deductions. See Reed Shuldiner & David Shakow, 
Lessons from the Limitation on Itemized Deductions, 93 TAX NOTES 673, 683 tbl.4 (2001). 
Interestingly, that data showed that: 
[T]he percentage of taxpayers taking the standard deduction is greater for adjusted gross 
income exceeding $500,000 than it is for adjusted gross income under $500,000. 
Generally, one would expect that itemized deductions increase with income. Thus, the 
percentage taking the standard deduction should decline with income. The most likely 
explanation is that section 68 is forcing taxpayers to take the standard deduction. 
Id. at 683. 
43 See I.R.C. §§ 62, 67 (2004); but cf. I.R.C. § 62(a)(4) (2004). 
44 See I.R.C. § 63(c)(1) (2004) (defining standard deduction), I.R.C. § 63(c)(2) (providing 
certain basic standard deduction amounts, unadjusted for inflation, and referring to applicable 
percentage for joint returns), I.R.C. § 63(c)(4) (specifying inflation adjustment), I.R.C. 
§ 63(c)(7) (providing 200% as applicable percentage for 2003 and 2004); Rev. Proc. 2002-70, 
2002-2 C.B. 845, 848 § 3.09(1) (providing inflation-adjusted standard deduction for unmarried 
individual for 2003). 
45 See H.R. REP. NO. 78-1365, pt. 1, at 23 (1944) (“In the usual case . . . the deductions 
which are to be made from gross income in arriving at adjusted gross income are limited to 
certain business expenses and losses which are treated as losses from sales or exchanges of 
property.”). 
46 The Senate Finance Committee Report seems to reflect a notion that those activities the 
expenses of which are not deductible from gross income are those likely to have few deductible 
expenses: 
Fundamentally, the deductions . . . permitted to be made from gross income in 
arriving at adjusted gross income are those which are necessary to make as nearly 
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never been pure, in that various non-business expenses have also been favored 
with above-the-line deductibility.47  
In addition to the disadvantage of characterization as itemized rather than 
above-the-line deductions, most investment expenses are subject to the two-
percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions.48 This means that amounts 
below two percent of adjusted gross income (AGI)49 are entirely disallowed.50 
Accordingly, these deductions are subject to a floor that increases proportionately 
with AGI. For example, for purposes of computing regular tax liability, a 
taxpayer with $10,000 of AGI loses the first $200 of miscellaneous itemized 
deductions, a taxpayer with $100,000 of AGI loses the first $2,000 of 
miscellaneous itemized deductions, and a taxpayer with $1,000,000 of AGI loses 
the first $20,000 of miscellaneous itemized deductions.51 Any remaining 
 
equivalent as practicable the concept of adjusted gross income, when that concept is 
applied to different types of taxpayers deriving their income from varying sources. Such 
equivalence is necessary for equitable application of a mechanical tax table or standard 
deduction which does not depend upon the source of the income. For example, in the case 
of an individual merchant or store proprietor, gross income under the law is gross receipts 
less the cost of goods sold; it is necessary to reduce this amount by the amount of business 
expenses before it becomes comparable . . . to the salary or wages of an employee in the 
usual case. Similarly, the gross income derived from rents and royalties is reduced by the 
deductions attributable thereto . . . in order that the resulting adjusted gross income will be 
on a parity with the income from interest and dividends in respect of which latter items no 
deductions are permitted in computing adjusted gross income. 
S. REP. NO. 78-885, pt. 1, at 24–25 (1944). 
47 See Keith E. Engel, Deducting Interest on Federal Income Tax Underpayments: A 
Roadmap Through a 50-Year Quagmire, 16 VA. TAX REV. 237, 284 & n.192 (1996). Expenses 
relating to rents and royalties are above-the-line deductions, see I.R.C. 62(a)(4) (2004), 
although the activities that produce them might be considered investment activities. See Engel, 
supra, at n.192. Their inclusion as above-the-line deductions obviates the need for a 
determination whether activities such as renting out apartments or owning a mine constitute 
business activities under Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941), discussed below. See 
infra text accompanying notes 202–09. 
48 See I.R.C. §§ 62, 67, 212 (2004); but cf. I.R.C. § 62(a)(4). 
49 Adjusted gross income consists of gross income minus above-the-line deductions. See 
I.R.C. § 62. 
50 The two-percent floor is a form of phase-out. See Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case 
Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX REV. 645, 723 n.380 (2003). In 1998, the Joint 
Committee on Taxation estimated that approximately one-fourth of individual taxpayers were 
affected by at least one phase-out, phase-in, or floor. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 
105TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO INDIVIDUAL EFFECTIVE MARGINAL 
TAX RATES 17 (Comm. Print 1998). 
51 The remaining miscellaneous itemized deductions, if any, are aggregated with the 
taxpayer’s other itemized deductions. Those deductions are then reduced by applying section 
68, if applicable. The remaining itemized deductions are compared with the standard deduction; 
the taxpayer should elect to itemize if remaining itemized deductions exceed the standard 
deduction. 
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miscellaneous itemized deductions will be aggregated with the taxpayer’s other 
itemized deductions before reduction by the “[o]verall limitation on itemized 
deductions,”52 if applicable, which is discussed below.53  
The two-percent floor was added in 1986, as part of comprehensive changes 
that lowered federal income tax rates while broadening the tax base.54 The 
legislative history reflects a concern both with expenditures that are more 
personal than profit-seeking in nature and for reducing required record-keeping:55
The Congress concluded that the prior-law treatment of employee business 
expenses, investment expenses, and other miscellaneous itemized deductions 
fostered significant complexity, and that some of these expenses have 
characteristics of voluntary personal expenditures. For taxpayers who 
anticipated claiming such itemized deductions, prior law effectively required 
extensive record-keeping with regard to what commonly are small expenditures. 
Moreover, the fact that small amounts typically were involved presented 
significant administrative and enforcement problems for the Internal Revenue 
Service. These problems were exacerbated by the fact that taxpayers frequently 
made errors of law regarding what types of expenditures were properly 
allowable under prior law . . . . 
The use of the deduction floor also takes into account that some 
miscellaneous expenses are sufficiently personal in nature that they would be 
incurred apart from any business or investment activities of the taxpayer. For 
 
52 See I.R.C. § 68 (2004). A few deductions are not subject to the overall limitation on 
itemized deductions. See I.R.C. § 68(c). 
53 See infra text accompanying notes 66–71. 
54 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, § 132(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2114 (1986).  
55 Professor Debby Geier sums the rationales up as follows: 
While some may view section 67 as nothing but a bald revenue grab by Congress to 
make the legislative ledgers balance, others view it with more equanimity. Many 
deductions taken by folks under sections 162 and 212 prior to the enactment of section 67 
had only a very tenuous relationship to any income-producing activity and had personal-
consumption benefits as well. The deduction for The Wall Street Journal subscription is a 
classic example. Such unjustifiable deductions were difficult, if not impossible, for the 
IRS to monitor in any effective way. Thus, some see section 67 as having achieved 
significant simplification for most folks who typically don't incur sufficient deductions of 
the type subject to section 67 to require them to keep records, as well as significant 
administrative simplification for the IRS.  
Deborah A. Geier, Some Meandering Thoughts on Plaintiffs and Their Attorneys' Fees and 
Costs, 88 TAX NOTES 531, 533 (2000). Of course, some taxpayers will need to keep records 
regardless, because they will not know the aggregate amount of their itemized deductions—or 
even their AGI—until year end. See Robert J. Peroni, Reform in the Use of Phase-Outs and 
Floors in the Individual Income Tax System, 91 TAX NOTES 1415, 1418 (2001) (“Section 67 . . . 
[makes] it difficult for taxpayers to figure out prior to the end of the tax year whether they will 
be able to deduct any of their miscellaneous itemized deductions. Given that fact, many 
taxpayers will likely keep records just in case they do exceed the 2 percent floor.”). 
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example, membership dues paid to professional associations may serve both 
business purposes and also have voluntary and personal aspects; similarly, 
subscriptions to publications may help taxpayers in conducting a profession and 
also may convey personal and recreational benefits. Taxpayers presumably 
would rent safe deposit boxes to hold personal belongings such as jewelry even 
if the costs, to the extent related to investment assets such as stock certificates, 
were not deductible.56
Thus, investment expenses otherwise deductible under section 212 of the Code 
are considered sufficiently personal in nature to be at least partially disallowed. 
Miscellaneous itemized deductions also are entirely disallowed in computing 
alternative minimum taxable income, the tax base of the alternative minimum tax 
(AMT).57 The AMT is a tax that may be imposed on individuals and corporations 
in addition to the regular tax.58 Essentially, with respect to the taxpayers to which 
it applies,59 the AMT targets so-called “tax preference items” that escape taxation 
under the regular tax.60 In effect, “[t]he AMT denies any deduction for the 
expenses of the production or collection of income,”61 that is, for expenses 
related to investment activities.62 Although the legislative history does not 
 
56 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 78–79 (Comm. Print 1987). 
57 See I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (2004) (disallowing any deduction for miscellaneous 
itemized deductions). 
58 See I.R.C. § 55 (2004). 
59 The tax generally applies above an exemption amount; that amount for the 2003 tax 
year was $40,250 or $58,000 for individuals, depending on filing status. Note that alternative 
minimum tax is the amount imposed in addition to the regular income tax. See I.R.C. § 55(a). 
The exemption amount therefore essentially imposes a zero rate on the first dollars that exceed 
the taxpayer’s regular taxable income and do not exceed the exemption under the alternative 
minimum tax. However, the exemption is phased out at high levels of alternative minimum 
taxable income. See I.R.C. § 55(d)(3). 
60 See I.R.C. §§ 55(b)(2), 56 (2004). 
61 Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen, How the Income Tax Undermines Civil Rights Law, 73 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1092 n.97 (2000). 
62 A 1994 Treasury Department Report found that the “AMT disallowance . . . affects 
only a small fraction of investment expenses . . . . The treatment . . . probably has little 
aggregate economic effect.” Treasury Dep’t, Report to the Congress on Section 212 Expenses 
and the Alternative Minimum Tax (1994), reprinted in Treasury Sees No Need to Allow AMT 
Taxpayers to Deduct Investment Expenses, TAX NOTES TODAY, 94 TNT 255-5 (Dec. 30, 1994) 
[hereinafter Treasury Report]. The Report stated that, in 1991, only about 148,000 individuals 
reporting miscellaneous deductions were subject to the AMT. Id. “Their miscellaneous 
deductions which counted as AMT preferences equaled $3.4 billion.” Id. In the intervening 
years, many more individuals have become liable for the AMT. See Leonard E. Burman et al., 
The AMT: Projections and Problems, 100 TAX NOTES 105, 105 (2003) (“Although it has 
historically applied to only a very small share of taxpayers, the tax is projected to grow rapidly 
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explain the reason for the disallowance,63 the reasons probably are similar: 
“doubts about the legitimacy of the deductions.”64  
The Treasury Department commented in 1994: 
By mismeasuring economic income, the current law treatment of section 
212 expenses can distort the after-tax return on investments involving section 
212 expenses. Taxpayers for whom section 212 expenses are limited or 
disallowed might find other investments relatively more attractive. . . . 
How taxpayers change their investment patterns in response to limitations 
on section 212 expenses depends on several factors, most importantly on the 
after-tax return on the investments and on the type of expense subject to the 
section 212 limitation. The greater the difference between after-tax returns of 
investments involving limited section 212 expenses and other investments, the 
more taxpayers will choose alternative investment opportunities. . . .65
Under the regular (non-AMT) federal income tax, most itemized deductions 
(but not the investment interest deduction and certain others),66 as computed after 
the reduction on miscellaneous itemized deductions, are further reduced for 
individuals with AGI over a certain amount.67 The so-called “overall limitation 
on itemized deductions” of section 6868 operates to reduce most itemized 
 
over the next decade, transforming it from a class tax to a mass tax. . . . By 2010, the AMT will 
affect 33 million taxpayers—about one-third of all taxpayers—up from 1 million in 1999.”). 
63 Gregg D. Polsky, A Correct Analysis of the Tax Treatment of Contingent Attorney’s 
Fee Arrangements: Enough with the Fruits and the Trees, 37 GA. L. REV. 57, 73 (2002). 
64 Geier, supra note 55, at 534; see also Sager & Cohen, supra note 61, at 1092 (focusing 
on the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the AMT’s disallowance of miscellaneous 
itemized deductions). 
65 Treasury Report, supra note 62.  
66 Itemized deductions not subject to section 68 are the deduction for medical expenses, 
which is subject to a 7.5% floor under section 213; the deduction for investment interest, which 
is deductible only from investment income under section 163(d); gambling losses, which are 
deductible only from gambling income under section 165(d); and uncompensated casualty and 
theft losses allowed by section 165. 
67 See I.R.C. § 68 (2004). Professors Shuldiner and Shakow found that, for the 1994 tax 
year, of those individuals itemizing deductions, 100 percent of those with AGI over $200,000 
were affected by section 68. Shuldiner & Shakow, supra note 42, at 682 tbl.3. This is not 
surprising; section 68 requires the reduction of itemized deductions of those taxpayers with 
AGI over a specified threshold (which remains under $200,000). See I.R.C. §§ 68(a), (b); Rev. 
Proc. 2002-70, 2002-2 C.B. 845, 848 § 3.10. In 1994, 69.7% of those itemizing and with AGI 
between $100,000 and $200,000 were affected. Shuldiner & Shakow, supra note 42, at 682 
tbl.3. Almost all high-income individuals itemize their deductions. See id. at 683 tbl.4; see also 
supra note 42. 
68 See I.R.C. § 68. The limitation was enacted as part of the Revenue Reconciliation Act 
of 1990 and its initial sunset provision was repealed by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1993. Shuldiner & Shakow, supra note 42, at 673. It is currently scheduled to phase out from 
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deductions by a lump sum computed as three percent of AGI,69 except that the 
deductions will not be reduced below twenty percent of the amount the taxpayer 
can otherwise claim.70 For example, a taxpayer with itemized deductions of 
$10,000 and AGI exceeding the applicable amount by $1,000 would reduce 
itemized deductions by $30 (three percent of $1,000). A taxpayer with itemized 
deductions of $50,000 and AGI exceeding the applicable amount by $1,500,000 
would reduce itemized deductions by $40,000 (eighty percent of $50,000).71  
It is also possible that the reduction in itemized deductions will reduce those 
deductions to less than the amount of the standard deduction, in which case the 
taxpayer will take the standard deduction in lieu of itemizing.72 For example, a 
taxpayer with itemized deductions of $10,000 and AGI exceeding the applicable 
amount by $100,000 would reduce itemized deductions by $3,000 (three percent 
of $10,000) and, if married, would claim the larger standard deduction of 
$9,500.73 All taxpayers with AGI over the applicable amount and itemized 
 
2006 through 2009, I.R.C. § 68(f), cease to exist for a year, I.R.C. § 68(g), and then be 
reinstated when the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 sunsets, see 
Pub. L. 107-16, §§ 901(a)(1), (b), 115 Stat. 38, 150 (2001). Professors Shuldiner and Shakow 
note that “[t]he phasedown of section 68 has no effect in determining whether a taxpayer is 
more likely to be subject to the ‘3 percent rule’ (now 2 or 1 percent [in 2006 through 2009]) 
relative to the ‘80 percent rule’ (now 53.33 percent or 26.67 percent [in 2006 through 2009]). 
The phasedown does, however, make it less likely that taxpayers will be forced to take the 
standard deduction.” Shuldiner & Shakow, supra note 42, at 679. 
69 Because of the length of the section 68 phase-out range, “most taxpayers covered by 
section 68 will be within the phase-out range and thus will be subject to the 3 percent rule rather 
than either the 80 percent rule or the standard deduction.” Shuldiner & Shakow, supra note 42, 
at 675–76. 
70 See I.R.C. § 68(a)(2); Shuldiner & Shakow, supra note 42, at 674; Calvin H. Johnson, 
Simplification: Replacement of the Section 68 Limitation on Itemized Deductions, 78 TAX 
NOTES 89, 89 (1998). The provision is stated as a reduction by eighty percent of the otherwise 
allowable itemized deductions. See I.R.C. § 68(a). Reduction by eighty percent will leave 
twenty percent remaining. 
71 Three percent of $1,500,000 is $45,000, which is larger than the $40,000 reduction. 
Given the way section 68 functions, “the 80 percent rule can be the operative bound on the 3 
percent rule only if the taxpayer's itemized deductions exceed five times the allowable standard 
deduction.” Shuldiner & Shakow, supra note 42, at 676. For married taxpayers filing jointly in 
2003, this meant that the taxpayer’s itemized deductions would have to be at least $47,500 for 
the eighty percent rule to apply. Cf. id. (providing similar calculation for 2001). For 2003, the 
standard deduction for married taxpayers filing jointly was $9,500. See supra note 44 and 
accompanying text. 
72 See Shuldiner & Shakow, supra note 42, at 679. Shuldiner and Shakow state, based on 
the 1994 IRS Statistics of Income data they analyze, that “[w]hile it is not possible to determine 
whether a taxpayer was forced to take the standard deduction by operation of section 68, the 
data do suggest that a significant number of taxpayers fall into that category.” Id. at 683. 
73 This was the standard deduction for married couples filing a joint return for the 2003 
tax year. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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deductions in excess of the standard deduction will pay more tax than they 
otherwise would,74 regardless of whether the reduction has the effect of reducing 
the itemized deduction or prompting them to take the standard deduction.75
The legislative history of section 68 is not very helpful; it states simply that 
the intent of the provision is to limit itemized deductions.76 However, 
contemporaneous commentators stated that many of the legislators were 
concerned with increasing progressivity.77 Calvin Johnson has argued that the 
effect of section 68 is an implicit one-percent tax on AGI for individuals with 
AGI that exceeds the applicable threshold,78 who are high-income individuals.79 
 
74 Like the overall limitation on itemized deductions, the phase-out of personal 
exemptions increases the effective tax rate applicable to those who experience it. The phase-out 
of personal exemptions effectively creates a surtax of about four percent of income within the 
range of the phase-out. Calvin H. Johnson, Simplification: Replace the Personal Exemptions 
Phaseout Bubble, 77 TAX NOTES 1403, 1403 (1997). For 2003, the phase-out range was 
$209,250 to $331,750 for married taxpayers filing joint returns. Rev. Proc. 2002-70, 2002-2 
C.B. 845, 849 § 3.15. This raises those taxpayers’ average tax rates. Taxpayers with income 
exceeding the amount for complete phase-out of personal exemptions experience complete 
elimination of the exemptions for that tax year. Those taxpayers also experience an increase in 
average tax rates but not to the same extent because the surtax ceases on income above the level 
at which personal exemptions have been eliminated. See Johnson, supra, at 1404. The result is a 
disproportionate burden on families with total income for the year within the phase-out range 
than on those with total income that exceeds the range. Professor Johnson has called for repeal 
of the provision on that basis as well as others. See id. at 1404–05 (pointing out the 
extraordinary complexity and illogic of the mechanics of the provision). Professor Johnson 
proposed replacing the phase-out with an explicit increase of one percentage point in the top 
two marginal rates. Id. at 1406–07. He pointed out that the increase would raise slightly more 
revenue than the phase-out of personal exemptions, id. at 1407, while shifting the tax burden to 
the higher end of the income spectrum. See id. (“The proposal is pro-family. It promotes 
efficiency by cutting unnecessarily high tax rates, without shifting tax to those less able to pay. 
It simplifies the tax law and yields a fairer rate structure. Who then could resist it?”).  
75 That is, lowering the amount deductible will increase taxable income, the tax base. 
See I.R.C. § 1 (2004) (defining tax rates applicable to individuals’ taxable income), I.R.C. § 63 
(2004) (defining taxable income). 
76 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 101-964, at 1030–33 (1990). 
77 See J. Andrew Hoerner, “Pease Plan” Emerges as Key Issue in Debate Over Tax 
Progressivity, 49 TAX NOTES 498, 498–99 (1990); Gene Steuerle, Budget Act 1990: Revival of 
the Progressivity Debate, 49 TAX NOTES 1251, 1252 (1990); see also Donaldson, supra note 
50, at 724 n.392. 
78 Johnson, supra note 70, at 90; see also Shuldiner & Shakow, supra note 42, at 674 
(“Where the 3 percent rule applies, the effect of section 68 is to raise the marginal tax rate on 
the last dollar of income rather than to reduce the tax benefit on the last dollar of itemized 
deduction.”). That is because, in the range in which the three percent rule is operative, the dollar 
value of a deduction is not affected by section 68. See id. at 678. For example, if a taxpayer 
with $10,000 of otherwise allowable itemized deductions has $50,000 of adjusted gross income 
in excess of the applicable amount, those deductions will be reduced by $1,500 to $8,500. If the 
taxpayer discovers that, in fact, he is entitled to an additional $1,000 itemized deduction, the 
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As Professor Johnson explains, this increases the effective tax rate for these 
individuals by more than one percentage point because AGI is a larger figure than 
taxable income, the tax base of the income tax.80 He further notes that “[s]ection 
68 was justified by its proponents as a disguised tax hike, raising revenue from 
top-bracket taxpayers without raising the explicit section 1 rates.”81
Professor Edward McCaffery has pointed out that the tax rates in section 1 
are well-publicized, particularly when they change, and that “the single highest 
rate bracket is socially prominent, whereas each person’s individual highest rate 
bracket is individually prominent.”82 He has argued that the prominence83 of the 
section 1 rates vis-à-vis hidden or partially hidden rate increases explains 
Congress’s propensity for hidden increases.84 He lists the phaseouts of itemized 
 
itemized deductions allowed by section 68 will be $9,500. Because the $1,000 additional 
deduction will not be reduced by section 68, the marginal value of that deduction will be 
determined by multiplying the deduction by the taxpayer’s marginal rate. 
79 The AGI threshold for 2003 was $139,500, except that it was $69,750 for married 
individuals filing separately. Rev. Proc. 2002-70, 2002-2 C.B. 845, 848 § 3.10. 
80 Johnson, supra note 70, at 90. AGI is larger than taxable income because AGI is not 
reduced by the standard deduction (or itemized deductions) or personal exemptions. See id. 
(“[F]or taxpayers with itemized deductions of 25 percent of AGI, it would take a tax stated to 
be 1.59 percent of taxable income to give the same revenue as 1.19 percent of AGI tax.”) 
(footnote omitted).  
81 Id. at 92; see also Shuldiner & Shakow, supra note 42, at 693 n.95 (“While it is 
possible that section 68 and its companion, section 151(d) (phaseout of personal exemptions), 
were repealed in a rare attempt at simplification, there is another intriguing explanation. Just as 
an earlier Bush administration sought to hide an increase in marginal tax rates through the use 
of phaseouts, the current Bush administration may well have sought to hide a decrease in 
marginal rates through the repeal of the same provisions.”). 
82 See Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1887 
(1994). 
83 “Prominence refers to the practice of attaching particular and disproportionate 
importance to highly visible or easily recallable events or facts. . . . Individuals are apt to over-
react to disasters that are well-publicized on television in predicting the future; in analyzing 
present facts, individuals are apt to give disproportionate weight to their own immediate, local 
experiences, and so on.” Id. at 1886–87. “Framing” is also relevant. “Framing refers to the 
well-documented phenomenon under which individuals react to the purely formal way in which 
a question is presented or ‘framed.’” Id. at 1905. 
84 Id. at 1887, 1890 (“[T]he doubly non-prominent technique . . . may be the most 
attractive move available to the legislator. A second-best move is to expand the domain of the 
higher rate brackets, implicating only individual prominence, not social prominence.”). 
That is, an explicit increase in tax rates is both highly visible and likely to be perceived as 
a government imposition on the taxpayer. On the other hand, the overall limitation on itemized 
deductions is buried far from the marginal rates; the marginal rates are in section 1, while the 
overall limitation on itemized deductions is in section 68. The impact of section 68 on a given 
taxpayer is non-obvious. See Johnson, supra note 74, at 1404 (“For a household consisting of a 
couple and three children (i.e., five exemptions), the surtax is between 3.8–4.2 percent of the 
taxpayer’s income, again depending on the bracket. For a household with 10 exemptions, the 
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deductions and personal exemptions among the “cognitive tricks” employed by 
Congress.85
Unlike many provisions, section 68 never explicitly phases out.86 In fact, it 
operates over a large range of income, limited only by the twenty-percent floor on 
itemized deductions contained in section 68 and the option to take the standard 
deduction.87 As Professors Reed Shuldiner and David Shakow have pointed out, 
a result of the lump sum reduction of deductions is that any net zero transaction 
consisting of gross income and an itemized deduction will produce a positive tax 
for a taxpayer subject to the three-percent rule because, by definition, gross 
income increases AGI but itemized deductions do not reduce it.88 This effect 
holds even for itemized deductions not subject to section 68, such as the 
deduction for investment interest.89 The particular tax burden on leveraged 
 
surtax could be 8.3 percent.”) (footnote omitted); id. (“The phase-out taxes are complicated 
enough that the most expert tax economists in the country sometimes make mistakes describing 
them.”). In addition, it may be viewed as a reduction in benefits granted by the tax system 
rather than an unadulterated burden; it may be more palatable to a taxpayer to be faced with a 
cutback of a tax-reducing exemption than to be faced with an increase in tax, even if they have 
the same economic effect. See McCaffery, supra note 82, at 1874 (“A standard lesson from 
prospect theory in particular and cognitive theory more generally is that people are especially 
averse to losses. For example, people will not use credit cards if a merchant advertises a 3% 
penalty for using them, but they will do so if the same merchant advertises a 3% bonus for 
using cash: being penalized appears worse than forsaking a bonus, although the two outcomes 
are economically equivalent. Similarly, people consistently attach more disutility to losing a 
sum of money or a valuable possession than they do to failing to gain the same sum or good, 
even controlling for wealth effects.”). 
85 Id. at 1898 & nn.86–87.; see also Peroni, supra note 55, at 1425 (“[The language of the 
House committee report] is another way of saying that the purpose of section 68 was to raise 
effective tax rates on higher-income taxpayers in a nontransparent fashion.”). 
86 See I.R.C. § 68 (2004); Shuldiner & Shakow, supra note 42, at 675–76. 
87 Shuldiner & Shakow, supra note 42, at 674–75.  
88 Id. at 678–79. 
89 Id.  
For example, if Lisa Leverage, an unmarried individual, earns $1,000 of investment 
income but spends $1,000 on investment interest, the income will be included in her gross 
income, I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (2004), and the deduction will be allowed in full because her 
investment interest does not exceed her investment income, I.R.C. § 163(d) (2004). The interest 
deduction will be an itemized deduction. See I.R.C. §§ 62, 67(b)(2) (2004). Assume that Lisa 
has $10,000 in other itemized deductions, none of which are subject to the two-percent floor on 
miscellaneous itemized deductions, see I.R.C. § 67(a) (2004), but all of which are subject to 
reduction by section 68. If her AGI, apart from the investment transaction, exceeds the 
applicable amount of section 68 by $50,000, the reduction in the $10,000 of itemized 
deductions will be $1,500. However, once the investment transaction is considered, AGI 
exceeds the applicable amount by $51,000: the $1,000 of investment income increases AGI but 
the $1,000 of interest expense does not reduce AGI because investment expense is a below-the-
line (itemized) deduction. Accordingly, the $10,000 of deductions subject to section 68 will be 
reduced by $1,530 instead of $1,500. The net zero investment transaction will therefore cost 
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investments is probably a side effect of the Congressional response to tax shelters 
of limiting the deductibility of investment interest.90 Regardless, the net result is 
the equivalent of a lower tax rate on the deduction side than on the income side.91  
As Professors Shuldiner and Shakow also point out, the negative tax 
consequences do not stop there. The artificially increased AGI also decreases the 
taxpayer’s personal exemptions.92 Any AGI increase in the phase-out range of 
the limit on personal exemptions will have this effect, though it will not be as 
startling as with respect to a net zero transaction. For example, a taxpayer with 
$300,000 of income and $100,000 of expenses to produce that income will have 
$100,000 more AGI if the expenses are investment-related than if they are 
business-related. If the family consists of husband, wife, and two dependent 
children and the activity is investment-related, for the 2003 tax year, the family 
would lose seventy-two percent of its four personal exemptions (which function 
like deductions in the tax calculation), a disallowance of $8,784.93
 
Lisa $30 (three percent of the income amount) although investment interest deductions are not 
themselves subject to section 68.  
As Professors Shuldiner and Shakow point out, the existence of the interest deduction 
implicitly requires at least an equal amount of investment income because investment interest is 
deductible only in the amount of investment income. See Shuldiner & Shakow, supra note 42, 
at 693. The same is true for gambling losses. See id. Thus, in any instance in which investment 
interest is deductible, the taxpayer will bear an additional tax burden. See id. (“We are at a loss 
to find a justification for what is in effect an oddly structured excise tax on gambling and 
leveraged investments.”). All itemized deductions create a similar effect but those limited to 
particular sources of income are the most severe. 
The burden on gambling may result from a moral judgment. Commissioner v. 
Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 27 (1987), is instructive in that it demonstrates the Court’s conflict 
over whether to treat gambling as a trade or business—which was the only way to let 
Groetzinger avoid another tax on phantom gambling gains under law applicable at the time. See 
id. at 25–26 & n.3 (although Groetzinger had a $2,032 net gambling loss, IRS argued that, 
under 1978 law, a portion of his $70,000 gambling loss deduction was a tax preference item 
that would subject him to alternative minimum tax of $2,142); see also infra text accompanying 
notes 210–21. 
90 See, e.g., Calvin Johnson, What’s a Tax Shelter?, 68 TAX NOTES 879, 882 (1995) 
(“Shelters are explained by debt.”); see also Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Anti-Tax Shelter 
Rules: Protecting the Earned Income Tax Base, 71 TAXES 859, 867 (1993) (discussing the 
limitation on investment interest as an anti-tax shelter rule). 
91 This, in turn, eliminates the taxpayer’s ability to invest more in higher return assets 
without increasing risk. See supra text accompanying notes 4–6. 
92 Shuldiner & Shakow, supra note 42, at 693 & n.93 (example based on gambling gains 
and losses, which have the same effect for this purpose as investment income and investment 
interest expense). 
93 In the phase-out range, the percentage of personal exemptions available is reduced by 
two percentage points for every $2,500. I.R.C. § 151(d)(3) (2004). Four personal exemptions 
total $12,200 ($3,050 * 4). The phaseout range for 2003 for married taxpayers filing jointly for 
2003 was $209,250 to $331,750. Rev. Proc. 2002-70, 2002-2 C.B. 845, 849 § 3.15(2). 
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Although Professors Shuldiner and Shakow do not explicitly mention this, 
the two-percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions causes the same type 
of problem for the individual taxpayers to whom it applies94—and a tax burden 
that is cumulative with the burden discussed above. That is, a net zero transaction 
will increase AGI, thereby increasing the floor below which no miscellaneous 
itemized deduction is available, in effect disallowing deduction of an amount 
equal to two percent of the net zero amount.95 In fact, because the two-percent 
floor applies prior to the overall limitation on itemized deductions,96 a net zero 
transaction can have the effect of subjecting five percent of the net zero amount to 
taxation.97 Of course, taxable income is the tax base, not the tax, so the additional 
tax borne will depend on the taxpayer’s top marginal rate.98  
Although the effect of the differential tax rates applied to income and 
deductions is most dramatic for transactions that are net zero and that involve an 
 
94 See Shuldiner & Shakow, supra note 42, at 679 (“In general, any phase-out based on 
adjusted gross income (or a similar amount) will cause a differential rate on income and 
deductions. Thus, for example, the phaseout of deductible contributions to individual retirement 
accounts—which is a phaseout of an above-the-line deduction—and the phaseout of the HOPE 
credit—which is a phaseout of a tax credit—have similar effects.”).  
95 The Lisa Leverage transaction is an example. See supra note 89. In that example, the 
$1,000 of investment income, though economically zeroed out by the $1,000 interest expense, 
would raise the two-percent floor by $20 (two percent of $1,000) through the $1,000 increase in 
AGI. The result would be the disallowance of an additional $20 in miscellaneous itemized 
deductions, such as investment expenses (other than investment interest and expenses to 
produce rents and royalties; the latter are not itemized deductions, see I.R.C. § 62(a)(4) (2004)). 
96 See I.R.C. § 68(a) (2004) (referring to “otherwise allowable” itemized deductions), 
I.R.C. § 68(d) (“This section shall be applied after the application of any other limitation on the 
allowance of any itemized deduction.”). 
97 For example, if, in the Lisa Leverage example, see supra note 89, the $10,000 of 
itemized deductions included miscellaneous itemized deductions of at least $20, then the 
addition of the $1,000 of gross income and the concomitant increase in AGI would decrease 
miscellaneous itemized deductions by $20. The remaining itemized deductions ($9,800 
excluding the $1,000 of investment interest) would be further reduced by three percent of AGI, 
$1,530 in the above example. See supra note 89 (hypothesizing AGI exceeding the applicable 
limitation of I.R.C. § 68 by $51,000 once the investment income is included). Thus, on these 
hypothetical facts, the additional $1,000 of income from a net zero transaction involving 
income and an itemized deduction resulted in the taxation of an additional $50, five percent of 
$1,000. 
The taxation of a full five percent of the amount of a net zero transaction will occur in any 
instance in which a taxpayer subject to the three-percent rule has miscellaneous itemized 
deductions remaining after application of the two-percent floor (or remaining after application 
of the two-percent floor to AGI less the income from the net zero transaction). The Lisa 
Leverage example illustrates this point. See supra notes 89, 95. 
98  For example, a $50 increase in taxable income, as in the Lisa Leverage example 
discussed in notes 89 and 97, supra, taxed at a rate of 30%, results in a tax increase of $15, a 
1.5% surtax on the $1,000 of income. 
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itemized deduction limited to the amount of related gross income (such as the 
investment interest expense and gambling losses discussed by Professors 
Shuldiner and Shakow or deductions under Code section 183(b)(2)), in fact, a 
similar consequence results from any itemized deduction. That is, itemized 
deductions do not lower AGI but the income against which they can be offset 
raise AGI. Thus, even a transaction that does not net to zero (e.g., $2,000 of 
investment income and $1,000 of investment interest expense) results in a higher 
tax on the income than the deduction because it is the additional income that 
increases reductions based on AGI.  
In addition, the same effect holds for itemized deductions that are not linked 
to specific types of income. For example, expenses (other than interest) to 
produce dividend income are miscellaneous itemized deductions but are not 
limited by the amount of investment income. If a taxpayer has income from 
investments, that income, like all income, will increase the cut-back of the two-
percent floor and the three-percent rule of section 68. However, deductions that 
reflect the expenses that give rise to that income will not reduce the cut-back. In 
this case, the deduction reduced by the additional income may well be the 
investment deduction itself. However, the same events may also reduce an 
entirely unrelated deduction, such as the medical expense deduction, which is 
subject to a floor of 7.5% of AGI.99  
Additionally, itemized deductions that are not miscellaneous have the same 
effect. For example, assume that a taxpayer decides to give fifty percent of her 
income to charity. Assume that she has $100,000 of income from wages, no other 
gross income, and no above-the-line deductions. Her AGI is therefore 
$100,000.100 If she gives $50,000 to her church (the maximum deductible under 
section 170),101 she will have a $50,000 itemized charitable contribution 
deduction in addition to any other itemized deductions that she may have. Given 
the large charitable contribution deduction, the taxpayer will elect to itemize, and, 
because of the relatively low AGI in this example, itemized deductions will not 
be reduced under section 68. However, any miscellaneous itemized deductions 
that the taxpayer may have will be reduced by $2,000, two percent of her AGI. 
So long as the taxpayer has any miscellaneous itemized deductions (such as 
unreimbursed employee business expenses), those deductions will be taxed at a 
higher rate than her wage income is.  
These examples demonstrate that making a deduction itemized rather than 
above-the-line has the effect of increasing the rate of tax on any income 
 
99 See I.R.C. § 213(a) (2004). 
100 I.R.C. § 62 (2004).  
101 I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (2004). 
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associated with that deduction.102 The effect is the most pronounced where the 
Code expressly links the deduction to certain types of income, because the 
income must by definition exist for the deduction to be allowed. Nonetheless, the 
effect extends beyond that more narrow category of cases. Thus, the below-the-
line status of most investment-related expense deductions, by disallowing part of 
an otherwise available deduction, has the effect of raising the tax rate on those 
expenses. 
As indicated above, a specific type of expense, interest expense, also is 
treated less favorably when it relates to investments rather than business activity. 
While individuals’ business interest is fully deductible, their investment interest is 
deductible only from investment income.103 This restriction addresses two issues, 
both relating to investments that accrue unrealized appreciation. One issue raised 
in the legislative history is the possibility that a taxpayer can deduct investment 
interest at ordinary income rates but pay tax on any gain on the investment at 
preferential capital gains rates.104 In addition, in that scenario, the deduction is 
current and any income is realized later. Thus, section 163(d) eliminates 
“[m]ismeasurement (at least that attributable to leverage) arising from unrealized 
appreciation of investment assets . . . .”105 For example, assume that a taxpayer 
with a salary of $100,000 per year borrows $500,000 to purchase investments and 
will pay $40,000 of interest on the investment for the year. If the investment 
 
102 Cf. Shuldiner & Shakow, supra note 42, at 693 (identifying the effect with respect to 
investment interest expense and gambling losses for taxpayers subject to the three-percent rule 
of section 68).  
103 I.R.C. §§ 163(a), (d) (2004).  
According to IRS Statistics of Income for tax year 2000, of those taxpayers who itemize, 
the AGI group with the largest absolute number of returns claiming a deduction for investment 
interest was the group with AGI between $100,000 and $200,000. IRS Statistics of Income for 
Tax Year 2000, tbl.2.1, available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=96586,00.html 
[hereinafter 2000 IRS Statistics of Income]. The largest absolute dollar amount was claimed by 
those taxpayers itemizing deductions with AGI of $10,000,000 or more; the second largest 
absolute dollar amount was claimed by those in the $200,000 to $500,000 AGI group. See id. 
12.6% of returns of taxpayers who itemized and had AGI of $100,000 or more claimed an 
investment interest deduction. The aggregate investment interest expense claimed by that group 
was approximately $19,624,386,000, about .74% of that group’s aggregate AGI. Of course, 
these figures do not reflect investment interest that was paid but not claimed as a deduction 
because it was disallowed by Code section 163(d). 
104 H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, pt. 1, at 72 (1969).  
105 Cecily W. Rock & Daniel N. Shaviro, Passive Losses and the Improvement of Net 
Income Measurement, 7 VA. TAX REV. 1, 49 (1987); see also Lawrence Zelenak, When Good 
Preferences Go Bad: A Critical Analysis of the Anti-Tax Shelter Provisions of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, 67 TEX. L. REV. 499, 562 (1989) (“The preference concerned in cases to which 
section 163(d) applies will usually be the deferral of tax on unrealized appreciation.”); H.R. 
REP. NO. 91-413, pt. 1, at 72 (1969). 
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produces no current return,106 allowing a deduction would enable the taxpayer to 
reduce his taxable income by $40,000, arguably a mismatching of income and 
expenses.107
The effect of the limitation is to place a cap on the investment interest that an 
individual taxpayer may deduct.108 No similar limitation exists with respect to 
leveraged investment in an active business. The following example illustrates the 
effect of this difference: Alice and Bob, both of whom are unmarried, each earn 
$150,000 of salary income in 2003. Alice borrows $200,000 to start a business on 
the side. Bob borrows $200,000 to buy stock. Assume that each taxpayer pays 
$20,000 in interest expense for the year. Assume further that neither the business 
nor the investment produces any return for the year. Alice may deduct the 
$20,000 of interest above the line while Bob may not deduct any of it. On these 
facts, Alice will owe $28,962 in federal income tax for 2003 and Bob will owe 
$34,630.32, a difference of $5,668.32.109  
 
106 Any appreciation will be taxed when and if eventually realized. At that point, the 
investment interest will become deductible. See I.R.C. §§ 163(d)(2), (4)(B)(ii) (2004); Daniel 
N. Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1189, 1196 (1989) 
(“Since unrealized appreciation is mostly deferred rather than excluded (in the case of 
appreciated stock, it would be taxed upon the sale of the stock at a gain), disallowed deductions 
are carried forward, rather than permanently denied.”). 
107 Of course, the same could be said with respect to business interest. In addition, the law 
effectively treats a wage earner worse than someone with unrelated income from capital: 
By permitting the interest deduction to the extent of investment income, it discriminates 
against the taxpayer who has only earned income out of which to pay his interest expense. 
The abuse [of deducting interest expense from ordinary income and subsequently paying 
tax on gain at capital gains rates] is the same in either case, though under the bill the 
individual with earned income, but not a person receiving dividends or other investment 
income, might lose his interest deduction. 
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 91ST CONG., STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWIN S. 
COHEN 42 (Comm. Print 1969). 
108 This “basketing” approach is a technique that the Code sometimes uses to limit the 
deductibility of expenses from nonbusiness activities. See supra text accompanying notes 10, 
34. Another example is that business expenses and losses are fully deductible under Code 
sections 162 and 165, but if an individual’s activity is determined not to be engaged in for profit 
within the meaning of section 183, the taxpayer may deduct expenses connected with that 
activity only if they are otherwise deductible under a Code section other than section 162 or 
212, or to the extent of income from the activity. I.R.C. §§ 183(a), (b), (c) (2004). 
109 The driving force behind the difference is disallowance of the $20,000 deduction with 
respect to Bob. On these facts, that disallowance results in the partial phase-out of Bob’s 
personal exemption (given his higher AGI). It does not result in taxation of a portion of Bob’s 
taxable income at a higher marginal rate than the rate applicable to Alice’s last dollar of 
income, but it could on slightly different facts. 
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Of course, if the investment (or another investment110) produced some 
income (say, $3,000), Bob theoretically could deduct that amount of his 
investment interest expense. However, the theoretically deductible amount (here, 
$3,000) is an itemized deduction, and, as discussed above,111 those deductions, in 
the aggregate, are traded off against the standard deduction.112 Thus, on these 
facts, even as a single taxpayer (entitled to a standard deduction half that of a 
married couple), Bob will be better off taking the standard deduction, unless he 
has other itemized deductions as well.113
B. Restrictions on the Deductibility of Investment Losses  
The Code imposes restrictions on investment-related losses as well as 
expenses. One of these restrictions is the limitation on capital losses,114 which 
may be viewed as the flip-side of the well-known capital gains preference.115 
 
110 See supra note 103. 
111 See supra text accompanying note 41. 
112 See I.R.C. §§ 62, 67(a), (b)(1) (2004). 
113 The standard deduction for 2003 for an unmarried taxpayer was $4,750. See Rev. 
Proc. 2002-70, 2002-2 C.B. 845, 848 § 3.09(1) (providing inflation-adjusted standard deduction 
for unmarried individual for 2003). The relevant amount of other itemized deductions is the 
amount remaining after application of the two-percent floor to any miscellaneous itemized 
deductions and the application of the overall limitation on itemized deductions. See supra text 
accompanying notes 48–71. 
114 See I.R.C. § 1211(b) (2004). Corporations may deduct capital losses only from capital 
gains, I.R.C. § 1211(a), but do not benefit from a capital gains preference, see I.R.C. § 11 
(2004) (regular corporate tax rates, with top rate at 35%), I.R.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2004) (35% rate 
applicable to net capital gain). 
115 See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2004). One justification for the capital gains preference is the notion 
that because the federal income tax system does not index basis for inflation or otherwise 
exclude from taxation the portion of “gain” actually due to inflation, realized capital gain may 
not actually reflect economic gain, in whole or in part. The longer the asset is held, the larger 
the amount of inflation embodied in the return on eventual disposition of the asset, though the 
longer the asset is held, the greater the economic benefits of deferral. See Joseph Isenbergh, The 
End of Income Taxation, 45 TAX L. REV. 283, 321 (1995) (“[T]he [pre-1986] capital gains 
preference . . . . offset to a degree the undeniable effect of inflation in enlarging nominal gains 
from sales of capital assets beyond their real value.”). That is probably not the reason the capital 
gains preference initially was enacted. See William D. Popkin, The Deep Structure of Capital 
Gains, 33 CASE W. RES. 153, 159, 161 (1983). In addition, that justification is undermined by 
the relatively short holding period required for application of the capital gains preference—it 
need only be a year and a day. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2004) (applying maximum capital gains rate 
to net capital gain), I.R.C. § 1222 (2004) (defining net capital gain and its component parts). 
However, assets held for a shorter term before realization bear more of the effects of inflation 
than those held for the longer term because a shorter holding period lessens the benefit of 
deferral.  
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Capital losses are deductible only to the extent of a taxpayer’s capital gains plus, 
in the case of an individual taxpayer, up to $3,000 of ordinary income.116 
Individuals’ disallowed capital losses are carried forward for possible deduction 
in a later year.117 No similar disallowance provision exists for ordinary losses. 
Thus, although the capital gains preference provides a tax benefit to appreciated 
property that is sold, the capital loss disallowance rules provide a significant 
disadvantage for capital assets sold at a loss.118  
 
In general, gains held for a shorter period of time are taxed at rates that exceed the 
ordinary tax rate. This is because the inclusion of inflationary gains in the tax base more 
than offsets the deferral advantage. On the other hand, gains held for a longer period of 
time are taxed at a rate below the ordinary tax rate as the deferral advantage exceeds the 
effect of taxing inflationary gains. The crossover point depends on the share of the total 
gain that is inflation, and on the real rate of return on capital. 
Jane G. Gravelle & Lawrence B. Lindsey, Capital Gains, 38 TAX NOTES 397, 399–400 
(1988). 
116 I.R.C. § 1211(b) (2004). Ordinary income is essentially income that is not capital in 
character. See I.R.C. § 64 (2004). Ordinary loss is loss from the sale of exchange of an asset 
other than a capital asset. I.R.C. § 65 (2004). 
The Bush administration proposed increasing the $3,000 amount to $8,250. See H.R. 
1619, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002) (making that change and adding an inflation adjustment 
provision); Ways and Means Approves Bill to Increase Capital Loss Deduction Limitation to 
$8,250, 196 DAILY TAX REP. GG-1 (2002).  
The capital loss rules are coordinated with the net operating loss rules as follows: “In the 
case of a taxpayer other than a corporation . . . the amount deductible on account of losses from 
sales or exchanges of capital assets shall not exceed the amount includable on account of gains 
from sales or exchanges of capital assets . . . .” I.R.C. § 172(d)(2)(A) (2004). Thus, the net 
operating loss computation for an individual does not include net capital losses. 
117 I.R.C. § 1212(b)(1) (2004). 
118 The combination of favorable treatment for investment gains and unfavorable 
treatment of investment losses may seem ambiguous as to whether the capital gains rules 
encourage or discourage investment. In fact, it is possible that the rules encourage some 
divestment. First, the rules may encourage taxpayers disposing of some investments to dispose 
of others because the treatment of capital gains and losses is linked. Because an individual 
taxpayer with recognized capital losses in a particular year can deduct as much as his capital 
gains plus up to $3,000 of ordinary income, I.R.C. § 1211(b) (2004), a taxpayer with large 
capital losses has an incentive to dispose of capital assets with unrealized gains in the same year 
so as to take advantage of capital losses that exceed $3,000. By contrast, a taxpayer with $3,000 
or less in capital losses has an incentive to hold off on recognizing the gains until a later year 
because the losses will be deductible from ordinary income. Gains recognized in the later year 
will in turn benefit from the capital gains preference if the assets were held for more than a year 
and they are not offset by recognized losses. 
Conversely, a taxpayer with recognized gains in a taxable year has an incentive to dispose 
of capital assets with unrealized losses in order to shelter the gains. This is particularly true 
because, although individuals may carry disallowed losses forward to subsequent tax years, 
they may not carry them back to earlier years and the taxed gains may not be carried forward to 
be reduced by losses that occur in later years. See I.R.C. § 1212(b) (2004). The encouragement 
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A principal justification for imposing a limitation on the deduction of capital 
losses include the taxpayer’s ability to time the recognition of gains and losses: 
“If a taxpayer owns two stocks, one having appreciated by $1 million and the 
other having declined by $1 million in value, the provision prevents him from 
deducting a loss of $1 million by selling the loss stock while retaining the 
appreciated stock.”119 Another justification is the cost to the treasury of allowing 
a rate reduction on the income side but no rate limitation on the deduction side.120
Because investment property generally constitutes a capital asset, the capital 
loss rules apply to investment property with recognized losses. By contrast, many 
business assets are “quasi-capital” assets that in effect can benefit from the capital 
gains preference without being burdened by the limitation on capital losses.121 
The Code initially defines as capital assets “property held by the taxpayer 
(whether or not connected with his trade or business),” with several important 
exceptions.122 The exceptions from the capital asset definition encompass many 
 
of additional divestment by a taxpayer who has decided to recognize certain capital gains or 
losses may seem to be a matter of timing in that assets not sold in one year would instead be 
sold in another year. In many instances that may well be the case. However, given the current 
incentive to hold appreciated assets until death, see I.R.C. § 102(a) (2004) (exclusion from 
gross income at death), I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1) (2004) (fair market value basis for property 
received by reason of death), some of those assets might never have been sold absent the link 
between capital gains and losses.  
119 Shaviro, supra note 106, at 1196; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 339 (“Because 
taxpayers have discretion over when they realize their capital gains and losses, unlimited 
deductibility of net capital losses against ordinary income would encourage investors to realize 
their capital losses immediately to gain the benefit of the deduction against ordinary income but 
to defer realization of their capital gains.”). 
120 See H.R. REP. NO. 67-1388 (1923). The report states: 
[T]o-day the taxpayer pays a maximum tax of 12½ per cent on gains derived from the sale 
of capital assets, but is allowed to deduct in full from his taxable income his net losses 
resulting from the sale of capital assets during the taxable year. The injustice to the 
Government is too obvious to require much comment. . . . The Government can collect 
but 12½ per cent of a gain, but it is compelled to lighten the burden of the taxpayer to the 
extent of 58 per cent of the losses. 
Id. at 2; see also Michelle Arnopol Cecil, Toward Adding Further Complexity to the Internal 
Revenue Code: A New Paradigm for the Deductibility of Capital Losses, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1083, 1119–26 (1999); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Deductibility by Individuals of Capital Losses 
Under the Federal Income Tax, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 291, 304 (1973). This apparently was not a 
relevant justification for the 1986 Congress; Larry Zelenak has pointed out that the fact “[t]hat 
the 1986 Act retained the capital loss limitation despite the Act's repeal of the 60% capital gains 
deduction demonstrates that Congress did not intend the capital loss limitation to serve as a 
rough offset for the favorable tax rate formerly applied to capital gains.” Zelenak, supra note 
105, at 567 (footnote omitted). 
121 See I.R.C. § 1231 (2004); see also infra text accompanying note 126. 
122 I.R.C. § 1221(a) (2004). Personal use property is not generally excluded, so it benefits 
from the capital gains preference. For example, gain on the sale of a personal residence is taxed 
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items connected to trade or business activity, such as inventory,123 real or 
depreciable property used in the taxpayer’s trade or business,124 and accounts 
receivable acquired in the ordinary course of business.125  
Thus, real property and depreciable property used in the taxpayer’s trade or 
business do not constitute capital assets under Code section 1221. However, if 
these types of property are held for more than a year, they constitute “quasi-
capital assets” under section 1231.126 Under section 1231, if, in a particular 
taxable year, the gains from these assets for any taxable year exceed losses from 
these assets, the gains and losses are treated as long-term capital gains and 
losses.127 If the losses equal or exceed the gains, then both the gains and losses 
are treated as ordinary.128 Therefore, disposition of depreciable or real trade or 
business assets held for more than one year is rewarded with a win-win rule that 
does not apply to investment assets: The character of gains is capital and of losses 
is ordinary, except with respect to the recapture of depreciation.129  
For noncorporate taxpayers, investment losses are disadvantaged vis-à-vis 
trade or business losses with respect to characterization as net operating losses 
(losses that can be carried to other tax years130), as well. Net operating losses 
include all trade or business losses, but nonbusiness losses (typically investment 
losses because most personal losses are disallowed by Code section 165(c)) are 
allowed only to the extent of the taxpayer’s gross income from nonbusiness 
activity.131 This “basketing” precludes a taxpayer from carrying a net investment 
 
at favorable capital gains rates, to the extent it is taxable at all after the application of Code 
section 121, which excludes most gain on the sale of the taxpayer’s principal residence if 
certain criteria are met. I.R.C. § 121 (2004). The limitation on the deductibility of capital losses 
generally does not affect personal use property because losses on the sale of such property 
generally are not deductible. See I.R.C. §§ 165(a), (c) (2004). 
123 I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1). Inventory, the goods sold by a business, reflect the day-to-day 
earnings that are typical of ordinary income.  
124 I.R.C. § 1221(a)(2). As discussed below, the treatment of real property and depreciable 
property used in a trade or business is determined by Code section 1231. See infra text 
accompanying note 126. 
125 I.R.C. § 1221(a)(4). Accounts receivable reflect debt arising in the ordinary course of 
business, essentially substitutes for ordinary income. 
126 See I.R.C. § 1231(b)(1) (2004). 
127 See I.R.C. § 1231(a)(1). 
128 See I.R.C. § 1231(a)(2). 
129 See I.R.C. §§ 1245, 1250 (2004). In general, because depreciation deductions reduce 
ordinary income, these Code sections treat as ordinary income the amount of gain that is 
attributable to prior depreciation. 
130 Under current law, taxpayers generally can carry net operating losses back two years 
and forward 20 years. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A) (2004). 
131 I.R.C. §§ 172(c), (d)(4). 
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loss to a prior or subsequent year (other than a capital loss subject to the capital 
loss carryover rules).132
The passive activity loss rules also apply this basketing approach; taxpayers 
cannot avoid the deduction-side limitations on investments by investing passively 
in another’s active business.133 Under the passive activity loss rules, if the 
taxpayer invests in trade or business or income-producing activities134 in which 
he does not “materially participate” (other than portfolio investment135), and/or 
rental activities,136 and losses from those activities exceed income from those 
activities for the year, the loss is disallowed and is deferred for possible use in the 
following year.137 Material participation is defined in the Code as “involve[ment] 
in the operations of the activity on a basis which is—(A) regular, (B) continuous, 
 
132 The legislative history of this provision is not clear why it includes this restriction. The 
House Report states, in part: “In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, allowable 
deductions not attributable to a trade or business regularly carried on by the taxpayer are 
allowed only to the extent of the gross income not derived from the trade or business.” H.R. 
REP. NO. 76-855, at 17 (1939) (discussing section 122, an antecedent provision). This makes 
the tax treatment sound comparable to the current treatment in Code section 183 of activities 
not engaged in for profit. 
133 “No activities are subject to both [the] limitations [on investment interest and on 
passive activity losses], and, in general, activities that are conducted by individuals for profit, 
other than those in which the taxpayer materially participates, are subject to one of the two 
rules.” Rock & Shaviro, supra note 105, at 49 n.161 (citing Conf. Rep., supra note 12, at 153, 
reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 4241). 
134 See I.R.C. § 469(c)(6) (2004). 
135 Portfolio investment is covered by the limitation on investment interest discussed 
above. See supra notes 103–13 and accompanying text.  
Considered together, sections 469 and 163(d) constitute a "two basket" approach to 
tax shelter limitations. To ensure that section 163(d) does not overlap with the passive loss 
rules, it provides that investment income and expenses do not include "any income or 
expenses taken into account under section 469 in computing income or loss from a 
passive activity." Investment interest also does not include any interest taken into account 
in computing passive activity income or loss under section 469. Passive activities—
including interest expenses attributable to such activities—go into the section 469 basket, 
while investments and their related interest expenses go into the section 163(d) basket. 
Zelenak, supra note 105, at 564 (footnotes omitted); see also supra note 133. 
136 There is an exception for the first $25,000 of losses from rental real estate activities 
except that the $25,000 is phased out for AGI between $100,000 and $150,000. See I.R.C. 
§ 469(i) (2004). 
137 See I.R.C. § 469(a), (b). The taxpayer will be able to use the loss (or credit) the 
following year only if the activity produces net income the following year. Deferral is 
disadvantageous because of the time value of money. 
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and (C) substantial.”138 The regulations contain a number of safe harbors, 
including 500 hours of participation in the activity during the year.139  
The passive activity loss provision is the one that effectively shut down the 
tax shelters of the 1970s and 1980s, at least in conjunction with earlier changes in 
the law.140 Though there is no uniformly accepted definition of tax shelter,141 it is 
clear that passivity is not the key.142 However, one feature of many of the tax 
shelters in which lawyers, doctors, and others with high income participated, is 
that they did not participate in any business conducted by the shelter.143 This 
unifying feature presented a “silver bullet” to stop these activities.144
Because the passive activity loss rules make no distinction between 
legitimate investments and purported investments made to generate artificial tax 
losses, they also impose a tax burden on unprofitable but genuine investments.145 
 
138 I.R.C. § 469(h)(1). 
139 See Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a) (as amended in 1996). 
140 See Shaviro, supra note 90, at 859. They were part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
See Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 501(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2233 (1986).  
141 Johnson, supra note 90, at 879 (“There is no consensus definition of a ‘tax shelter’ in 
the law or legal literature.”). One good definition is “a transaction designed to give deductions 
in an amount large enough to reduce . . . taxes in a sum greater than the net consideration or 
cost . . . of the entire operation.” Id. at 883 (quoting Emmons v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 26, 31 
(1958)). 
142 Johnson, supra note 90, at 880–81; Mona Hymel, Tax Policy and the Passive Loss 
Rules: Is Anybody Listening? 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 616 (1998) (“Many question the 
appropriateness of the passive loss rules in the attack on abusive tax shelters.”). Professor 
Johnson laments: 
The trouble with the 1986 act is that nobody seems to have known what a tax shelter 
was. The definition used in section 469, “passive activity,” is a terrible diagnosis. There is 
nothing wrong with being active, nothing wrong with passive, and nothing wrong with 
combining the two. If some kid comes up to me and says, “What’s a tax shelter?,” I 
cannot tell him it is a passive activity. 
Johnson, supra note 90, at 880–81.  
143 Cf. Johnson, supra note 90, at 881. Professor Johnson argues: 
One plausible theory is that section 469 is, at its core, protectionist legislation, trying 
to keep the bad accounting as the exclusive privilege of insiders. Only the insiders get the 
artificial losses. You need to be a real real estate man to get the nonreal real estate tax 
losses. You have to have manure on your boots to get the cow-pod farm tax losses.  
Id. (footnote omitted). 
144 See Lawrence Zelenak, Business Purpose, Economic Substance, and Corporate Tax 
Shelters: Codifying Anti-Avoidance Doctrines and Controlling Corporate Tax Shelters, 54 
SMU L. REV. 177, 191 (2001). 
145 Arguably, this is exactly the purpose of section 469. That is, section 469 does not 
address the question of whether the activity in question is a sham. A sham should not be 
respected for tax purposes, so section 469 will not apply to it. See DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE AND POLICY 873, 876 (3d ed. 2004). Section 
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For example, assume that a married taxpayer with a salary of $300,000 per year 
decides to invest in a bakery conducted through a partnership.146 Assume that the 
bakery is a legitimate business that will be run by the partners. Assume further 
that the taxpayer invests $200,000 of cash and that the partnership has a net loss 
of $250,000 for the year, of which $100,000 is properly allocable to the taxpayer. 
If the bakery is operated solely by other partners, the taxpayer will be unable to 
deduct the loss. However, if the taxpayer “materially participates” in the 
operation of the bakery, the $100,000 will constitute a trade or business loss, 
deductible above the line. On the facts (assuming that the taxpayer’s spouse has 
no earnings), that will make a difference of $34,449.36 in the taxpayer’s tax 
liability for 2003.147
For individuals, the deductibility of bad debt losses also hinges on whether or 
not the debt had a business connection. All taxpayers can deduct business bad 
debts that are wholly worthless and can deduct the worthless portion of a partially 
worthless business bad debt.148 By contrast, noncorporate taxpayers can deduct 
“nonbusiness” bad debts only if they are wholly worthless, and then only as 
short-term capital losses.149 In part, the treatment of nonbusiness bad debts 
reflects Congress’s concern for personal debts, especially those of dubious 
legitimacy.150
 
469 simply ensures that losses from “passive” activities are not deducted from “active” income, 
such as salary. However, that begs the question of why active income should be segregated 
from passive deductions. The Haig-Simons norm does not call for such segregation. See supra 
note 7 and accompanying text. However, arguably, allowing early deduction of losses from an 
investment activity (while deferring income) would provide consumption tax treatment by 
effectively exempting part of the return on the investment from tax. See Teacher’s Manual to 
DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE AND POLICY ch. 30, 
at 9 (3d ed. 2004). 
146 The example assumes that the taxpayer’s spouse has no income. 
147 Deductibility of the $100,000 loss results in a $42,297.50 federal income tax liability. 
Non-deductibility results in federal income tax liability of $76,746.86. A large part of the 
differential reflects the tax benefit of the $100,000 deduction. The remainder is due to a partial 
phase-out of personal exemptions resulting from the additional $100,000 of adjusted gross 
income that results when the $100,000 loss is not deductible.  
148 I.R.C. § 166(a) (2004). 
149 I.R.C. § 166(d). Nonbusiness bad debts include both investment bad debts and 
personal bad debts. Thus, in this instance, the Code makes a personal loss deductible (though as 
a relatively disfavored type of loss) and groups investments with personal activities.  
150 See H.R. REP. NO. 77-2333, at 45. 
An example of a nonbusiness bad debt would be an unrepaid loan to a friend or 
relative, while business bad debts arise in the course of the taxpayer's trade or business. 
This liberal allowance for nonbusiness bad debts has suffered considerable abuse through 
taxpayers making loans which they do not expect to be repaid. 
Id. 
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With respect to investment bad debts, treating the debt as a short-term capital 
loss keeps the character of the loss comparable to that of a worthless security151 
and to the sale or exchange of an investment asset.152 However, this tax treatment 
contrasts with that applicable to business bad debts; they are deductible from 
ordinary income.153 Thus, for example, an employee who makes a $50,000 loan 
to his employer (which may be a corporation), to protect his employment, may 
deduct it above the line if it becomes worthless and similarly may deduct a 
portion of it if only that portion is worthless. By contrast, a stockholder who 
makes a $50,000 loan to the corporation in which he owns stock will have a 
capital loss and not until total worthlessness of the debt.154 If it becomes totally 
worthless and the shareholder has no capital gains (or none that are not absorbed 
by other capital losses), at most $3,000 of the bad debt will be deductible for that 
year.155 The nonbusiness nature of nonbusiness bad debts also restricts the 
usefulness of these losses under the net operating loss rules.156  
This Part of the Article has shown that the Code contains numerous 
limitations on the deductibility of investment expenses and losses, each of which 
has its own justification or rationale. Taken together, however, the picture that 
emerges consists of systematic deduction-side restrictions on individuals’ 
investment activities but not on their business activities. The next Part 
demonstrates that the comparatively liberal deductibility of business losses 
reduces the risk of individuals’ business activity. In effect, as discussed in Part 
IV, the Code implicitly subsidizes entrepreneurship by individuals, particularly 
high-income individuals.  
 
151 See I.R.C. § 165(g) (2004). 
152 A taxpayer holding a worthless debt cannot sell or exchange the debt precisely because 
it is worthless.  
[The] plan [for nonbusiness losses] was suited to put nonbusiness investments in the 
form of loans on a footing with other nonbusiness investments. The proposal originated 
with the Treasury Department, whose spokesman championed it as a means “to insure a 
fairer reflection of taxable income,” and the House Ways and Means Committee Report 
stated that the objective was “to remove existing inequities and to improve the procedure 
through which bad-debt deductions are taken.” 
Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82, 91–92 (1956) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Hearings 
Before House Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 90; H.R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 44). 
153 See I.R.C. § 166(a); United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 95–96 (1972). 
154 In this respect, unlike with respect to expenses to produce the respective income, 
employees are treated better than investors, rather than equally disfavored. See I.R.C. §§ 62, 67 
(2004); see also supra note 40. 
155 See I.R.C. § 1211 (2004). 
156 See I.R.C. § 172(d)(4) (2004); Generes, 405 U.S. at 96; see also supra notes 131–32 
and accompanying text. 
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III. SHARING RISK OF LOSS WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
A person with capital to invest naturally seeks to maximize the financial 
return on the investment. In a world with taxes, the investor should focus on the 
post-tax return. In general, it is fair to assume that investments that are riskier 
need to provide higher expected returns to attract investors.157 Each investor has a 
certain tolerance for risk, and risk-averse investors consider not only the overall 
expected return but also the risk of loss.158 The risk of loss must also be assessed 
on a post-tax basis because the loss ultimately borne by the investor is the portion 
remaining after any tax benefit is applied.  
“Because losses are fully deductible under a normative income tax, an 
investor can tolerate greater risk in a world with an income tax while maintaining 
the same exposure she would have had in a tax-free world. This is because the 
investor and the government share the risk of loss . . . .”159 In other words, 
assuming that losses are fully deductible, the investor will actually bear only the 
portion of the loss that remains after application of the tax rate on the loss side.  
For example, if an investor would bear a $1,000 loss before taxes but the loss 
is fully deductible for federal income tax purposes and the applicable tax rate is 
thirty percent, the investor will bear only $700 of the loss, with the federal 
government bearing the other $300.160 Accordingly, if losses are deductible, the 
investor can invest more than he would in a world without taxes, without 
 
157 In other words, investors demand higher returns to invest in riskier assets, all else 
being equal. 
Among finance theorists, the term “risk” refers to fluctuations or variations in 
returns, including both unusual gains and unusual losses. . . . Because . . . market (or beta) 
risk cannot be diversified away, risk-averse investors should demand a risk premium in 
the form of higher expected returns before they will be willing to hold stocks with a high 
degree of beta risk. Indeed, the CAPM [Capital Asset Pricing Model] predicts that the 
relationship between beta risk and returns should be linear: a stock with twice the market’s 
level of beta risk must offer twice the market’s expected return. 
Lynn A. Stout, Corporate Finance: How Efficient Markets Undervalue Stocks: CAPM and 
ECMH under Conditions of Uncertainty and Disagreement, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 475, 481 
n.23 (1997) (citing RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE 173–83 (5th ed. 1996)). 
158 For example, a risk-averse investor would prefer a guaranteed return of $100 to a 50% 
chance of a $300 return and a 50% chance of a $100 loss, even though the expected value of 
the latter is $100 ($150 - $50), so that the bets are, in theory, equivalent. See Lawrence Blume 
& Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 
569, 585 (1984); cf. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 30–31 (“The precise amount of risk that an 
investor is willing to bear is a personal matter and is inextricably related to the amount an 
investor is willing to lose if the investment does badly.”). 
159 Cunningham, supra note 2, at 31.  
160 In the general case, “the government bears the percentage of the loss equal to the tax 
rate t and the investor bears the balance, (1 - t).” Id. 
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increasing his risk of loss. Assuming a thirty percent tax rate, the investor could 
bear a pre-tax loss of $1,428.57; after tax, this loss would amount to only 
$1,000.161 In other words, the imposition of a thirty percent flat tax with fully 
deductible losses increased by 42.86% the amount the investor could risk.162  
As the above example shows, an income tax that allows the deductibility of 
losses should increase risk-taking. Consider the model that Evsey Domar and 
Richard Musgrave developed.163 It demonstrated that, given certain 
assumptions,164 including an assumption that the return on investments 
compensates only for risk,165 investors will invest more in riskier investments in 
the presence of an income tax than in its absence.166  
 
161 See id. (“[I]f an investor were willing to invest $1,000 in a risky venture in a world 
without taxes, she should be willing to invest $1,000/(1 - t) in that venture in a world with a 
normative proportional income tax.”). In the example in the text, $1,000 divided by .7 is 
$1,428.57. 
162 The investment increased by $428.57, which is 42.857% of $1,000. 
163 See Domar & Musgrave, supra note 2.  
164 In addition to full loss offsets and a normative income tax, the assumptions include (1) 
proportional (and unchanging) taxation rather than progressive taxation; (2) constant marginal 
returns to investment; (3) costless borrowing, because an investor who was already fully 
invested in the risky asset would nonetheless have to invest more in that asset to replicate the 
pre-tax expected return, necessitating borrowing; (4) zero or at least low transactions costs for 
portfolio shifts; (5) infinite and infinitely divisible investment possibilities; and (6) no inflation. 
See Terrence R. Chorvat, Apologia for the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 38 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 239, 260 (2003); Cunningham, supra note 2, at 35–36; Bankman & Griffith, 
supra note 2, at 397. The model also implicitly assumes unlimited availability of borrowed 
funds. These assumptions are necessary for the investor to replicate the pre-tax situation but are 
not necessary for the general point, relied on in this Article, that full loss offsets reduce an 
investor’s risk. The “basic conclusion that proportional taxation with loss offsets encourages 
risk-taking is now widely accepted by economists.” Warren, supra note 120, at 298–99 n.29 
(1973); cf. Cecil, supra note 120, at 1107 (“It is generally agreed that permitting the 
deductibility of capital losses is necessary if the government is attempting to induce taxpayers 
to invest in risky undertakings.”). 
165 In other words, the basic model assumes that the riskless rate of return on investment is 
zero. Cf. Chorvat, supra note 164, at 261(assuming zero riskless rate of return); Alvin C. 
Warren, Jr., How Much Capital Income Taxed Under an Income Tax is Exempt Under a Cash 
Flow Tax?, 52 TAX L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) (assuming 2% return on riskless investment); 
Cunningham, supra note 2, at 32 (assuming .6% return on riskless investment). Professor 
Warren demonstrated that, under the assumptions discussed in the text, including full loss 
offsets, an income tax will impose a tax on the riskless rate of return on the entire portfolio, 
even after portfolio adjustments. See Warren, supra, at 8–9.  
Return on investment may be conceived of as payment for a combination of inflation, 
deferred consumption, and risk. Cf. Fried, supra note 6, at 985 (“Investment returns include 
three components: an inflation premium, the real, riskless rate of interest, and positive or 
negative returns to risk.”). 
166 See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 2, at 41; Bankman & Griffith, supra note 2, at 378; 
Domar & Musgrave, supra note 2.  
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For example, assume that an investor in a no-tax world has $200 to invest. 
Also assume that the riskless rate of return on investment is zero.167 Assume that 
Asset A is a riskless asset and Asset B is a risky asset that has a 50% chance of 
providing a positive 30% return over a one-year period and a 50% chance of 
returning a 10% loss over that period. Assume further that in the no-tax world, a 
particular investor would choose to invest $100 in Asset A and $100 in Asset B; 
this allocation reflects the amount of risk that particular investor is willing to bear. 
Given a $100 investment in Asset B, the expected return over a one-year period 
on an investment in Asset B will be $10, as illustrated in the chart below:168







30% = $30 10% = $10 $10169
The investor therefore should have a total of $210 at year’s end: the $100 
invested in Asset A, the $100 invested in Asset B, and the $10 return on Asset B.  
If a flat 30% tax were imposed on returns to investment (and losses could be 
fully deducted),170 because the $10 expected return would bear a $3 tax, the 
investor would expect to have only $207 ($100 + $107) if he made the same 
                                                                                                                                         
167 See supra note 166. The payment for deferred consumption is very low, less than one 
percent, but inflation is not that low. See John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, 
Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals in the United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of 
Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2095, 2164 (2000) (“Importantly, some revealing 
empirical studies have shown that the real riskless rate of return in the U.S. from 1926–1989 
has been very low, as low as 0.5%. In contrast, the annual inflationary rate of return, or 
premium, has been about 3.1%.”) (footnote omitted). Professor Cunningham explains: 
Since a normative income tax is indexed for inflation, r is the real risk-free rate of 
return, an amount that has averaged .6% per year over the last 70 years. Under an 
unindexed income tax, however, r is the nominal risk-free rate of return, an amount that 
includes inflation, which has averaged 3.7% over the same period of time. This suggests 
that the real tax burden imposed on capital income over this period of time would have 
been on average over six times greater under an unindexed income tax than it would have 
been under a normative income tax. Furthermore, the magnitude of the burden imposed 
by an unindexed income tax is primarily a function of inflation, not real income. 
Cunningham, supra note 2, at 41 (footnotes omitted). 
168 The expected value of the $100 at year’s end will be $65 + $45, or $110. 
169 $30 * .5 + <$10> * .5 = $10.  
170 The model requires that losses be refunded by the government to the taxpayer if the 
taxpayer lacks other income against which to offset them. See Domar & Musgrave, supra note 
2.  
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investments.171 Only if the investor were to receive $210 after tax—a $10 
return—would he be in the same economic position as before the tax was 
imposed. In other words, given the tax on the risky asset, the investor’s expected 
pre-tax return would have to be $14.29 in order to amount to $10 after tax.172  
To obtain a $14.29 return, the investor will have to invest more in Asset B, 
the risky asset. In other words, the investor will need to shift some of the $200 
from Asset A into Asset B. Investing $57.10 in Asset A and $142.90 in Asset B 
will produce the desired pre-tax return of $14.29173 ($10 after tax),174 recreating 
the investor’s pre-tax situation. 
It might appear that the investment shift has increased the investor’s risk; 
after all, the investor has increased his investment in the risky asset, Asset B. 
However, Domar and Musgrave showed that the risk of loss of amounts invested 
in Asset B has decreased proportionately with the tax.175 That is, if the 
government imposes a 30% tax with full loss offsets, the government bears 30% 
of any losses. In effect, the government has become a partner in the investor’s 
wager.176  
The fact that the investor has not increased his risk can be illustrated 
mathematically. Recall that Asset B provides a 50% probability of a 30% gain 
and a 50% probability of a 10% loss and that, in the world with a flat 30% tax, 
the investor will invest $142.90 in Asset B. The following chart shows the 
expected gains and losses in the no-tax and flat tax worlds: 
Amount Invested in Asset B to Equalize Returns in No-Tax and Flat Tax Worlds 
WORLD AMOUNT 
INVESTED 
GAIN (30%) LOSS (10%) 
No-Tax $100 $30 $10 
                                                                                                                                         
171 The $107 expected return on Asset B is the $100 invested plus the $7 remaining after 
the 30% tax on the $10 return. It is also the net of a 50% probability of a $30 return subject to 
the 30% tax (which would leave $121) and a 50% probability of $10 loss, which if fully 
deductible, leaves only a $7 loss (which would leave $93). Thus, the expected post-tax return of 
$7 depends on the assumption that losses are fully deductible (and in fact refundable if the 
investor has no other income against which to offset them). 
172 $14.29 - (.3 * $14.29) = $10. 
173 $142.29 * .10 = $14.29. 
174 See supra note 171.  
Of course, the replication of pre-tax return through shifting more into the risky asset 
assumes that the individual was not invested entirely in the risky asset before the tax was 
imposed. 
175 See Domar & Musgrave, supra note 2.  
176 Cunningham, supra note 2, at 31; McNulty, supra note 167, at 2165. 





($30 after tax) 
$14.29 
($10 after tax) 
Thus, not only is the expected return the same, but the expected after-tax gain 
and loss are the same. In other words, after taxes, the investor does not have a 
50% chance of losing $14.29 but instead has a 50% chance of losing $10, just as 
he did in the no-tax world. This example illustrates the critical nature of the 
model’s assumption that losses are fully deductible. If some or all of the $14.29 
loss were not deductible, then the investor would not be in the same situation that 
he was pre-tax, and the additional investment in Asset B would have increased 
his risk of loss compared to his risk in the no-tax world.177
Under the Domar-Musgrave analysis, not only does taxation increase 
investment in relatively risky assets, it increases investment in assets that bear 
more tax.178 What is critical to that result, in addition to full loss offsets, is that 
                                                                                                                                         
177 Note that if the riskless rate of return is not zero, the investor will bear a tax equal to 
the tax on the riskless rate of return applied to the entire portfolio. For example, as Professor 
Alvin Warren has demonstrated, if the tax rate is thirty percent, the riskless rate of return is two 
percent, then the tax on a $100 portfolio will be sixty cents. See Warren, supra note 165, at 8; 
see also Chorvat, supra note 164, at 266 & n.180 (using $200 portfolio, 30% tax rate and .5% 
riskless rate of return and arriving at $0.30 of tax, $200 * .005 * .3). In addition, Professor Nöel 
Cunningham has shown that, given the model’s assumption that investors borrow in order to 
replicate their pre-tax return, the tax burden that an investor bears increases with that investor’s 
cost to borrow. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 37. This essentially results in a regressive tax on 
wealth, given the likelihood that wealthier persons face lower borrowing costs. Id. He treats the 
interest as deductible, as is generally the case under current law. In the example he uses, the 
investor would choose to replicate the pre-tax, pre-interest rate of return. The investor in his 
example bears $10 of tax even after the increased investment—effectively the after-tax interest 
cost of that investor (he uses a $15 interest cost and a 33 1/3 percent tax rate). See id. at 37–38. 
The investor could of course increase his investment further, to address the increased borrowing 
cost. Although the investor could thereby obtain his pre-tax return, he would nonetheless bear 
the (after-tax) cost of increased borrowing—a form of implicit tax. See MYRON S. SCHOLES & 
MARK A. WOLFSON, TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH 83–102 (1992).  
178 For example, if the tax enacted were 40% rather than 30%, the investor in the example 
in the text accompanying notes 168–75 would have to obtain a pre-tax return of $16.66 in order 
to yield the same post-tax return of $10. This would require an investment of $166.60 in Asset 
B, rather than $142.90, as illustrated in the chart below: 
Amount Invested in Asset B for $10 After-Tax Expected Return After One Year, in No-Tax, 
Flat 30% Tax and Flat 40% Tax Worlds 
WORLD AMOUNT INVESTED EXPECTED RETURN (10%) 
No-Tax $100 $10 
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the higher tax rate is applicable on the deduction side, not just the income side.179 
Imagine, for example, that, in a thirty percent flat tax world, the tax on income 
increases to forty percent  while the tax rate applicable to deductions remains 
thirty percent,180 and compare that with the reverse situation (income taxed at 
thirty percent rate but deductions allowed at a forty percent rate). Compare the 
amounts that would need to be invested in those situations in order to keep the 
amount of the loss at $10: 
Amount Invested in Asset B for $10 After-Tax Loss on 
Losing Investment After One Year, in No-Tax, Flat 30% Tax, 
Flat 40%, and Variable 30%/40% Tax Worlds 
WORLD AMOUNT 
INVESTED 
GAIN (30%) LOSS (10%) 
No-Tax $100 $30 $10 
30% Flat 
Tax 
$142.90 $42.87  
($30 after tax) 
$14.29  
($10 after tax) 
                                                                                                                                         
30% Flat 
Tax 
$142.90 $14.29 ($10 after tax) 
40% Flat 
Tax 
$166.60 $16.66 ($10 after tax) 
The same result would be obtained if the investor instead held a portfolio of three assets, 
one riskless asset and two otherwise identical risky assets, one bearing a 30% tax and one 
bearing a 40% tax. See Chorvat, supra note 164, at 265. 
These counter-intuitive results may be more understandable if considered from the 
perspective that, in effect, increasing the rate of tax on the return on an asset requires greater 
investment to achieve the same after-tax return. As indicated above, increased investment in the 
asset is rational because the risk of loss decreases proportionately with the tax. See supra text 
accompanying notes 174–76. 
179 Cf. Bankman & Griffith, supra note 2, at 402 (stating, in context of a tax system with 
no loss offsets, “an income tax without symmetrical treatment of gains and losses, or a tax 
applied to those who are unable to adjust their investment portfolios, reduces the utility, or 
surplus, of risk-takers in much the same way that taxation of interest reduces the utility or 
surplus of savers.”). 
180 This could be done by nominally applying the same rate but disallowing twenty-five 
percent of all deductions. In other words, for example, only $75 of $100 of otherwise available 
deductions would be allowed. Forty percent of $75 is $30, so it is as if all $100 of deductions 
were allowed but the rate applied were only thirty percent. 




$166.60 $49.38  
($30 after tax) 
$16.66  





$142.90 $42.87  
($25.72 after tax) 
$14.29  





$166.60 $49.38  
($34.98 after tax) 
$16.66 
($10 after tax) 
This chart shows several things. First, in order to keep the loss in the loss 
scenario at no more than $10 after tax, the amount invested under a tax with 
different tax rates on income and deductions must be based on the tax rate applied 
to deductions, not income. Second, increasing the rate applicable to losses allows 
increased investment in that asset without greater risk of loss, but increasing the 
rate applicable to income does not; the amount invested when the rate on income 
is forty percent is no more than when it was thirty percent. The reason for this is 
that if more were invested, the amount the investor could lose would increase, 
increasing the after-tax riskiness of the investment.181  
                                                                                                                                         
181 The following chart shows that if the investor were risk-neutral, and were only 
concerned about expected after-tax return, the investor would invest more if the tax on income 
were higher but the after-tax amount the investor could lose if the investment turned out to be a 
loser (which has a fifty percent probability) increases above $10.  
Amount Invested in Asset B for $10 After-Tax Expected Return After One Year, in Variable 
30%/40% Tax Worlds 
WORLD AMOUNT 
INVESTED 
GAIN (30%) LOSS (10%) EXPECTED 
RETURN 





($28 after tax) 
$13.33 
($8 after tax) 
$10 
(after tax) 





($32.72 after tax) 
$18.18  
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The chart also shows that the effect of maintaining the amount the investor 
stands to lose at $10 after tax despite the application of different rates to the loss 
side and the gain side means that the amount the investor stands to gain, after tax, 
will vary from the amount that it was in the worlds in which there was only one 
rate. The chart above showed that in the world of a forty percent tax on income 
and a thirty percent tax on losses, the investor stood to gain $25.72 after tax from 
a successful investment, rather than $30. In the world of a thirty percent tax on 
income, and a forty percent tax on losses, the investor stood to gain $34.98 after 
tax, rather than $30.  
This, in turn, means that the expected return in the forty percent tax on 
income/thirty percent tax on losses world is lower than $10 after tax and the 
expected return in the thirty percent tax on income/forty percent tax on losses 
world is higher than $10 after tax. The chart below illustrates this: 
2004] THE ENTREPRENEURSHIP EFFECT 1443 
 
Expected After-Tax Return on Above Investments After One Year, 
in No-Tax, Flat 30% Tax, Flat 40%, and Variable 30%/40% Tax Worlds, 
Assuming $10 After-Tax Loss in Loss Scenario 
WORLD AMOUNT INVESTED EXPECTED RETURN 
No-Tax $100 $10 
30% Flat Tax $142.90 $10 after tax 
40% Flat Tax $166.60 $10 after tax 
40% Tax on Income, 
30% on Losses 
$142.90 $7.86 after tax 
30% Tax on Income, 
40% on Losses 
$166.60 $12.49 after tax 
The chart above depicts the intuitive result that the effect of increasing the tax 
on income is to lower the investor’s return if he keeps risk of loss the same and 
the effect of increasing the tax rate applicable to losses is to raise the investor’s 
return if he maintains the same risk of loss. 
Although the model that allows investors to replicate pre-tax return is 
essentially a special case because of the additional limiting assumptions it 
requires,182 it, like the general point that deductibility of losses decreases an 
investor’s risk, hinges critically on the allowance of loss deductions. An income 
tax without loss offsets will reduce investors’ gains from successful risky 
investments, but will not reduce their losses from unsuccessful investments. In 
certain cases, the combination of taxable gains and nonrefundable losses will 
reduce the expected return of risky assets below the return of safe assets, causing 
all investors to purchase riskless assets. In other cases, where the expected return 
from risky assets remains above that of the riskless assets, the tax simply will 
make risky investments less attractive.183
Thus, the liberal deductibility of net losses from active businesses cushions 
the risk of those investments. By contrast, the numerous limitations on the 
deductibility of individuals’ net investment losses, discussed above,184 provide no 
such cushion. As discussed below, this disparity in effect provides an implicit 
subsidy for individuals’ investments in their own business activities.  
                                                                                                                                         
182 See supra note 164. 
183 Bankman & Griffith, supra note 2, at 401. 
184 See supra text accompanying notes 114–56. 
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IV. THE ENTREPRENEURSHIP SUBSIDY 
Part II demonstrated that individuals’ investment losses face important limits 
on deductibility that their business losses do not.185 The discussion in Part III 
showed that, given certain assumptions and the presence of an income tax, the 
ability to deduct losses with respect to an activity effectively shifts part of the risk 
of that activity to the government. Several conclusions flow from this analysis. 
First, the full loss offsets assumption behind Domar-Musgrave is systematically 
violated with respect to individuals’ investments. Thus, it is unrealistic to think 
that individuals functionally can eliminate the tax burden on investment capital 
through portfolio shifts, or even shift substantial risk to the federal government, 
absent the significant additional limiting assumption that, each year, the portfolio 
contains significant income from investments of the right character. By contrast, 
proprietors of active businesses can obtain the equivalent of full loss offsets or 
nearly full loss offsets if they have other income from any source or even net 
income in some years and net losses in others.  
Consider the following examples. First, assume that a taxpayer, Ann, has 
$100,000 in income, all from employment. She also has $50,000 in capital to 
invest. Assume that her deductible expenses from the $50,000 investment exceed 
her income in the first year by $10,000 (for simplicity, assume that there are no 
capital losses). If Ann invests in a wholly owned business, the $10,000 will be 
fully deductible from her employment income, above the line, effectively 
affording her full loss offsets from the activity. By contrast, if these were 
investment expenses, Ann would have to basket any interest-related income and 
expense first and then only be able to deduct the remaining investment expenses 
below the line and subject to the two-percent floor. This would disallow part of 
the loss, effectively applying a lower tax rate to the $10,000 of losses than the rate 
applied to her last dollars of income (of course, if at least $10,000 of the $100,000 
of income were from other investments, Ann generally would be able to deduct 
the investment expenses from that income.). 
It is not unrealistic to imagine a taxpayer with employment income who also 
starts a business on the side. “[Internal Revenue] Service data indicates that only 
50% of sole proprietors report more than 50% of their income from self-
 
185 One commentator has stated: 
For many years, the United States has had a love affair with small business. Americans 
may shop in megamalls and Super Wal-Marts, but they admire and respect the 
entrepreneurial spirit embodied in the many small businesses that increasingly drive our 
economy. The passion and concern the public has for small businesses, particularly 
entrepreneurs, is unparalleled. 
Melissa A. Peters, The Little Guy Myth: The Fair Act’s Victimization of Small Business, 42 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1925, 1925 (2001). 
2004] THE ENTREPRENEURSHIP EFFECT 1445 
 
                                                                                                                                        
employment.”186 In addition, if Ann were married, her overall tax picture would 
differ somewhat compared to if she were single, but the fundamental point would 
not change.187 That is, if the $100,000 of employment income were not Ann’s 
but Ben’s, Ann’s husband, and Ann invested the $50,000 of capital, resulting in a 
$10,000 net loss, the loss would be deductible from Ben’s employment income 
on the couple’s joint return if the loss was business-related but not if it was 
investment-related.  
These examples may suggest that the Code in effect baskets investment 
income with investment losses and business income with business losses. 
However, the latter is not true. Business expenses and losses are deductible from 
income regardless of the source of the income.188 It may seem as if a taxpayer 
with primarily investment income would therefore be indifferent between 
business expenses and losses and investment expenses and losses. However, that 
is not the case with respect to volatile investments. 
For example, what if Ann has investments that produce current income when 
they are successful, but they produce income in some years but not others? 
Assume that in Year 1, Ann has $100,000 of income; in Year 2, a $50,000 loss; 
in Year 3, $100,000 of income; in Year 4, a $50,000 loss, and so on. What if Ann 
takes $50,000 of capital and invests it in a new investment in Year 4, and, just as 
in the prior examples,189 the otherwise deductible expenses of that investment 
exceed her income from that investment by $10,000? If the capital is invested 
passively, Ann simply must bear the full weight of a $10,000 loss. However, if 
the capital were invested in a business, Ann could carry back the $10,000 to Year 
3 and obtain a refund of some of the tax she had paid with respect to that year. 
Therefore, once again, Ann can achieve the equivalent of full loss offsets only by 
placing her capital in an active business, not an investment activity.190
 
186 See John W. Lee, A Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax Entities 
Universe: “Hey the Stars Might Lie But the Numbers Never Do,” 78 TEX. L. REV. 885, 962 
n.404 (2000) (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-99-76, TAXPAYERS FACE 
MANY LAYERS OF REQUIREMENTS 4 n.5 (1999)). Of course, many of the individuals filing a 
Schedule C may be reporting work performed as an independent contractor to supplement low 
wages. See id. at 962 (quoting Oversight on Impact of Complexity in the Tax Code on 
Individual Taxpayers and Small Business: Hearing Before House Ways & Means Subcomm., 
105th Cong., 2d Sess. 7–8 (1998) (statement of Steve Bafundo, C.P.A.)). 
187 As a married taxpayer, Ann would be more likely not to deduct any of the investment 
expenses because the standard deduction for married taxpayers filing jointly was $9,500 in 
2003; it was half that ($4,750) for unmarried taxpayers. See supra note 44 and accompanying 
text. 
188 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
189 See supra text accompanying notes 185–87. 
190 This example does not apply the limitation on capital losses, see I.R.C. § 1211 (2004). 
Individuals can carry forward unused capital losses. See I.R.C. § 1212(b) (2004). Making the 
extreme assumption that, in this example, all of the $100,000 gains and $50,000 losses are 
capital, Ann could carry over her Year 4 $50,000 loss into Year 5 (or $47,000, if Ann had 
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Thus, for individual taxpayers, the Code in effect provides a subsidy for 
business activity that it does not provide for investments.191 This particular 
subsidy generally is implicit in the Code’s distinct approach to individuals’ losses 
and expenses from passive investments as opposed to business activities.192 How, 
 
$3,000 of other income, see I.R.C. § 1211(b)(1)). However, the $10,000 net investment loss in 
Year 4 could not be carried forward under section 1212 because, in the example, it arises out of 
investment expenses in excess of investment income; it is not a capital loss. 
191 Of course, an individual who conducts a business as a sole proprietor will owe self-
employment tax, a tax not applicable to passive investment. See I.R.C. §§ 1401, 1402 (2004); 
see also supra note 16. It is the presence of labor that gives rise to that tax. However, passive 
investment involves only the allocation of the individual’s capital, not his labor, and active 
business involves both. To compare the overall tax treatment of the passive investor with that of 
the business owner, the allocation of the passive investor’s labor must also be considered. If the 
passive investor is employed by another, he (and his employer) will pay employment tax 
comparable to the self-employment tax. See supra note 16.  
The “idle rich” is a fairly small class. With respect to under age 65 heads of households, 
only about five percent of the top one percent of wealth holders were not in the labor force in 
1983 and 1992 (not working part-time, full-time, “unemployed,” or retired). Edward N. Wolff, 
Who Are the Rich? A Demographic Profile of High-Income and High-Wealth Americans in 
DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH (Joel Slemrod ed., 
2000) at 81 tbl.3.3 (5.4% in 1983 and 3.6 % in 1992, based on Survey of Consumer Finances 
Data). “Clearly many inheritors enjoy working and making more money. They are not, by and 
large, unproductive.” Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1325 (2003) (footnote omitted). See also id. at 1323 (“[O]f the total 
income in the United States, income from capital (including inherited wealth) declined from 55 
percent in the 1920s, to 35 percent in the 1950s–1960s, to 15 percent in the 1990s. 
Hardworking entrepreneurs have steadily replaced coupon clippers.”) (footnote omitted). 
192 Entrepreneurship is favored by the tax system in more direct ways, as well. For 
example, Code section 1202 provides a fifty-percent exclusion for gain on certain small 
business stock, including stock in a “specialized small business investment company,” which is 
an organization that provides “a source of equity capital for incorporated and unincorporated 
small-business concerns, in such manner and under such terms as the small business investment 
company may fix in accordance with the regulations of the Administration,” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 684(a). I.R.C. § 1202 (2004); see also infra text accompanying notes 351–56. The American 
Jobs Creation Act of 2004, enacted in October of 2004, contains a number of provisions that 
benefit small businesses.  See Pub. L. 108–357, §§ 201-51 (“Business Tax Incentives” title), 
331-41 (subtitle entitled “Incentives for Small Manufacturers”), 118 Stat. 1418 (2004).  
Entrepreneurship also is subsidized by the federal government outside of the tax system. 
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 631 (2004) (“It is the declared policy of the Congress that the 
Government should aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small-
business concerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise, to insure that a fair 
proportion of the total purchases and contracts or subcontracts for property and services for the 
Government (including but not limited to contracts or subcontracts for maintenance, repair, and 
construction) be placed with small-business enterprises, to insure that a fair proportion of the 
total sales of Government property be made to such enterprises . . . .”). The mission of the 
Small Business Administration, established by Congress, is to “[m]aintain and strengthen the 
nation's economy by aiding, counseling, assisting and protecting the interests of small 
businesses and by helping families and businesses recover from national disasters.” 
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then, does federal income tax law define the distinction between the “business” 
activities that experience the subsidy and the “investment” activities that do not? 
A. The Role of Labor in the Business/Investment Distinction 
Despite the Code’s systematic distinction between business and investment 
activities, discussed above,193 it does not contain a definition of “trade or 
business” applicable to the many provisions in which that phrase is used.194 
However, the phrase has been defined judicially in the context of specific 
provisions.195 An early case, Deputy v. Dupont,196 provides background and is 
analogous, though not directly on point.  
In that case, the Supreme Court distinguished between the business of E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours and Company (Dupont) and the taxpayer, an individual who 
was a sixteen-percent shareholder of Dupont. The taxpayer had paid $647,711.56 
in connection with assisting Dupont in providing company stock to nine new 
executives of Dupont.197 The IRS argued that the taxpayer’s “activities in 
connection with conserving and enhancing his estate did not constitute a ‘trade or 
business’ within the meaning” of the relevant Code section,198 which allowed the 
deduction of “‘ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the 
 
http://www.sba.gov/aboutsba/index.html. Professors David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim argue 
that the question of whether to provide a particular benefit through the tax system or through 
direct expenditures should be a question of how to organize government rather than one of tax 
policy. See DAVID A. WEISBACH & JACOB NUSSIM, THE INTEGRATION OF TAX AND SPENDING 
PROGRAMS (John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 194 2d Series, 2003), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID442063_code030909570.pdf?a
bstractid=442063.  
193 See supra text accompanying notes 39–156. 
194 See Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987).  
The phrase ‘trade or business’ . . . is common in the Code, for it appears in over 50 
sections and 800 subsections and in hundreds of places in proposed and final income tax 
regulations. . . . Despite this, the Code has never contained a definition of the words ‘trade 
or business’ for general application, and no regulation has been issued expounding its 
meaning for all purposes.”) (footnote omitted).  
Id. at 27; see also Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500, 503 (1974) (“The words ‘trade or 
business’ appear . . . in about 60 different sections of the 1954 Act. Those other sections 
are not helpful here . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
195 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987) (gambling losses for 
purposes of AMT); Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500, 503 (1974) (experimental 
expenditures); Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941) (expenses of producing income). 
196 308 U.S. 488 (1940).  
197 Id. at 489–92. 
198 Id. at 493. 
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taxable year in carrying on’” a trade or business.199 The Court held for the 
government, on the grounds that the expenditures related not to the taxpayer’s 
business but to that of the corporation200 and they were not “ordinary” 
expenditures even if they were connected to a business of the taxpayer.201 
Although the majority did not define the phrase “trade or business” in Dupont, 
Justice Frankfurter, in a brief but well-known concurrence, stated, “carrying on 
any trade or business,’ within the contemplation of § 23(a), involves holding 
one’s self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services.”202  
Higgins v. Commissioner,203 which presented the issue squarely, arose after 
Dupont. Mr. Higgins, who had investments totaling $35,000,000 in real estate, 
bonds and stocks,204 apparently worked every day205 overseeing his investments 
with the assistance of several employees.206 Like the taxpayer in Dupont, Higgins 
claimed that his expenses—which consisted of salaries and other expenditures—
were deductible under Code section 23(a), the predecessor of section 162.207 In 
denying the deductions, the Court stated: 
The petitioner merely kept records and collected interest and dividends from his 
securities, through managerial attention for his investments. No matter how large 
the estate or how continuous or extended the work required may be, such facts 
are not sufficient as a matter of law to permit the courts to reverse the decision of 
the Board [of Tax Appeals]. Its conclusion is adequately supported by this 
record, and rests upon a conception of carrying on business similar to that 
expressed by this Court for an antecedent section.208  
 
199 Id. at 489–90 (quoting Code section 23(a)). 
200 Id. at 493–94. 
201 Id. at 494–95. 
202 Dupont, 308 U.S. at 499 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Code section 23(a)(1) is the 
predecessor of Code section 162(a). See, e.g., Lettie Pate Whitehead Found., Inc. v. United 
States, 606 F.2d 534, 537 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979). 
203 312 U.S. 212 (1941). 
204 Higgins v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 1005, 1006 (1939), aff’d, 111 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 
1940), aff’d, 312 U.S. 212 (1941). 
205 Id. at 1007 (“Upon receipt of a letter [Mr. Higgins] would usually either cable or radio, 
being a prolific user of the cable and radio. He was in touch with his New York office by letter 
or cable almost daily.”). 
206 Higgins, 312 U.S. at 213–14. 
207 See supra note 33. 
208 Higgins, 312 U.S. at 218 (footnote omitted). The Board of Tax Appeals was the 
predecessor of the current United States Tax Court. See Leandra Lederman, “Civil”izing Tax 
Procedure: Applying General Federal Learning to Statutory Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 183, 191 n.36 (1996). 
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Although the holding apparently turned on the standard of review, implying 
that if the Board of Tax Appeals had held for Mr. Higgins, the Supreme Court 
might have upheld that decision, the Court’s ruling is still good law—investment 
activities, no matter how extensive, cannot constitute a trade or business for 
purposes of section 162.209 Thus, a modern-day Mr. Higgins would face the 
limitations on miscellaneous itemized deductions discussed above,210 with 
respect to the salaries he pays his employees, the rent for office space, and the 
like. 
Higgins did not define the phrase “trade or business” but Commissioner v. 
Groetzinger,211 a more recent decision, came closer to doing so with respect to 
the context of the provision in issue in that case.212 Groetzinger involved a full-
time gambler who gambled only for his own account.213 He apparently gambled 
approximately $70,000 in 1978, ending the year with a net loss of about 
$2,000.214 The IRS asserted that he was subject to alternative minimum tax under 
the law in effect in the year in question, which could be reduced by deductions 
attributable to a trade or business but not by other deductions.215 Thus, 
Groetzinger argued that his gambling activities constituted a trade or business.  
In Groetzinger, the Court first rejected the test that Justice Frankfurter had 
used in his concurrence in Dupont, referring to it as a “gloss” and an 
“adumbration,” and noting that it had never been adopted by a majority of the 
Supreme Court.216 The Court also stated,  
[w]e accept the fact that to be engaged in a trade or business, the taxpayer must 
be involved in the activity with continuity and regularity and that the taxpayer’s 
 
209 See Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 31 (1987) (“expenses incident to 
caring for one’s own investments, even though that endeavor is full time, are not deductible as 
paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business”). Nonetheless, being a “trader”—essentially 
buying and selling securities in one’s account with great frequency, rather than relying 
primarily on passive returns—can constitute a trade or business. See infra note 221 and 
accompanying text. 
210 See supra text accompanying notes 48–65. 
211 Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 31.  
212 Id. at 27 n.8. 
213 Id. at 24. In other words, Groetzinger did not place bets for others, sell tips, or act as a 
bookie. Id. If he had, those facts would have supported characterization of his activities as a 
trade or business under Justice’s Frankfurter’s concurrence in Deputy v. Dupont. See supra text 
accompanying note 201. 
214 Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 25 (“In 1978, he [Groetzinger] had gross winnings of 
$70,000, but he bet $72,032; he thus realized a net gambling loss for the year of $2,032.”). 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 31–32. 
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primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for income or profit. A 
sporadic activity, a hobby, or an amusement diversion does not qualify.217  
This statement does not seem to contrast the gambling activity of Mr. 
Groetzinger and the investment activity of Mr. Higgins. Did Higgins not pursue 
his activity in good faith, with regularity, and, if not full-time, nearly so? He also 
employed others to assist him.218 It “was not a hobby or a passing fancy.”219 In 
addition, unlike Groetzinger, Higgins actually profited from his efforts.220 The 
fact of profit alone should warrant a deduction under the Haig-Simons norm.221  
Nonetheless, the Court made clear that it saw a distinction from Higgins that 
warranted a deduction in Groetzinger:  
We do not overrule or cut back on the Court’s holding in Higgins when we 
conclude that if one’s gambling activity is pursued full time, in good faith, and 
with regularity, to the production of income for a livelihood, and is not a mere 
hobby, it is a trade or business within the meaning of the statutes with which we 
are here concerned.222  
To square Higgins with Groetzinger, the focus must be on the “active” or 
“passive” nature223 of the taxpayer’s earnings.224 In Higgins, the Court noted that 
 
217 Id. at 35. 
218 Higgins, 39 B.T.A. at 1006. 
219 Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 36. 
220 Higgins had a $35,000,000 portfolio that generated $380,394 of gross income in 1932. 
Higgins, 39 B.T.A. at 1011. 
221 See supra note 7. 
222 Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 35. 
223 See, e.g., Mayer v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 149, 156 (1994) (“To claim a trade or 
business deduction, the taxpayer must himself perform the activity characterizing the ‘trade or 
business.’”); Levin v. United States, 597 F.2d 760, 765 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (taxpayer “passively 
accumulating earnings” or “merely overseeing one’s accounts” is not engaged in trade or 
business of trading stocks).  
224 Cf. Snell v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1938) (“The word [business], 
notwithstanding disguise in spelling and pronunciation, means busyness; it implies that one is 
kept more or less busy, that the activity is an occupation.”). 
Both Higgins and Groetzinger involved taxpayers caught by a glitch in the Code that was 
subsequently fixed by Congress, in Groetzinger’s case prior to his litigation but for later tax 
years, and for Higgins after his litigation but retroactively. As discussed in the text, Higgins lost 
in the Supreme Court while Groetzinger won. It is interesting to note the Board of Tax 
Appeals’ characterization of Mr. Higgins: 
The petitioner has not been in the United States since 1921, having been in Europe, 
particularly in France, during that time. He had no business whatever in France or Europe, 
and in the taxable years reported no income from foreign corporations. He lived there as a 
matter of choice because he liked to live there for his own pleasure and for his health. He 
has a seagoing yacht.  
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Higgins “did not participate directly or indirectly in the management of the 
corporations in which he held stock or bonds.”225 Similarly, in another case, 
United States v. Generes,226 which involved a bad debt that required 
characterization as a business or nonbusiness debt,227 the Supreme Court stated: 
In tax jargon, Generes’ status as a shareholder was a nonbusiness interest. It was 
capital in nature and it was composed initially of tax-paid dollars. Its rewards 
were expectative and would flow, not from personal effort, but from investment 
earnings and appreciation. On the other hand, Generes’ status as an employee 
was a business interest. Its nature centered in personal effort and labor, and 
salary for that endeavor would be received.228
In that regard, an older case stated: 
A person of property, who devotes his time to the active management of it and 
also to active participation in the management of the companies in which his 
property is invested, and who maintains an office for that purpose where he 
spends a substantial part of his time, is carrying on business within the meaning 
of this statute. . . . The line comes between those who take the position of 
passive investors, doing only what is necessary from an investment point of 
 
Higgins, 39 B.T.A. at 1009. It was completely irrelevant to the issue in Higgins that Mr. 
Higgins happened to own a yacht in addition to his $35,000,000 portfolio of stocks and 
bonds. Why mention it if not to portray Mr. Higgins as someone who did not need 
government protection of his earnings? 
225 Higgins, 312 U.S. at 214; cf. Medchem, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
116 T.C. 308 (2001). In Medchem, the Tax Court stated: 
[W]e believe that Congress promulgated the ‘active conduct of a trade or business’ 
requirement of section 936(a) intending to prevent a domestic corporate taxpayer from 
availing itself of the possessions tax credit unless it established and regularly operated an 
employment-producing, profit-motivated business activity in a U.S. possession. We also 
believe that Congress expected the taxpayer to participate meaningfully in the 
management and operation of that activity and to invest significantly in that activity, the 
expected result of which would be to strengthen the economy of the possession where the 
activity was located. 
Id. at 336. 
226 405 U.S. 93 (1972). 
227 See I.R.C. § 165(c) (2004); see also supra text accompanying notes 148–56. 
228 Generes, 405 U.S. at 100–01; see also Smartt v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-65. 
In Smartt, the Tax Court stated: 
Returns from investing—as a shareholder—are “expectative”; they result from 
appreciation and earnings on the investment rather than from personal effort or labor. . . .  
On the other hand, one’s role or status as an employee is a business interest. Its typical 
nature is the exertion of effort and labor in exchange for a salary. 
Id. 
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view, and those who associate themselves actively in the enterprises in which 
they are financially interested and devote a substantial part of their time to that 
work as a matter of business. . . .229
As this suggests, the focus is also on the taxpayer’s own labor. Higgins had 
several employees, and employment constitutes a trade or business,230 but their 
activities were not imputed to him. As another example, the Court of Federal 
Claims has stated: 
The arguably more fundamental reason for determining that plaintiff is not 
entitled to treatment as a “trader” [which would constitute a trade or business] 
. . . is simply that plaintiff is not a trader because he, personally, did not engage 
in (or direct) the “trading” of stocks, or the transactions related to the stocks at 
issue, regardless of how long they were held. In fact, there is no evidence that he 
personally ever engaged in a single trading transaction.231
As this quotation may suggest, one odd effect of the distinction between 
earnings from labor and earnings from investment is that, although holding 
stocks, bonds, or real estate for their dividends, interest, and rents does not 
constitute a trade or business under Higgins, under case law distinguishing 
Higgins, the investor who buys and sells with great frequency, turning over the 
contents of his portfolio often, is deemed to be in the trade or business of trading 
stock.232 For example, in Groetzinger, the Supreme Court stated, in part, “we 
 
229 Foss v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 326, 327–28 (1st Cir. 1935); see also Washburn v. 
Commissioner, 51 F.2d 949, 953 (8th Cir. 1931) (“A party may have investments in corporate 
stock, have no particular occupation, and live on the return of his investments. That would not 
constitute business under the statute in question. He may, however, take such an active part in 
the management of the enterprise in which he has investments as to amount to the carrying on 
of a business.”). These holdings are in line with Dupont, 308 U.S. at 488, discussed above. See 
supra text accompanying notes 195–201. 
230 See Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 28. 
231 Mayer v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 149, 155 (1994) (emphasis omitted); cf. Levin v. 
United States, 220 Ct. Cl. 197, 205 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (“In contrast to the distant management of a 
portfolio portrayed in Higgins, judgments regarding purchases and sales were made directly by 
taxpayer, based on his personal investigation of the assets, operation and management of 
various corporations.”); Mayer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-209 (“[W]e do not reach 
the issue of whether the mere fact that petitioners ceded full discretion over their accounts, and 
engaged in no trading in such accounts themselves, precludes them from being classified as 
‘traders.’”). 
232 See, e.g., Moller v. United States, 721 F.2d 810, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (if “securities are 
bought and sold with reasonable frequency in an endeavor to catch the swings in the daily 
market movements and profit thereby on a short term basis,” that indicates that the taxpayer is 
engaged in the trade or business of trading stocks; if “securities are purchased to be held for 
capital appreciation and income, usually without regard to short-term developments that would 
influence the price of securities on the daily market,” the taxpayer is a mere investor); Purvis v. 
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conclude . . . that . . . expenses incident to caring for one’s own investments, even 
though that endeavor is full time, are not deductible as paid or incurred in 
carrying on a trade or business . . . [but] that the opposite conclusion may follow 
for an active trader . . . .”233  
The passive/active distinction is not solely judicial. A similar distinction is 
reflected in the earned income credit of Code section 32234 and the foreign earned 
income exclusion.235 For those purposes, “earned income” is generally defined to 
include wages, salaries, tips, and other employee compensation that constitute 
gross income for the taxable year, as well as net earnings from self-
employment.236 Thus, no earned income credit is awarded with respect to 
dividends, interest, rents, and other earnings on “passive” investments. In fact, 
individuals with “excessive” passive investment income are not eligible to claim 
the earned income credit regardless of the amount of earned income they have.237
Similarly, and as indicated above, Code section 469, an anti-tax shelter 
provision, generally defers losses and credits from “passive activities” until there 
is income from the activity against which to offset them.238 For the most part,239 
 
Commissioner, 530 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1976); Liang v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 1040, 
1043 (1955) (“The distinction between an investment account and a trading account is that in 
the former, securities are purchased to be held for capital appreciation and income, usually 
without regard to short-term developments that would influence the price of the securities on 
the daily market. In a trading account, securities are bought and sold with reasonable frequency 
in an endeavor to catch the swings in the daily market movements and profit thereby . . . .”). See 
also Mayer, 32 Fed. Cl. at 155 (1994) (“83.8% of [taxpayers’] investment income came from 
dividends, interest, and long-term appreciation (capital gains) and only the remainder (16.2%) 
was generated by ‘short-term’ trades (although not ‘short-term’ under the definition in Moller, 
since most of these securities were held more than thirty days)” so taxpayers were mere 
“investors”). 
233 Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 31 (citations omitted). Accordingly, a stock-owning taxpayer 
who forgoes much of the deferral afforded by the realization requirement, and perhaps the 
benefits of the capital gains preference (by selling stock after holding it only briefly) can benefit 
from the lifting of the deduction-side restrictions that apply to investors. See supra text 
accompanying notes 39–156 (discussing these restrictions).  
234 See I.R.C. § 32 (2004) (providing refundable credit with respect to “earned income” of 
eligible low-income individuals). 
235 See I.R.C. § 911 (2004) (excluding, up to a cap, “foreign earned income” of certain 
citizens and residents of the United States living abroad). 
236 I.R.C. §§ 32(c)(2), 911(d)(2). 
237 I.R.C. § 32(i). For this purpose, “investment income” includes “capital gain net 
income.” I.R.C. § 32(i)(2)(D). The investment income cap was $2,600 for 2003. See Rev. Proc. 
2002-70, 2002-2 C.B. 845, 848 § 3.06(2). This rule apparently serves as a means test, though it 
is both overbroad (for example, given the cap for 2003, a taxpayer selling a relatively low value 
item at a $2,700 gain is disqualified) and underinclusive (otherwise eligible taxpayers with 
enormous wealth that does not yield current earnings qualify for the credit).  
238 See supra text accompanying notes 133–37. 
1454 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1401 
 
                                                                                                                                        
passive activities are trade or business or investment-type activities in which the 
taxpayer does not “materially participate.”240 Therefore, in order to avoid 
disallowance of losses and credits under this section, the taxpayer generally must 
“materially participate” in the activity.241 Material participation is defined as 
“involve[ment] in the operations of the activity on a basis which is—(A) regular, 
(B) continuous, and (C) substantial.”242 Implementing regulations provide a facts 
and circumstances test as well as a number of safe harbors that focus on the 
amount of time the taxpayer personally devotes to the activity.243
Thus, the primary distinction between business activity and investment 
activity is the element of labor. At a minimum, an active business requires the 
provision of labor.244 An income-oriented activity involving the provision of 
labor can constitute a trade or business regardless of whether capital accompanies 
the labor. However, as the discussion above demonstrated, an activity in which 
capital can produce earnings without accompanying labor—that is, an investment 
activity—does not constitute a trade or business.245  
In effect, federal income tax law provides an incentive for a taxpayer with 
capital to combine labor with the capital, rather than investing it passively,246 so 
long as either the taxpayer or his spouse has other income from labor or the 
taxpayer’s other income is variable (giving rise to profit years and loss years).247 
This subsidy for actively run businesses arguably serves to level the playing field 
because entrepreneurship is riskier than investing in established ventures.248 The 
 
239 The term “passive activity” also includes most rental activities, regardless of the 
taxpayer’s level of participation. I.R.C. §§ 469(c)(2), (4) (2004). 
240 I.R.C. § 469(c). 
241 I.R.C. § 469(c)(1). 
242 I.R.C. § 469(h)(1). 
243 See Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a) (as amended in 1996). 
244 To constitute a trade or business, an activity must also have continuity and regularity 
and be engaged in for profit. Groetzinger, 480 U.S at 35; see also supra text accompanying 
notes 210–16. 
245 See supra text accompanying notes 193–232. 
246 Code section 469 serves to deny full loss offsets to a taxpayer’s non-portfolio passive 
investment. See I.R.C. § 469 (2004); see also supra notes 133–37 and accompanying text. 
247 If the taxpayer and/or his spouse have a substantial and steady stream of income from 
passive investments, then the taxpayer has no federal income tax incentive to put capital in 
active business rather than passive investment. In fact, in that case, the taxpayer might prefer to 
invest passively because of the relatively lower risk of established ventures compared to start-
ups. 
248 Of course, encouraging risk through tax incentives is not necessarily salutary. For an 
argument that “risk incentives are difficult to defend economically, except perhaps under 
limited circumstances and then only when making the most favorable assumptions,” see 
Livingston, supra note 13, at 165. However, whether providing incentives for risk-taking is 
beneficial depends on whether there would be an optimal amount of risk-taking without 
incentives. Because individuals are ambiguity averse (they prefer risks with known 
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next section explores which subset of individual taxpayers benefit from this 
subsidy to the greatest extent. 
B. Who Benefits From the Subsidy? 
The discussion thus far has explored a subsidy for taxpayers with variable 
income or other labor income who combine labor and capital. In fact, this subsidy 
primarily benefits high-income taxpayers, for both tax and non-tax reasons. First, 
the higher the taxpayer’s other income, the greater amount is available to use to 
offset losses. Second, as discussed below, higher-income taxpayers are more 
likely to have capital left after taking advantage of tax-favored investment 
opportunities. Third, the high-income also are most likely to have the resources to 
capitalize a start-up business, as well as to afford tax advice. In addition, as 
discussed in Section C, high-income individuals benefit most from the tax 
advantages afforded successful small businesses. 
1. Who are the Entrepreneurs? 
Taxpayers with the most income or wealth249 engage in entrepreneurial 
activity disproportionately.250 In 1995, 74.3% of the top 1% of taxpayers251 (by 
 
probabilities to unknown risks), Chorvat, supra note 12, at 617 (citing DANIEL ELLSBERG, RISK, 
AMBIGUITY AND DECISION 131–50 (2001)), Professor Terry Chorvat argues that “[b]ecause 
entrepreneurial activity is subject to fairly ambiguous risks, in the absence of some incentive, 
the amount of entrepreneurial activity will be lower than the social optimum.” Id. at 647 
(citing Wen-Fang Liu, Saving and Portfolio: Observable Implications with Knightian 
Uncertainty (Univ. of Washington Working Paper, Apr. 2000) and Joram Mayshar, Should 
Government Subsidize Risky Private Projects?, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 20, 23 (1977)); see also 
Cullen & Gordon, supra note 15 (explaining that effect of spillover benefits of entrepreneurship 
may be that market incentives produce too little entrepreneurial activity).  
249 As reported by Professor John Lee, the Congressional Research Service found in 1994 
that “‘families that owned small businesses were found to have eighty percent more income and 
over five times the wealth of the average family.’” Lee, supra note 186, at 910 (citing Jane G. 
Gravelle, Small Business Tax Subsidy Proposals, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 61–12, March 15, 
1993). 
Income and wealth are likely to be correlated. See Jeffrey H. Kahn, Personal 
Deductions—a Tax “Ideal” or Just Another “Deal”?, 2002 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 1, 22 n.70 
(2002); EDWARD N. WOLFF, RECENT TRENDS IN WEALTH OWNERSHIP, 1983–1998, at 5–6 
(Jerome Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 300, 2000) (“Wealth and income are strongly 
correlated. . . .”) (quoted in Deborah A. Geier, Incremental Versus Fundamental Tax Reform 
and the Top One Percent, 56 SMU L. REV. 99, 114 (2003)). 
250 See, e.g., Cullen & Gordon, supra note 15, at 31 (Their data, which uses income 
reported on federal tax returns for a sample of taxpayers, suggest that “entrepreneurial activity 
is heavily concentrated among the top one percent of the population.”); EDWARD P. LAZEAR, 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9109, Aug. 
2002), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9109 (Study of alumni of Stanford Graduate 
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income) owned interests in privately held businesses.252 On average, those 
businesses comprised 41.4% of the taxpayer’s net worth, and the single largest 
component of that net worth.253 For the period 1962 through 1995, 74.9% of that 
group owned interests in privately held businesses, while only 12.8% of the 
bottom 99% did.254 For the same period, on average, the net value of private 
businesses constituted 37.7% of the total net worth of the top 1% of taxpayers and 
only 14.8% of the total net worth of the bottom 99%.255
Entrepreneurs also make up a disproportionate percentage of the top of the 
population by income. One study found that, in 1989, entrepreneurs’256 
percentage of the top 1% of the population by income was 56.3%, and of the 4% 
just below the top 1% was 26.7%.257 In addition, the average net worth of 
entrepreneurs in the top 1% was $5,164,994, while the average net worth of non-
entrepreneurs in that group was $3,130,220.258  
Similarly, of expected decedents for 1998, the share of total assets of those 
with life-insurance-augmented assets of $10,000,000 and over attributable to 
active business was 49.4%, while the share of directly held public stock for that 
group was only 22.4%.259 For those with life-insurance-augmented assets of 
$5,000,000 to $10,000,000, the share attributable to active business drops to 
5.2%, while the share of directly held public stock for that group is 41.2%.260 
Overall, the 1998 mean and median income of those employed by another were 
 
School of Business bore out prediction that the proportion of individuals who are entrepreneurs 
increases with income bracket and the income distribution of entrepreneurs has a “fatter upper 
tail.”). 
251 In the 1980s, the top one percent by net worth owned approximately a quarter or a 
third of all wealth, excluding defined benefit pensions. See John Laitner, Inequality and Wealth 
Accumulation: Eliminating the Federal Estate and Gift Tax, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT 
TAXATION, 272 tbl.6-3 (William G. Gale et al. eds. 2001) (data from 1983 Survey of Consumer 
Finances and 1989 Panel Study of Income Dynamics). 
252 CHRISTOPHER D. CARROLL, PORTFOLIOS OF THE RICH, Working Paper No. 7826, at 28 
tbl.2 (Aug. 2000), available at http://www.econ.jhu.edu/people/ccarroll/richportfolios.pdf.  
253 Id. at 29 tbl.3. 
254 Id. at 28 tbl.2. Professor John Lee summarizes a variety of statistics on ownership of 
stock and ownership of business assets by stating “[t]he literature shows that the active owners 
of small corporations are, on the average, high income individuals . . . .” Lee, supra note 186, at 
908. 
255 Carroll, supra note 252, at 29 tbl.3. 
256 The term “entrepreneur” was defined as a household owning one or more active 
businesses with a total market value of at least $5,000. Gentry & Hubbard, supra note 12, at 4. 
257 Id. at 46 tbl.1. 
258 Id. at 47 tbl.2. 
259 See James M. Poterba & Scott Weisbrenner, The Distributional Burden of Taxing 
Estates and Unrealized Capital Gains at Death, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, 
supra note 251, at 440 tbl.10-8. 
260 Id. 
2004] THE ENTREPRENEURSHIP EFFECT 1457 
 
                                                                                                                                        
$40,500 and $53,500, while the same figures for the self-employed were $52,700 
and $109,000.261 There is an even starker contrast in family net worth: The 1998 
mean and median net worth of those employed by another were $52,400 and 
$168,900, while the same figures for the self-employed were $248,100 and 
$919,800, respectively.262
[O]nly 8.6 percent of households (in the 1989 cross-section of the Federal 
Reserve Board Survey of Consume Finances) . . . have active business assets of 
more than $5,000, but . . . those households own about 40% of household 
wealth. Moreover, the higher one goes in the wealth distribution, the greater is 
the importance of business owners and business assets. Entrepreneurs own 68 
percent of the net worth held by the top 1 percent of households in the wealth 
distribution.263
Thus, it appears that the richest individuals, measured either by income or 
wealth, disproportionately invest in active business rather than in publicly held 
companies, when compared to those in the strata below them. Of course, it is 
quite possible that for many individuals, it is the entrepreneurial activity that 
occasioned the high-income status, rather than the reverse, particularly because 
these figures consider only those who have high income (or wealth). In other 
words, these figures reflect survival bias in that they only look at entrepreneurs 
who have the threshold level of income (or wealth).264 However, it is interesting 
to note that to the extent that the entrepreneurship occasioned the high-income 
status, then even those individuals subject to the highest marginal tax rates have 
on the whole done well by investing disproportionately in active business.  
Statistics relating to the employment status and financial holdings of the top 
1% of Americans before and after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA ‘86) 
suggest that tax incentives may play a role. TRA ‘86 increased the importance of 
labor to favorable deduction-side tax consequences by enacting the two-percent 
floor and the passive activity loss rules265 and by tightening the limitation on 
 
261 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/98/bulltables98.txt. at tbl.1. 
262 Id. at tbl.2. 
263 Hubbard, supra note 15, at 456.  
264 According to IRS data from tax returns, entrepreneurs seem to be doing well. The IRS 
found that the number of non-farm proprietorship returns increased by 1.9% from 1999 to 2000 
and non-farm sole proprietor profits increased 3.3% for the 2000 tax year, a 2.4% increase in 
constant dollars. Michael Parisi & Brian Balkovic, Sole Proprietorship Returns, 2000, at 6, 7 at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/00spart.pdf. Aggregate non-farm sole proprietor profits were 
$214.7 billion. Id. at 6. Sole proprietorships with employees were included in the data. See id. at 
9, figure D (15.2% of aggregate expenses were for salaries and wages).  
265 See supra notes 48, 134, and accompanying text. 
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investment interest.266 It was also accompanied by pro-entrepreneurship 
rhetoric267 and contained concessions for small businesses.268  
The Federal Reserve Board conducted surveys of Consumer Finances in 
1983 and 1992.269 Those data cannot isolate the effect of the 1986 Act, but they 
are informative nonetheless. They show, for example, that in 1983 the portion of 
the top 1% by wealth that was self-employed was 38%, whereas in 1992, the 
portion of the top 1% by wealth (which may not consist of the same people as in 
1983) that was self-employed was 69%270—an increase of thirty-one percentage 
points. In addition, between 1983 and 1992, the share of income of the top 1% by 
wealth from self-employment, partnerships, and unincorporated business 
 
266 The 1986 Act eliminated the $10,000 ($5,000 for married taxpayers filing separately) 
of investment interest that could be deducted without regard to investment income. See Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511(a), 100 Stat. 2244 (1986). The 1986 Act also 
eliminated the capital gains preference, though that turned out to be temporary. See I.R.C. 
§ 1(h) (2004).  
267 See PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN, REMARKS DURING TAX BILL SIGNING CEREMONY 
(Oct. 22, 1986), reprinted in 33 TAX NOTES 413, 413 (1986) (“When I sign this bill into law, 
America will have the lowest marginal tax rates and the most modern tax code among major 
industrialized nations, one that encourages risk-taking, innovation, and that old American spirit 
of enterprise. We’ll be refueling the American growth economy with the kind of incentives that 
helped create record new businesses and nearly 11.7 million jobs in just 46 months. Fair and 
simpler for most Americans, this is a tax code designed to take us into a future of technological 
invention and economic achievement, one that will keep America competitive and growing into 
the 21st century.”); see also Kornhauser, supra note 18, at 162. 
The 1986 Act also lowered personal income tax rates, which has the effect of lowering the 
amount of risk transferred to the government, decreasing the incentive for entrepreneurship. See 
Cullen & Gordon, supra note 15, at 35–36.  
268 See Wilson, supra note 18. Mr. Wilson remarks: 
[N]otwithstanding [the] massive overhaul of the Code [in 1986], small business and its 
advocates were still able to extract special treatment from the lawmakers, primarily in the 
form of size tests that protected small firms from many of the TRA's [Tax Reform Act’s] 
provisions. . . . In total, these provisions gave small businesses an advantage over their 
larger competitors. Although small business was caught by some TRA reforms, on 
balance small business was a big winner under tax reform legislation of the mid-1980s. 
Id. at 56. 
269 In looking at the 1983 and 1992 data, Edward Wolff asks, as one of six introductory 
questions, “with the substantial increase in inequality over this period, and especially with the 
record-high salaries recorded on Wall Street and among professional workers in general, has 
there been a shift in the composition of the rich away from the classic ‘coupon clippers’ toward 
entrepreneurs?” See Wolff, supra note 191, at 74. Wolff’s discussion generally does not 
connect changes in levels of entrepreneurship among the very rich with tax changes during that 
period. See generally id. 
270 Id. at 82, 86. There was a corresponding drop in that group in the various categories 
that make up employment by others. See id.  
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increased from 27% to 40%.271 The share held by this group of net business 
equity increased from 52.1% to 62.0% while their share of stocks and mutual 
funds fell from 57.5% to 50.1%.272  
In addition, during that period:  
the income statistics show a greater reliance on labor income than other forms of 
income among the very rich. Between 1983 and 1992, labor earnings (both 
wages and salary and self-employment income) as a share of the total income of 
the top wealth percentile jumped from 51% to 69%, and that of the top income 
percentile from 60% to 68%.273
Correspondingly, the rich relied less on income from capital in 1992 than in 
1983; income from property, such as interest, dividends, capital gains, rents, and 
royalties, fell from 46% to 27% of the income of the top 1% by wealth and from 
36% to 30% for the top 1% by income.274
Thus, these statistics suggest that taxes may play a role in the concentration 
of entrepreneurs among the highest-income individuals, although it is unlikely to 
be the only important factor.275 The next Section addresses the issue of why high-
income taxpayers benefit disproportionately from the federal income tax subsidy 
of business activities. 
2. Why Do High-Income Individuals Benefit Most? 
There are a number of reasons why high-income taxpayers benefit most from 
the entrepreneurship tax subsidy.276 First, high-income taxpayers benefit from the 
greatest risk-shifting under the federal income tax because they face higher 
 
271 Id. at 109. Wolff points out that part of the increase may be due to the incentive 
created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 for C corporations to elect to be taxed under 
Subchapter S; the data classify S corporations as unincorporated business. Id. at 110. 
 272 Id. at 87, 88 tbl.3.4, 91 tbl.3.5. Although the absolute increase in the value of net 
business assets was large, from $1.232 trillion in 1983 to $2.5332 trillion in 1992 (unadjusted 
for inflation), the percentage increase was small. Id. A comparison of the holdings of the top 
one percent in 1983 and 1992 reveals that the percentage of their gross assets in net business 
equity increased slightly from 32.1% to 32.6% while the percentage of their gross assets in 
stock fell from 17% to 12.1%. See id. at 88 tbl.3.4, 91 tbl.3.5.  
273 Id. at 109. There was nonetheless a reduction in “labor-force effort” by the very rich, 
reflecting a shift to part-time work among the top one percent by income and both a shift to 
part-time work and retirement among the top one percent by wealth. Id. 
274 Id. at 110. 
275 High-income individuals may also be better able to bear the risks of entrepreneurship 
because of decreasing absolute risk aversion. In other words, a higher-income individual is 
more able to bear the risk of losing an investment of, say $50,000, than a lower-income 
individual is. 
276 On a practical level, they are more able to afford tax and financial advice.  
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marginal rates in a progressive income tax system. For example, in general, a 
taxpayer who has a top marginal rate of 30% shifts 30% of the risk of loss to the 
government, whereas a taxpayer with a top marginal rate of 15% shifts only 15% 
of the risk to the government.277  
Second, high-income taxpayers obtain the greatest benefits of the income-
splitting made possible by incorporating a successful business, discussed 
below.278 In addition, as discussed below, there are estate tax benefits to owning 
active business. Only very wealthy individuals need be concerned about estate tax 
liability; the estate tax only applies to fewer than two percent of estates each 
year.279
High-income taxpayers are also disproportionately affected by the 
restrictions on itemized deductions, discussed above,280 that affect investment 
expenses but not business expenses.281 IRS 2000 Statistics of Income data show 
that over 90% of individuals with AGI of $100,000 or more itemized their 
deductions, whereas only about 28% of individuals with AGI under $100,000 
did.282 In addition, because of the AGI threshold provided in section 68, the 
 
277 See supra text accompanying notes 158–61, illustrating the shifting of risk. 
278 See infra text accompanying notes 326–37. 
279 See Lee Anne Fennell, Death, Taxes, and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REV. 567, 593–94 & 
n.99 (2003). 
280 See supra text accompanying notes 39–102. 
281 Additionally, 12.6% of returns of taxpayers who itemized and had AGI of $100,000 or 
more claimed an investment interest deduction. See 2000 IRS Statistics of Income, supra note 
103, at tbl.2.1; see also supra note 103. It is not clear how many taxpayers incurred investment 
interest but did not deduct it because they had no investment income. 
282 There were 117,372,120 returns showing AGI under $100,000, not including those 
with zero AGI. 84,640,562 of those took the standard deduction, which is 72.11%. There were 
10,855,026 returns showing AGI of $100,000 or more. Of those, 1,029,964 took the standard 
deduction, which is 9.49%. All calculations done by the author, based on 2000 IRS Statistics of 
Income, supra note 103, at tbl1.2. The latter statistic is consistent with the 1994 data Professors 
Shuldiner and Shakow analyzed. See Shuldiner & Shakow, supra note 42, at 683 tbl.4; see also 
supra note 42. 
Lower-income individuals who itemize are more frequently affected by the two-percent 
floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions. A quarter of returns itemizing deductions and 
showing AGI under $100,000 are affected by the two-percent floor, whereas 19.35% of returns 
itemizing deductions and with AGI of $100,000 to $500,000 are affected. Only 11.86% of 
taxpayers with AGI over $1 million dollars who itemize deductions are so affected. See 2000 
IRS Statistics of Income, supra note 103, at tbl.2.1 (calculations performed by the author). 
These figures suggest that itemized deductions do not rise proportionately with income, which 
turns out to be the case. See 2000 IRS Statistics of Income, supra note 103, at tbl.1.2. In fact, 
with respect to some AGI groupings, as AGI increases, aggregate itemized deductions decrease 
(such as between the $50,000 to $75,000 and $75,000 to $100,000 AGI groups and the 
$500,000 to $1 million and $1 million to $1.5 million AGI groups).  
Of course, higher-income taxpayers affected by the two-percent floor lose many more 
dollars of deductions, given that the lost deductions are two percent of AGI. See 2000 IRS 
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overall limitation on itemized deductions affects all high-income individuals who 
itemize. Professors Shuldiner and Shakow found that in 1994, 1% of all itemizing 
returns with AGI between $55,000 and $100,000 were affected by the overall 
limitation on itemized deductions whereas 69.7% of those itemizing with AGI 
between $100,000 and $200,000 were affected and all of those itemizing with 
AGI over $200,000 were affected.283 Furthermore, some high-income taxpayers 
take the standard deduction and the data suggest section 68 as the most likely 
reason.284 Additionally, a disproportionate percentage of high-income taxpayers 
pay AMT285 and miscellaneous itemized deductions are entirely disallowed 
under the AMT.286
Although middle-income taxpayers may have a similar, if smaller, federal 
income tax incentive to combine their labor and capital into active business, in 
fact the Code tends to channel their capital to other investments. That is, 
taxpayers have tax incentives to make significant investments in owner-occupied 
housing, retirement vehicles, and whole life insurance,287 and middle-income 
taxpayers likely have little capital to invest after taking advantage of these tax-
favored investments.  
 
Statistics of Income, supra note 103, at tbl.2.1. In addition, a number of high-income 
individuals pay AMT, and miscellaneous itemized deductions are completely disallowed under 
the AMT. See supra notes 57–65 and accompanying text. 
283 2000 IRS Statistics of Income, supra note 103, at 682 tbl.3. IRS Statistics of Income 
for tax year 2000 show that virtually all taxpayers with AGI of $200,000 and up who itemized 
deductions were affected by section 68. See 2000 IRS Statistics of Income, supra note 103, at 
tbl.2.1.  
284 Shuldiner & Shakow, supra note 42, at 683 (pointing out that, in the 1994 data they 
present, the percentage of taxpayers taking the standard deduction is greater for those with AGI 
over $500,000 than it is for those with AGI under $500,000). For 2000, 8.72% of taxpayers 
with AGI between $500,000 and $1 million took the standard deduction, whereas 10.53% of 
taxpayers with AGI between $1 million and $1.5 million did. Id. The percentages decline from 
there: 8.71% of taxpayers with AGI between $1.5 million and $2 million took the standard 
deduction; 7.60% of taxpayers with AGI between $2 million and $5 million did; 5.47% of 
taxpayers with AGI between $5 million and $10 million; and 2.92% of taxpayers with AGI 
over $10 million did. 2000 IRS Statistics of Income, supra note 103, at tbl.1.2 (calculations 
performed by the author). 
285 Overall, .45% of individuals’ year 2000 returns paid AMT. 2000 IRS Statistics of 
Income, supra note 103, at tbl.1.2 (percentage calculated by the author). By contrast, 9.03% of 
taxpayers with over $100,000 of AGI paid AMT and 17.99% of taxpayers with over $200,000 
of AGI paid AMT. Id. (percentages calculated by the author). More specifically, 5.8% of 
taxpayers with AGI between $100,000 and $200,000 paid AMT. Id. (percentage calculated by 
the author). 18.79% of taxpayers with AGI between $200,000 and $500,000 paid AMT. Id. 
(percentage calculated by the author). 15.86% of taxpayers with AGI between $500,000 and 
$1million paid AMT. Id. (percentage calculated by the author). 13.70% of taxpayers with AGI 
between $1 million and $1.5 million paid AMT. Id. (percentage calculated by the author).  
286 See I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (2004); see also supra text accompanying notes 57–65. 
287 See infra text accompanying notes 287–304. 
1462 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1401 
 
                                                                                                                                        
With respect to owner-occupied housing, the Code provides several 
important benefits, although living arrangements fall in the category of personal, 
not profit-seeking, activities.288 First, although other personal interest generally is 
not deductible, home mortgage interest on debt of up to a maximum of 
$1,100,000 is deductible with respect to a first and second residence.289 Second, 
state and local real property taxes are deductible.290 Third, gain of up to $500,000 
on the sale of a principal residence is excludible from gross income if certain 
requirements are met.291 Taxpayers may take advantage of this provision as often 
as once every two years.292 Fourth, the Code does not tax the imputed income 
from home ownership. That is, although a taxpayer who puts $100,000 in a bank 
or in stock pays tax on the earnings293 and cannot deduct rent paid for housing,294 
the taxpayer who puts the $100,000 in a home in which he lives pays no tax on 
the imputed rental value.295 These provisions provide a substantial incentive for a 
taxpayer to invest in a home.296  
With respect to retirement, the Code provides incentives for a variety of 
different types of plans, many of which are employment-based. Employment-
 
288 See I.R.C. § 262 (2004) (denying deduction for “personal, living, or family 
expenses.”); see also supra text accompanying notes 27–32 (discussing Code’s distinction 
between personal and profit-seeking activities). 
289 I.R.C. §§ 163(a), (h)(3) (2004). 
290 I.R.C. § 164(a)(2) (2004). 
291 I.R.C. § 121 (2004). The $500,000 cap applies to qualifying married taxpayers filing a 
joint return. See I.R.C. § 121(b)(2)(A). Otherwise, the limit is $250,000. See I.R.C. § 121(b)(1). 
292 I.R.C. §§ 121(a), (b)(3). 
293 See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(4), (7) (2004). 
294 Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(3) (1987). 
295 The Code does not tax the imputed income from other assets, either, but the home is 
often a family’s most valuable asset. In addition, other assets are not favored by the other tax 
incentives that encourage home ownership. 
296 Although the home is a personal use asset, it has significant investment aspects. See 
Myron C. Grauer, A Case for Congressional Facilitation of a Collaborative Model of Statutory 
Interpretation in the Tax Area: Lessons to be Learned from the Corn Products and Arkansas 
Best Cases and the Historical Development of the Statutory Definition of “Capital Asset(s)”, 84 
KY. L.J. 1, 42 (1995–96) (“Many persons view their residences . . . as investments.”) (footnotes 
omitted). That is, many taxpayers hope to make a profit from their home (or from a series of 
different homes that they own over a period of time), perhaps to use that profit to help support 
their retirement. See F.H. Buckley, The Debtor as Victim, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1078, 1082 
(2002) (“[H]ouses are often an individual’s largest asset and his most important private source 
of retirement savings. . . . On retirement, the debtor will ordinarily cash in the house by trading 
down to a smaller house, using the proceeds of the sale as a nest egg.”) (footnote omitted). 
Alternatively, some senior citizens obtain a “reverse mortgage.” See Jean Reilly, Reverse 
Mortgages: Backing into the Future, 5 ELDER L.J. 17, 18 (1997). 
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based defined contribution plans297 allow for an exclusion from gross income of 
both employer and employee contributions, up to a maximum of $40,000 per 
year.298 In general, individual retirement accounts (IRAs) allow a tax deduction 
for contributions of up to $3,000 for the 2003 tax year;299 this amount is 
scheduled to increase to $5,000 for the 2008 tax year.300  
Tax-deductible IRAs provide more benefit to individuals who do not 
participate in employer-sponsored plans than to those who do; the maximum 
deductible amount is rapidly phased out for an individual who is an active 
participant in a pension plan, or whose spouse is an active participant.301 A 
taxpayer may not deduct an IRA contribution that exceeds “compensation,”302 
which is defined as the sum of “earned income”303 and alimony received.304  
With respect to life insurance, the Code generally does not tax life insurance 
proceeds payable “by reason of the death of the insured,”305 regardless of the 
source of the payments—premiums for term insurance, additional premiums for 
“whole life” insurance, and even the earnings on those additional premiums. In 
addition, the “inside build-up” of a whole life policy is not taxed as it is earned. 
Therefore, inside build-up paid out at death is never taxed. 
 
297 Code section 414 defines the term “defined contribution plan” as “a plan which 
provides for an individual account for each participant and for benefits based solely on the 
amount contributed to the participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, 
and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be allocated to such 
participant’s account.” I.R.C. § 414(i) (2004). It defines the term “defined benefit plan” as “any 
plan which is not a defined contribution plan.” I.R.C. § 414(j). For defined benefit plans, the 
maximum allowable benefit is $160,000 per year. I.R.C. § 415(b)(1) (2004). 
298 I.R.C. §§ 415(c)(1), (2). The maximum also cannot exceed 100% of the individual’s 
compensation. I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(B).  
These plans also apply to self-employed individuals. See I.R.C. §§ 401(c)(1), 415(c)(3)(B) 
(2004). 
299 See I.R.C. § 219(b)(5)(A) (2004). That amount is increased for individuals over age 
50. See I.R.C. § 219(b)(5)(B). For 2003, the amount of the increase was $500. Id. 
300 I.R.C. § 219(b)(5)(A). The amount will be adjusted for inflation after 2008. Additional 
contributions of $500 or $1,000 are allowed for individuals age 50 and older. I.R.C. 
§ 219(b)(5)(B).  
301 See I.R.C. § 219(g). 
302 I.R.C. §§ 219(b)(1)(B), (c) (considering spouse’s compensation in certain situations). 
IRAs in a sense shelter earnings from labor but, under the Cary Brown thesis, the economic 
effect is to exempt the return on capital from taxation. See Johnson, supra note 3 at 1022. Thus, 
the net effect of an IRA is to shelter from taxation the income on capital earned from the 
income from labor, given that contributions cannot exceed compensation. 
303 This term is defined in I.R.C. § 401(c)(2) (2004).  
304 I.R.C. §§ 219(a), (b)(1), (f)(1) (2004). 
305 I.R.C. § 101(a)(1) (2004). 
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Taxpayers, including middle-income taxpayers, do take advantage of these 
provisions. In 1998, 66.2% of families owned their primary residence.306 Of 
families with net worth in the second quartile from the bottom, 67.2% did, and 
those residences had a median value of $60,000.307 In the top two quartiles, over 
90% owned their primary residence.308 The median value of residences owned by 
taxpayers in the second quartile from the top was $95,000.309  
The percentage of families with income of $50,000 to $99,999 in 1998 
dollars that owned retirement accounts was 73.5%, and the average value of those 
accounts was $31,000.310 For families with income of $100,000 or more in 1998 
dollars, the percentage owning retirement accounts was 88.6%, and those 
accounts had a median value of $93,000.311 Of families with net worth in the 
second quartile, 44.2% owned a retirement account (with a median value of 
$8,100); in the third quartile, 56.4% did (with a median value of $28,000); and in 
the 75th to 89.9th percentiles, 71.9% did (with a median value of $59,800).312 
Overall, on average, in 1998, retirement accounts constituted 27.5% of families’ 
financial assets, the single largest percentage.313
The percentage of families with income of $50,000 to $99,999 in 1998 
dollars that owned life insurance was 39.8%, and the median cash value of those 
policies was $9,500.314 For families with income of $100,000 or more in 1998 
dollars, the percentage owning life insurance was 50.1%, and the median cash 
 
306 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Division of Research and 
Statistics, Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Results from the 1998 Survey of Consumer 
Finances, 86 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1, 17 tbl.8B (2000) [hereinafter 1998 Survey]. In 1998, of 
families with net worth in the bottom quartile, 14.1% owned their primary residence, which had 
a median value of $40,000. Id.  
307 Id. In 1998, 71% of families with income of $50,000 to $99,999 in 1998 dollars had 
home-secured debt. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES: THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK 727 tbl.1169 (121st ed. 2001) 
[hereinafter 2001 ABSTRACTS]. For families with income of $100,000 or more in 1998 dollars, 
the percentage with home-secured debt was 73.4. Id. Thus, approximately three-quarters of 
families with income of $50,000 and up had homes subject to a mortgage. A similar proportion 
owned retirement funds. See infra notes 310–12 and accompanying text.  
308 1998 Survey, supra note 306, at 17 tbl.8B. 
309 Id. For families with a net worth in the 75th to 89.9th percentiles, the median value of 
the principal residence was $140,000. Id. For families in the top 10% by net worth, the median 
value was $250,000. Id. 
310 See 2001 ABSTRACTS, supra note 307, at 726 tbl.1167. 
311 Id. 
312 1998 Survey, supra note 306, at 11 tbl.5B. In the top 10% of families by net worth, 
80.2% owned retirement accounts, with a median value of $125,000. Id. 
313 Id. at 8 tbl.4. Stocks were next at 22.7%. 
314 2001 ABSTRACTS, supra note 307, at 726 tbl.1167; 1998 Survey, supra note 306, at 11 
tbl.5B. 
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value of those policies was $18,000.315 In 1998, on average, the cash value of life 
insurance constituted 6.4% of a family’s financial assets.316  
Thus, middle-income taxpayers on the whole typically will have little capital 
that they cannot shelter in retirement vehicles, owner-occupied housing, and life 
insurance. By contrast, high-income taxpayers typically will have assets that 
exceed the caps of these provisions. High-income taxpayers own a 
disproportionate amount of capital when compared to middle and low-income 
taxpayers.317  
High-income taxpayers may take advantage of the tax benefits of home 
ownership, including the mortgage interest subsidy on two residences.318 
Additional homes or loans in excess of $1,100,000 will not benefit from that 
subsidy. The alternative minimum tax may also apply to eliminate any deduction 
for home mortgage interest.319 In addition, gains exceeding $250,000 on the sale 
of a principal residence ($500,000 for married taxpayers filing jointly) and gains 
on the sale of other residences will be taxed just like any other sale of a capital 
asset.320 High-income taxpayers also may shelter as much income as middle-
income taxpayers in qualified retirement plans but high-income taxpayers will 
have additional income that exceeds the limits of those vehicles.  
Thus, it is high-income taxpayers who likely more frequently have the choice 
to live off the return from a diversified portfolio of investments like Mr. 
 
315 2001 ABSTRACTS, supra note 307, at 726 tbl.1167; 1998 Survey, supra note 306, at 11 
tbl.5B. 
316 1998 Survey, supra note 306, at 8 tbl.4. 
317 See infra note 323 and accompanying text. For families with income of $100,000 or 
more in 1998 dollars, the percentage that directly owned stocks was 56.6% (median value of 
$55,000), the percentage owning savings bonds was 32.3% (median value of $1,500), the 
percentage owning mutual funds was 44.8% (median value of $65,000), and the percentage 
owning retirement accounts was 88.6% (median value of $93,000). 2001 ABSTRACTS, supra 
note 307, at 726 tbl.1167.  
In 1998, of families with a net worth in the top 10%, 58.9% owned stock directly (with a 
median value of $85,000), 33.1% owned savings bonds (with a median value of $2,000), 
46.4% owned mutual funds (with a median value of $107,000), and 82.9% owned retirement 
accounts (with a median value of $125,000). 1998 Survey, supra note 306, at 11 tbl.5B. In 
addition, 16.9% of these families owned other bonds (with a median value of $100,000). 
318 See I.R.C. §§ 163(a), (h)(3), (4)(A) (2004). In 1995, 96% of the top 1% of taxpayers 
by income owned their principal residence. Carroll, supra note 252, at 28 tbl.2.  
319 I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(C) (2004). The alternative minimum tax generally will apply at 
relatively higher levels of income coupled with relatively high deductions of the type 
disfavored by the tax (which include investment expenses and unreimbursed employee business 
expenses). 
320 See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2004) (defining capital gains preference), I.R.C. § 121 (2004) 
(defining exclusion for certain gains on sales of principal residences), I.R.C. § 1221 (2004) 
(defining capital asset), I.R.C. § 1222 (2004) (defining other terms relating to capital gains and 
losses). 
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Higgins,321 invest in someone else’s small business, as in the bakery example 
discussed above,322 participate in a trade or business by working for others, or 
start a business. By contrast, low-income taxpayers tend to have small amounts of 
capital to invest.323 They also have more limited borrowing prospects, and, when 
they do borrow, it is more costly.324  
 
321 Higgins v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 795, 796 (2d Cir. 1940), aff’d, 312 U.S. 212 
(1940); see also supra text accompanying notes 202–09. 
322 See supra text accompanying notes 146–47. 
323 For families with income under $10,000 in 1998 dollars, the percentage that owned 
stocks was 3.8% (median value of $14,000), the percentage owning savings bonds was 3.5% 
(median value of $1,800), the percentage owning mutual funds was 1.9% (median value of 
$6,000), and the percentage owning retirement accounts was 6.4% (median value of $7,500). 
For families with income of $10,000 to $24,999 in 1998 dollars, the percentage that owned 
stocks was 7.2% (median value of $10,000), the percentage owning bonds was 10.2% (median 
value of $1,000), the percentage owning mutual funds was 7.6% (median value of $26,000), 
and the percentage owning retirement accounts was 25.4% (median value of $8,000). See 2001 
ABSTRACTS, supra note 307, at 726 tbl.1167. The term “family” refers to a group of individuals 
residing in a single household, except that it includes one-person units. See id. at 726. 
In 1998, of the bottom quartile of families (by net worth), 3.1% owned stocks directly 
(with a median value of $700); 7% owned savings bonds (with a median value of $200); 2.1% 
owned mutual funds (with a median value of $1,500); and the percentage of those that owned 
retirement accounts was 18.4% (with a median value of $2,000). 1998 Survey, supra note 306, 
at 11 tbl.5B. 
The 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances sampled 4,309 families. 1998 Survey, supra note 
306, at 2. The sample included 2,927 households with net worth of less than $500,000 and one 
of more than $500 million, which was the amount necessary to be listed in the Forbes 400 
richest Americans for that year. See James M. Poterba & Scott Weisbrenner, The Distributional 
Burden of Taxing Estates and Unrealized Capital Gains at Death, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND 
GIFT TAXATION, supra note 251, at 427–28 (2001). 
324 See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 99 (2000) 
(“It is unfortunate that lower-income Americans do not have access to home equity loans and 
other forms of debt provided at low interest rates. Those seeking access to credit confront a 
variety of alternatives that all appear unattractive when compared to the options available to 
middle-class borrowers.”). 
For families with income of less than $10,000 in 1998 dollars, the percentage with any 
debt was 41.7%, and the median indebtedness was $4,100. For families with income of $10,000 
to $24,999 in 1998 dollars, the percentage with any debt was 63.7 and the median indebtedness 
was $8,000. For both groups, credit card balances and installment debt were the most frequent 
sources of debt but most of the debt amounts were attributable to home-secured debt. See 2001 
ABSTRACTS, supra note 307, at 727 tbl.1169. 
In 1998, for the lowest quartile of taxpayers by net worth, the median indebtedness of 
those families with debt was $8,400. This contrasts with median indebtedness of $28,400 for 
those families with debt in the next highest quartile, and $46,200 median indebtedness for those 
families with debt in the quartile that is the second from the top. 1998 Survey, supra note 306, 
at 21 tbl.11B. 
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It is therefore not surprising, given the incentive structure of the federal 
income tax, that, as the statistics above showed,325 the highest-income taxpayers 
tend to have much of their wealth invested in their own active businesses. Non-
tax factors such as diversification of risk and a desire for liquidity support the fact 
that even these individuals do not invest all of their capital in privately held 
businesses.  
C. The Taxation of A Profitable Business Venture 
The discussion above showed that the federal income tax subsidy for active 
business primarily benefits high-income individuals. It might seem that if the 
start-up venture is successful, a high-income taxpayer would be 
disproportionately burdened with high taxation because of the progressive nature 
of the tax rates. Although this is true in theory, in fact, a high-income individual 
can use a variety of techniques to lower taxation on the up side.326
The key to most of the tax-saving techniques is the option an entrepreneur 
has of incorporating the business, which is valuable for a successful business.327 
First, if used for a business, the corporate form can benefit individual taxpayers 
through income splitting (two or more trips up the graduated rate brackets).328 
Professor Joseph Isenbergh describes how this worked under pre-1986 law, 
which provided graduated tax rates for the first $100,000 of corporate income:329  
The basic idea was for the shareholders of the corporation, if they were also 
directly engaged in its operations, to leave a substantial balance of its income in 
the corporation as retained earnings after the deduction of their salaries. The 
result was two separate trips through the rate brackets for the two separate 
 
325 Of course, the tax system may not be the only reason for this allocation. See Carroll, 
supra note 252, at 2–4. 
326 The average tax rate paid by the top one percent of households (by income) in selected 
years between 1963 and 1995 ranged between approximately twenty and twenty-five percent. 
Carroll, supra note 252, at 27 tbl.1. This percent has not varied much over time because the 
decline in top marginal rates was accompanied by clamping down on tax shelters. Id. at 5. 
327 See Cullen & Gordon, supra note 15, at 2. Until 2003, this option was not tax-saving 
for the successful passive investor because the undistributed income of “personal holding 
companies” was taxed at the top marginal rate applicable to single individuals. See I.R.C. § 541 
(2002). Under a 2003 amendment, the applicable tax rate is 15%, see I.R.C. § 541 (2004), 
which is the same as the 15% maximum rate applicable to most dividends and adjusted net 
capital gain received by individuals. See I.R.C. §§ 1(h)(1)(C), (11) (2004). The amendment to 
section 541 is scheduled to sunset at the end of 2008, as is the 15% rate in I.R.C. § 1(h). See 
Pub. L. 108-27, § 303, 117 Stat. 752, 764 (2003). 
328 Repeated trips generally are precluded by Code section 1561. See I.R.C. § 1561 (2004) 
(defining limitations on certain multiple tax benefits in the case of certain controlled 
corporations), I.R.C. § 1563(a) (2004) (defining controlled group of corporations). 
329 Isenbergh, supra note 115, at 300 n.69 (citing then-current version of I.R.C. § 11(b)). 
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components of the earnings in the year they arose. The gains left in the 
corporation as retained earnings would be exposed to additional taxation upon 
their subsequent distribution to the shareholders, but with the advantage of delay 
in taxation at the shareholder level. Furthermore, a sale of the shares or a 
liquidation of the corporation permitted the value of the retained earnings to be 
captured by shareholders as benignly taxed capital gains. And finally, the shares 
receive a stepped-up tax basis upon the death of their individual owners, which 
permits a sale at fair market value at no income tax cost. From one generation to 
the next, therefore, deferral of shareholder-level tax on retained earnings 
becomes forgiveness.330
Current law taxes the first $50,000 of a corporation’s taxable income at 
15%,331 the next $25,000 at 25%,332 the amount between $75,000 and $10 
million at 34%333 and the remainder at 35%,334 subject to surtaxes for taxable 
income in excess of $100,000 that eventually impose a flat rate of 35%.335 The 
 
330 Id. at 300–301 (footnotes omitted). 
331 I.R.C. § 11(b)(1)(A) (2004). As Professor Lee points out, this is the same rate 
applicable to the working poor. See Lee, supra note 186, at 909. Of course, under current law, 
there is a 10 percent marginal rate applicable to individuals. I.R.C. § 1(i)(1) (2004). 
332 I.R.C. § 11(b)(1)(B). This is currently the marginal rate applicable to middle-income 
taxpayers (between $28,400 and $68,800 in taxable income for an unmarried individual in 
2003). See I.R.C. § 1(i)(2); Rev. Proc. 2002-70, 2002-2 C.B. 845, 846 § 3.01 tbl.3; cf. Lee, 
supra note 186, at 909.  
333 I.R.C. § 11(b)(1)(C). 
334 I.R.C. § 11(b)(1)(D). 
335 See I.R.C. § 11(b)(1). The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, enacted just as this 
Article was going to press in October of 2004, provides a deduction for “domestic production 
activities.” American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108–357 § 102, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004). 
The deduction, once it is fully phased in, and assuming the requirements and limitations of the 
section are met, will amount to 9 percent of the lesser of (1) “the qualified production activities 
income of the taxpayer for the taxable year” or (2) in the case of a corporation, the taxpayer’s taxable 
income for the taxable year (computed without regard to the deduction itself).  See id.; I.R.C. § 
199(a) (2004). The 9 percent deduction is equivalent to a rate cut of approximately 3 percentage 
points. See Committee on Ways and Means, Summary of Conference Report on H.R. 4520, The 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/hr4520/hr4250confreptshortsummary.pdf. 
Immediately prior to 1986, section 11(b) read as follows: 
The amount of the tax imposed by subsection (a) shall be the sum of— 
(1) 15% (16% for taxable years beginning in 1982) of so much of the taxable income as 
does not exceed $25,000;  
(2) 18% (19% for taxable years beginning in 1982) of so much of the taxable income as 
exceeds $25,000 but does not exceed $50,000;  
(3) 30% of so much of the taxable income as exceeds $50,000 but does not exceed 
$75,000;  
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top marginal rate applicable to income of individuals is also 35%,336 but an 
individual nonetheless benefits from shifting income to a corporation because of 
progressivity. In effect, the use of a corporation allows another trip up the 
graduated rate brackets.  
Professor John Lee has pointed out that sixty-one percent of C corporations 
report no income or a loss for tax purposes,337 thirty-seven percent “report, on the 
average, about $40,000, which is taxable at fifteen %”338 while a whopping 
“eighty percent of their owners are taxable at the higher individual income 
brackets . . . .”339 These high-income individuals can benefit from another trip 
through a 15% bracket by shifting up to $50,000 of taxable income to the 
corporation.340  
 
I.R.C. § 11(b) (1985). 
(4) 40% of so much of the taxable income as exceeds $75,000 but does not exceed 
$100,000; plus  
(5) 46% of so much of the taxable income as exceeds $100,000.  
In the case of a corporation with taxable income in excess of $1,000,000 for any taxable 
year, the amount of tax determined under the preceding sentence for such taxable year 
shall be increased by the lesser of (A) 5 percent of such excess, or (B) $20,250. 
336 See I.R.C. § 1(i)(2) (2004). Under current law, the brackets above the zero bracket are 
10%, 15%, 25%, 28%, 33%, and 35%. See I.R.C. §§ 1(i)(1)(A), (2). Of course, employment 
taxes raise the rate effectively applied to wages and salaries. See Lee, supra note 186, at 888 
(referring to then-existing “forty-five percent federal income and wage taxes combined.”). 
There was even more incentive for individuals to use the income-splitting technique 
described in the text when the top individual rate was much higher. Before changes in 1986, the 
top marginal federal income tax rate applicable to individuals was fifty percent. See I.R.C. § 1 
(1985). 
337 Lee, supra note 186, at 906 (citing Joint Comm. on Taxation Staff, Impact on Small 
Business of Replacing the Federal Income Tax, 96 TNT 81-16 at 5 n.8 (1996)) [hereinafter 
Joint Comm. on Taxation Staff]. 
338 Id. at 887; see also id. at 906. 
339 Id. Those brackets ranged from 31 to 39.6% at the time. Id. Professor Lee argued in 
1986: 
Even if the closely held corporation is taxed on its earnings, the ridiculously low 
graduated bottom corporate rates in comparison with the entrepreneur's usually high 
bracket on any additional income coupled with the opportunity to invest the business' net 
profits after minimal or no taxation in capital or section 1231 assets (e.g., plant and land) 
erode most of the credibility to the frequently raised argument that, absent the General 
Utilities exemption for long-term capital and section 1231 assets, the entrepreneur who 
incorporated her or his farm or corner drugstore would be worse off than if he or she had 
operated as a sole proprietor or in a partnership.  
John W. Lee, Capital Gains Exception to the House’s General Utilities Repeal: Further 
Indigestions from Overly Processed Corn Products, 30 TAX NOTES 1375, 1377 n.39 (1986).  
340 See Lee, supra note 186, at 910. 
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Note also that the owner/entrepreneur can manipulate the amount subject to 
corporate versus individual taxation by controlling the pay-out of profits as 
salary. Salary payments are deductible to the corporation,341 and therefore reduce 
the corporation’s taxable income.342 However, salary is taxable to the individual 
at individual rates and subject to employment taxes (most, but not all, of which 
are capped at modest levels of income).343 Thus, in most cases, aggregate 
taxation of the corporation and the entrepreneur will be lowered by failing to pay 
out substantial amounts of profits as salary.344
[T]he tax law has tried to limit the available opportunities to shift reported 
earnings into the corporate tax base. Opportunities for this kind of income 
shifting, however, do remain. At one extreme, consider the situation of a small, 
family-owned corporation. The family has virtually full flexibility to shift 
income between the personal corporate tax bases. Although it can still pay itself 
wages, it can easily retain profits within the firm instead. Retaining earnings 
implies extra corporate taxable income and less personal taxable income in the 
short term, though it probably implies larger realized capital gains when and if 
the firm is sold.345  
 
341 See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2004). 
342 See I.R.C. § 11(a) (2004). 
343 See infra note 349. 
344 See Lee, supra note 186, at 888. 
345 Roger H. Gordon & Joel Slemrod, Are “Real” Responses to Taxes Simply Income 
Shifting Between Corporate and Personal Tax Bases? in DOES ATLAS SHRUG?: THE ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 240, 243 (Joel Slemrod ed., 2000). 
If a corporation with untaxed profits is sold to an individual, then, economically, the price 
should reflect the tax liability of the undistributed dividends, a form of implicit tax. That tax 
will be lower than it would have been before Congress lowered the maximum tax rate on most 
dividends to fifteen percent. I.R.C. § 1(h)(1) (2004) (taxing adjusted net capital gain at rates of 
five percent and fifteen percent), I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) (defining “net capital gain” to include 
“qualified dividend income”); see supra text accompanying notes 22–23. If the corporation is 
sold to another corporation, there should be no implicit tax because a corporate parent 
effectively benefits from the exclusion of dividends through the dividends-received deduction. 
See I.R.C. §§ 243(a)(3), (b) (2004) (allowing a one hundred percent deduction for dividends 
received from a corporation in which it owns at least eighty percent of the shares, by vote and 
by value). 
As Professor Lee points out, the entrepreneur completely avoids double taxation if he dies 
holding the stock. See Lee, supra note 186, at 887–88; I.R.C. § 1014 (2004) (scheduled to 
terminate at the end of 2009, I.R.C. § 1014(f), and reappear in 2011, when the Economic 
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 sunsets, see Pub. L. 107-16, §§ 901(a)(1), 
(b), 115 Stat. 38, 150 (2001)). Of course, holding on to the stock until death requires bearing the 
costs of illiquidity. 
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The entrepreneur also can avoid the double taxation for which the corporate 
form is notorious by failing to pay dividends,346 though that double taxation is 
mitigated by the recent enactment of a 15% top rate on most dividends.347 
Professor Lee has calculated that:  
the splitting of business income between (1) compensation to shareholder-
employees taxed at higher individual income graduated rates and (2) profits left 
in the private C Corporation taxed at the lowest graduated corporate rates 
amounted, for 1993, to an annual tax expenditure or subsidy of $3 to $4 billion 
as to . . . 750,000 profitable small income, mostly private C Corporations.348
A pass-through entity, such as a partnership or limited liability corporation, 
will not accomplish a lowering of the federal income tax liability on profits. The 
idea is to leave most or all of the profits in the corporation, subjecting them to 
only to corporate-level taxation. A growing corporation can justify retaining 
earnings, thereby avoiding not only the tax on dividends but also the imposition 
of the accumulated earnings tax,349 a corporate-level penalty tax. This technique 
also minimizes self-employment taxes because self-employment taxes are 
imposed on salary, not on retained earnings or dividends.350  
 
346 See Lee, supra note 186, at 887–88. 
347 See I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(B) (five percent rate—declining to zero percent in 2008—applies 
to the amount of “adjusted net capital gain” that would otherwise be taxed at rates below 
twenty-five percent), I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C) (fifteen percent rate applies to remaining adjusted net 
capital gain), I.R.C. § 1(h)(3) (defining adjusted net capital gain to include qualified dividend 
income). These provisions are scheduled to sunset at the end of 2008. See Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, 108 Pub. L. 27, §§ 301–303, 117 Stat. 752, 764 (2003). 
348 Lee, supra note 186, at 888.  
349 The accumulated earnings tax only taxes accumulations in excess of reasonable 
business needs. See I.R.C. §§ 531–537 (2004). 
350 Employment taxes aggregate 15.3%. See I.R.C. § 1401(a) (2004) (defining the general 
self-employment tax as 12.4%), I.R.C. § 1401(b) (defining the hospital insurance tax for self-
employed individuals as 2.9%). The self-employed bear the 15.3% directly, see I.R.C. § 1401, 
while employers and employees each bear half of the 15.3%, see I.R.C. §§ 3101, 3111 (2004). 
The bulk of the employment tax is capped based on a wage base of $87,000 for 2003, but the 
2.9% hospital insurance excise tax (generally referred to as the Medicare tax) is not capped. See 
I.R.C. §§ 3101(b), 3111(b), 3121 (providing cap for taxes imposed by sections 3101(a) and 
3111(a)); Publication 15, Employer’s Tax Guide (Including 2003 Wage Withholding and 
Advance Earned Income Credit Payment Tables) (revised Jan. 2003) (2003 wage base), 
available at 2002 TNT 245–50. Because of the lack of a ceiling on the Medicare tax: 
tax planners have spent considerable time and effort over the last five years developing 
strategies for recasting income that might be considered self-employment earnings as 
passive types of income that are excluded from the net earnings from self-employment 
base, and for restructuring the forms of organizations so that earnings may be distributed 
as dividends rather than compensation for services. 
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The federal income tax cost of incorporating a closely held business is 
generally small. The Code facilitates the formation of closely held businesses by 
minimizing the tax burden of contributions of assets to corporations.351 Under 
Code section 351, transferors of property who obtain eighty percent “control” of 
a corporation’s stock (by vote and by value) do not recognize realized gain except 
to the extent of their divestment (the receipt of property other than stock).352
The incorporation also can convert much of the entrepreneur’s profits from 
ordinary income to capital gain. That is, the entrepreneur will now own stock, a 
capital asset. An eventual sale of an ownership interest in the business will 
therefore likely be taxed at preferential capital gains rates.353 In addition, with 
respect to the gain on stock in a small business—already likely subject to the 
capital gains preference—Code section 1202 allows non-corporate taxpayers to 
exclude half of the gain on qualified small business stock354 held for more than 
five years.355 This will result in a net tax rate on the profit of only fourteen 
percent.356
This provision applies to the sale of the business’ stock and may thereby 
seem to encourage divestment. However, it should, in fact, encourage an 
entrepreneur to grow a business once it is incorporated, for three reasons. First, 
whether the corporation qualifies as a “small” business is determined by initial 
 
Dilley, supra note 16, at 81–82.  
351 Contributions to partnerships in exchange for partnership interests also are tax-free. 
I.R.C. § 721(a) (2004). 
352 I.R.C. §§ 351(a), (b) (2004). 
353 See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2004). Section 1202 gain is taxed at a 28% rate. See I.R.C. 
§§ 1(h)(1)(E), (4)(A)(ii). 
354 To constitute “qualified small business stock,” the stock must have been acquired by 
the taxpayer at its original issue, I.R.C. § 1202(c)(1) (2004), the corporation must conduct an 
active business or qualify as a specialized small business investment company, I.R.C. 
§§ 1202(c)(2), (e), and the aggregate gross receipts of the corporation immediately after the 
issuance of the stock cannot exceed $50,000,000, I.R.C. § 1202(d), among other requirements. 
A “small business investment company” is an organization that provides “a source of equity 
capital for incorporated and unincorporated small-business concerns, in such manner and under 
such terms as the small business investment company may fix in accordance with the 
regulations of the Administration.” 15 U.S.C. § 684(a) (2004).  
355 See I.R.C. § 1202. This provision applies only to C corporations. See I.R.C. 
§§ 1202(c)(1), (2)(A). 
356 In addition, a noncorporate taxpayer can “roll over” the gain on qualified small 
business stock held for more than 6 months into another qualified small business by purchasing 
stock in the new qualified small business within 60 days of selling the old business and making 
an election. See I.R.C. § 1045 (2004). 
Of course, a 14% rate no longer looks as favorable now that the general capital gains rate 
has decreased from 20% to 15%. Compare I.R.C. § 1(h)(1) (2002) with I.R.C. § 1(h)(1) (2003). 
However, it remains below the 15% rate a high-income individual experiences with respect to 
both capital gains and dividends. 
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capital—information that is available at the time of the incorporation. Thus, 
incorporators can be fairly confident ex ante that these provisions will apply (and 
can plan so as to make them applicable).357 Measuring smallness on initial 
incorporation does not deter efforts aimed at corporate growth. Second, the fifty-
percent exclusion on the gain side requires a five-year holding period, which 
deters quick divestment; this stands in contrast to the mere year and a day 
minimum holding period of the general capital gains preference.358 Third, 
because the exclusion is a percent of appreciation, every additional dollar of 
growth provides an additional potential tax benefit.359 The taxpayer therefore has 
an additional incentive to continue to grow the enterprise rather than to divest 
relatively early and invest the proceeds elsewhere.  
One study found that entrepreneurship “is heavily concentrated in the top one 
percent of the population” and that if individual income tax rates were cut by five 
percentage points across the board, entrepreneurial activity would drop thirty 
percent overall, but most at the top.360 That study also found that if the lowest 
corporate tax rate were cut from fifteen percent to ten percent, “entrepreneurial 
activity [would] more than double[] . . . in each quantile, and in aggregate.”361 
Part of the effect of such a reduction would be to allow taxpayers other than those 
in the highest brackets to benefit from income-shifting, so it is not surprising that 
this change would increase entrepreneurship even in the lower quantiles. 
Of course, incorporation is itself a risk. What if the business ceases to be 
successful after it is incorporated?362 Even then, the entrepreneur can deflect a 
significant portion of that risk to the federal government. First, the entrepreneur 
can make an election under Subchapter S so that the losses pass through.363 The 
corporation’s losses will then generally be deductible from the other income of 
 
357 Compliance with the active business requirements of section 1202 and 1244 cannot be 
determined ex ante but presumably can be controlled by the stockholders.  
358 See I.R.C. § 1222 (2004). 
359 Of course, with a low capital gains rate, that tax benefit is relatively small. See supra 
note 356.  
360 Cullen & Gordon, supra note 15, at 31. 
361 Id. The quantiles are based on earnings ability and are grouped as follows: 0–70, 70–
80, 80–90, 90–95, 95–99, 99–100. Id. at 50 tbl.3a. 
362 A corporation cannot simply be terminated without treating it as a taxable liquidation. 
See I.R.C. §§ 331, 336 (2004) (defining taxable liquidations). Of course, the business might not 
be liquidated but might be sold or acquired in a non-taxable merger or acquisition. See I.R.C. 
§ 368 (2004) (defining reorganizations).  
363 See I.R.C. §§ 1361, 1363(a) (2004). An empirical study of entrepreneurs’ saving and 
investment decisions noted that, in their sample, forty-nine percent of the businesses were sole 
proprietorships, twenty-four percent were partnerships, fourteen percent were C corporations 
and eleven percent were S corporations. See Gentry & Hubbard, supra note 12, at 6. 
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the entrepreneur (or his spouse),364 subject to any applicable restrictions.365 In 
1996, approximately twenty-eight percent of S elections were made by C 
corporations.366
Second, if the entrepreneur chooses to exit the business by selling it, or if the 
stock becomes totally worthless,367 the usual restrictions on the deductibility of 
capital losses will not apply to the first $50,000 of loss ($100,000 in the case of 
married taxpayers filing jointly) per year with respect to the corporation’s 
stock.368 Thus, the usual basketing of capital losses is eliminated for those 
amounts. This provision, unlike the gain-side provision, applies to S corporations 
as well as C corporations,369 so it can be used in conjunction with the Subchapter 
S election.370 Notice also that the value of the deduction will also reflect the 
entrepreneur’s top marginal rate; it is not matched to the 14% rate applied to gain 
on the sale of a successful small business corporation.371
Thus, not only does the federal income tax operate to deflect some of the risk 
of start-up business to the federal government, it also protects the successful (and 
well-advised) entrepreneur from harsh taxation of profits. The entrepreneur will 
not experience the higher taxation generally applied to labor, but instead will 
benefit from the lower taxation often accorded capital.372  
 
364 The deduction of losses is limited to the shareholder’s basis in stock and debt of the S 
corporation. I.R.C. §§ 1366(d)(1)(A), (B) (2004). 
365 See I.R.C. §§ 1363(a), (b), 1366. The character of items passes through I.R.C. 
§ 1366(b), so, for example, capital losses of the S corporation will be subject to the limitation 
on capital losses at the shareholder level. See I.R.C. § 1211(b) (2004). 
366 Susan Wittman & Robert Grant, S Corporation Returns, 1996, 18 SOI BULL., No. 4, at 
40, 40 (1999), cited in Lee, supra note 186, at 925 n.219. Professor Lee reports: 
[Sixty-eight percent] of C to S conversions for 1987 reported positive income (almost 
two-thirds of the remaining C to S conversions reporting a loss in 1986 also reported a 
loss in 1987). This indicates that perhaps a third of C to S conversions are made in order to 
pass through operating losses otherwise trapped in a C Corporation. 
Lee, supra note 186, at 924 (citing Susan M. Wittman & Amy Gill, S Corporation Elections 
After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 17 SOI BULL., No. 4, at 82, 83 (1998)). 
367 See I.R.C. §§ 165(g)(1), (2) (2004); Treas. Reg. § 1.1244(a)-1(a). 
368 See I.R.C. § 1244 (2004). 
369 See id.; Walter D. Schwidetzky, Is it Time to Give the S Corporation a Proper 
Burial?, 15 VA. TAX REV. 591, 609 n.74 (1996).  
370 However, increases in basis resulting from S corporation income will not increase 
basis for purposes of section 1244. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1244(d)-2(a); John R. Dorocak, I.R.C. 
Section 1244: Current Issues—Advances to Failing Corporations, Guarantees of Third-Party 
Debt, Limited Liability Companies, and S Corporations, 14 VA. TAX REV. 329 (1994). 
371 See supra note 355 and accompanying text. 
372 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Scholars have sometimes argued that capital 
effectively is not taxed. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 2, at 652–53 (arguing that income tax on 
capital often approaches zero, or is at least “limited, relative to the tax planning, compliance and 
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In addition, if the entrepreneur dies holding a profitable business, the estate 
will benefit from more favorable treatment under the estate tax than if the estate’s 
assets consisted of passive investments, presumably because of concerns that 
heirs might be forced to sell a family business in order to pay estate taxes. Estates 
with land used in a business can value it based on its business use373 even if the 
land would be worth more if put to another use, reducing the land’s value for 
estate tax purposes by up to $840,000 for 2003,374 if the land passes to a family 
member who continues to use the land in a trade or business.375 In addition, if the 
value of the decedent’s interest in a closely held business exceeds a thirty-five 
percent threshold, the estate can defer the payment of the portion of the estate tax 
liabilities attributable to the business376 for up to five years,377 paying only 
interest, annually,378 at a rate of two percent.379 After that, the estate can spread 
the payment of that portion of the tax over five more years.380
 
administration costs.”). However, a recent empirical study found that capital does bear tax. See 
Roger Gordon et al., Do We Now Collect Any Revenue From Taxing Capital Income? Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9477 (Feb. 2003), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9477. Specifically, that study found that if new investment were 
allowed to be “expensed” immediately, that would cost the government approximately $90.1 
billion in federal income tax revenue from individuals for 1995. Id. at 6–12. 
373 I.R.C. § 2032A (2004). 
374 See Rev. Proc. 2002-70, 2002-2 C.B. 845, 849 § 3.23. 
375 See I.R.C. §§ 2032A(b)(2), (c), (e)(1). Additional estate tax is imposed if, “within 10 
years after the decedent's death and before the death of the qualified heir,” the heir ceases to use 
the land for a business use or disposes of the land. I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(1).  
Until recently, the Code also allowed an elective estate tax deduction of up to $675,000 for 
“qualified family-owned business interests,” I.R.C. § 2057(a) (2004), so long as the heir 
materially participated in the business after the decedent’s death, see I.R.C. § 2057(f). Section 
2057(f) provided for additional tax if the material participation requirement was not met for a 
period of 10 years following the decedent’s death or until the heir’s death, whichever came 
first. If the full deduction was claimed, the unified credit against the estate tax was reduced to 
$625,000. See I.R.C. § 2057(a)(3)(A). The unified credit amounted to $1 million for 2003. 
I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2004). If a smaller deduction was claimed, the $625,000 was increased by the 
difference up to the otherwise allowable amount. See I.R.C. § 2057(a)(3). The deduction 
terminated on December 31, 2003. See I.R.C. § 2057(j). 
Richard Schmalbeck reports that “in 1997, fewer than 3,200 estates with gross assets of 
less than $5 million, who had any assets categorized as ‘closely-held stock,’ had any net estate 
tax liability at all.” Richard Schmalbeck, Does the Death Tax Deserve the Death Penalty? An 
Overview of the Major Arguments for Repeal of Federal Wealth-Transfer Taxes, 48 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 749, 768 (2000) (citing Barry Johnson & Jacob Mikow, Federal Estate Tax Returns, 
1995–1997, 19 STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 102 (1999)). 
376 See I.R.C. § 6166(a)(2) (2004). 
377 See I.R.C. § 6166(a)(3). 
378 I.R.C. § 6166(f)(1). 
379 I.R.C. § 6601(j) (2004). 
380 See I.R.C. §§ 6166(a)(1), (3). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Although commentators sometimes discuss the federal income tax as if all 
profit-seeking activities are treated similarly, in fact, individuals’ expenses and 
losses face limitations on deductibility that business expenses and losses do not 
face. Part II of this Article showed that, although each of the restrictions may be 
justified individually, together they form a pattern that systematically limits 
individuals’ investment-related deductions. 
These restrictions on deductions violate the “full loss offsets” assumption of 
the Domar-Musgrave model, discussed in Part III, under which an investor can 
increase investment in risky assets without actually increasing his risk (after 
taxes). As Part III of the Article showed, not only is the “full loss offsets” 
assumption critical, but, in the presence of a progressive rate system rather than 
the proportional (flat) tax system assumed by Domar and Musgrave, the critical 
rate is the marginal rate applied to deductions, not income.  
Part IV showed that the distinction in federal tax law between individuals’ 
business and investment activities is not the presence or absence of capital but 
rather the role of labor as a material income-producing factor. By requiring labor 
for an activity to constitute a “trade or business,” the federal income tax system 
rewards individuals’ industrious activity with significantly greater loss offsets—
and therefore decreased risk—than is available for their “passive” earning 
activities. 
The net effect of this systematic distinction in the Code is a subsidy for 
entrepreneurship for high-income individuals with capital and income from labor 
(which may be the spouse’s income) or income that varies from year to year. The 
subsidy is most valuable for high-income individuals, in part because they are the 
ones who will likely have income to invest after taking full advantage of other 
tax-favored activities. High-income individuals almost obtain the largest benefit 
from deducting expenses and losses, because of the progressive nature of the 
federal income tax system. Similarly, high-income individuals obtain the greatest 
benefit from income splitting with a corporation if a start-up business becomes 
successful. 
The tax subsidy for entrepreneurship explored in this Article is likely 
primarily accidental, given how it results from a combination of provisions that 
are scattered throughout the Code and limit deductions from investment activities 
rather than addressing business activities directly. However, the existence of the 
subsidy is not particularly surprising. 
Historians have noted that a “small-business ideology has been present 
throughout American history”381 and politicians recently have proposed small 
business incentive packages in the name of America's “entrepreneurial spirit.”382
 
381 Wilson, supra note 18, at 31 (quoting SMALL BUSINESS IN AMERICAN LIFE 2 (Stuart 
W. Bruchey ed., 1980)). 
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Americans love small business. Despite the notoriously high rate of early failure, 
every year hundreds of thousands of undaunted Americans launch small 
businesses. The folklore of the independent entrepreneur being the backbone of 
American self-reliance and work ethic is a more persuasive argument for 
favorable tax incentives than any reality-based economic consideration.383
Identifying the components of the tax subsidy, many of which are not 
initially obvious, buried as they are in limitations on deductions, is useful because 
it highlights possible side effects of changes in federal income tax law. For 
example, the recently enacted Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2003384 made a number of changes in federal income tax rates applicable to 
individuals that may have the unintended consequence of lowering the incentive 
for entrepreneurship: it lowered individual tax rates, which lowers the advantage 
of deductions and it lowered the tax rate on dividends, which may spur passive 
investment. It also lowered the general rate applicable to adjusted net capital gain 
to fifteen percent from twenty percent.385 That change may be ambiguous in its 
effect because capital gains rates may apply to both investment and business 
activity. However, the change all but eliminated any differential with the fourteen 
percent rate applicable to gain on certain sales of small business corporations.386 
Thus, it will be interesting to see if there are observable differences in 
entrepreneurship trends following the 2003 legislation. 
 
382 Id. (quoting J. Andrew Hoerner, Small Business Incentives: An Eight-Fold Path to 
Who Knows Where?, 49 TAX NOTES 133, 133 (1990)).  
383 Wilson, supra note 18, at 31, 64 (footnotes omitted). Professor Michael Livingston 
makes a related point: 
It is a commonplace that Americans are becoming more risk averse, losing some of 
the adventurous spirit that characterized their ancestors. Yet the idea, if not always the 
reality, of risk taking retains its hold on popular imagination. Tax incentives are an 
expression of this ambivalence: They encourage risk taking while at the same time 
cushioning the relevant risks. Tax subsidies thus perform an incentive function, supporting 
investment in risky activities, but also a communication function, expressing the polity's 
approval of risk taking and providing at least a modest reward to risk takers. 
Livingston, supra note 13, at 183. He adds, “[a]sking government to make us daring has the 
faint whiff of decadence: We demand symbolic affirmation of what we fear we no longer are.” 
Id. at 231. 
384 108 Pub. L. 27, 117 Stat. 752 (2003).  
385 See 108 Pub. L. 27 § 301(a)(2)(A), 117 Stat. 752 (2003); compare I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C) 
(2003) with I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C) (2002). 
386 See I.R.C. § 1202 (2004); see also supra note 355 and accompanying text. 
